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By Lee Byong-chul

Is it now safe to say that the U.S.-North Korea relations have already hit rock bottom? Good bargaining between Washington and Pyongyang has newly kicked off after North Korea turned over to the United States documents related to its nuclear programs.

The documents reportedly number 18,822 pages or 314 volumes in seven boxes. Pyongyang's high-key response was by far the most positive. On top of this, the North had previously agreed to destroy a cooling tower attached to its Yongbyon nuclear facility within 24 hours of the communist country being removed from the U.S. list of terrorism sponsors.

After his trip to North Korea, Sung Kim, director of the U.S. State Department's Korean affairs, did not hide his satisfaction with the negotiators from the North Korean Foreign Ministry as well as the General Department of Atomic Energy on all aspects of the declaration that is to be soon submitted to China, host country of the six-party talks.

The 48-year-old director, born in South Korea, also said in a briefing session that ``I believe these are a complete set of documents for the 5-megawatt reactor and the reprocessing plant.''

Judging from Sung Kim's sanguine remarks over the discussions with the North Korean officials, Pyongyang appears to have closely cooperated with Washington this time, even though there are still some outstanding steps: the discharge of spent fuel from the reactor, the disabling of the control rod machine, and disabling of the fresh fuel rods.

The Bush administration, thus, found no reasons to `look to the left and right' in making a decision to provide 500,000 tons of food aid to the reclusive state on the brink of famine through the World Food Program (WFP) and U.S. nongovernmental organizations, while at the same time, improving the monitoring mechanism for the distribution of the food.

Dana Perino, the White House spokeswoman, told reporters that President Bush ``talks about repeatedly, which is his concern for the humanitarian condition for the people of North Korea, many of whom are starving.''

The decision is a good sign of improving relations between Washington and Pyongyang, given that the conservative Bush administration has to date been outraged by the troubled Kim Jong-il regime's diversion of food aid to the military and political cadres.

The Bush administration's change of North Korea policy includes intentions for boosting its diplomatic legacy before the administration ends its term, whereas North Korea intends to avoid its food crisis and to save time for a `disposable rapprochement' with the Bush administration where its political capital is significantly at a low ebb.

North Korea also understands the nature of politics that the outgoing U.S. President will want to protect his accomplishments from being reversed or undermined and that the incoming President, a Republican or a Democrat, will attempt to expeditiously reverse the policies of the previous President.

In particular, it is well worth noting that North Korea, according to the White House spokeswoman, ``has been open in saying it faces a major shortage in food supplies,'' in that North Korea has rarely released detailed information about trade relations with other countries on a regular basis, to say nothing of its domestic economic situation.

Last April, the WFP called for urgent help to avoid another mass starvation. In response, the U.S. will deliver its first shipment in June, in light of the urgency of North Korea's terrible food crisis and through ``close coordination and extensive consultation with expertise in the South Korean government,'' according to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The conservative South Korean government's de facto low-key decision to provide emergency assistance to North Korea underscores a long-building concern that the frequent food crisis mainly due to natural disasters and mismanagement could put the whole country into tragedy in the long run.

While pledging to take a tougher stance against North Korea particularly regarding the nuclear weapons program and human rights situation, therefore, the Lee Myung-bak government recently enunciated its willingness to provide the North with food aid without a request from North Korea if the food shortage becomes severe.

Seoul has previously made it clear that Pyongyang must make a formal request for food. The South Korean government's slight change of position toward North Korea is shaped by its own concerns: the possibility that Seoul may again be sidelined diplomatically in the course of Washington-Pyongyang dialogue as the Kim Young-sam government had had a similar experience with the Clinton administration.

Yet it is highly unlikely that the North would request assistance first. The North would, instead, pursue a ridiculous and contradictory tactic of talking with the U.S. while blocking the South with the hope of influencing the U.S.'s North Korea policy.

Over the past 10 years, the North has continually stressed the spirit of ``Our Koreans Together'' whenever it needs help from the South but the new government's conservative North Korea policy, willingly or not, has led the Kim regime to move closer to the Bush administration that had maliciously called North Korea one of the axis of evil regimes.

Doubtlessly, North Korea expects that the U.S. may be able to twist South Korea's arm at any time with regard to food assistance and inter-Korean cooperation. The Lee government, with its repeated gestures based on a sophisticated strategy of engagement to win favors from North Korea, must be in a dilemma about the formality of the assistance while veering off the previous regimes' course.

Even though President Lee declared his unconditional assistance over the humanitarian matters, the current South Korean government has its own grounds for reluctance about a rapid and out-of-focus assistance to North Korea.

The liberal regimes, by contrast, for 10 years have managed to put inter-Korean relations in the unique position where the two Koreas were not liked, not feared and not respected.

Lee Byong-chul is senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Cooperation (IPC), a nonpartisan policy advisory body based in Seoul. He can be reached at bcleebc@gmail.com.