Dancing With the Devil

By Lee Jeong-hoon

In early December 2007, the Bush administration showed a change in foreign policy toward North Korea by sending a letter to Kim Jong-il, leader of North Korea which the U.S. president once called one of the ``axis of evil'' countries.

Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's neo-realistic approach to the North Korea nuclear issue will be the touchstone in rescuing President George W. Bush from the swamp of the Iraq War whether it succeeds in terminating the nuclear issue or not.

In this context, the content of Bush's letter is raising keen international interest. What is the message that President Bush wrote and what lies beneath it: a complete denuclearization of North Korea? Well, I doubt it.

Let us examine neo-realism, which correlates with current U.S. foreign policy. Kenneth Waltz, an international politics scholar, defines neo-realistic diplomacy as occurring when every state acts rationally to maximize its relative national gains in the anarchic international system.

Ironically, every country in the six-party nuclear talks, to some degree, has something to gain from the presence of the North Korean nuclear state. Each country is playing the `give and take' game with one another while maximizing its own benefits in the negotiation process.

What does President Bush really want to achieve from the complex group dynamics in the six-party nuclear talks? Here are some assumptions for the U.S. to seek its maximum interests.

In one case, North Korea might ignore its pledged agreement of the six-party talks and escalate tension as it did in the first and second nuclear crises (in 1993 and 2002). Then, Japan and South Korea could not help but start to develop nuclear weapons, which would cause a nuclear arms race in the region. It is the worst-case scenario for all countries.

Conversely, what if North Korea relinquishes its nukes completely and establishes diplomatic relations with the U.S.? Although it is an ideal end-state for the negotiation, it will make the U.S. lose the justification for militarizing Japan to contain Chinese expansion. Moreover, its economic benefit from the arms sales in the region would dwindle.

The last assumption emerges from this question: Why is the U.S. concerned, unless North Korea's nuke is a direct lethal threat to its homeland security? The biggest concern of Washington is the proliferation of nuclear technology to other countries like Syria.

For North Koreans, abandoning their nuclear card is the same as admitting the collapse of its regime. Therefore, North Korea would be more likely to delay its obligation to declare its nuclear program to maintain an advantage in the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with the U.S.

In this regard, Gary Samore, vice president of the Council of Foreign Relations, notes, ``It is a wise compromise … it was better to accept a limited agreement which stabilized the situation and capped North Korea's production of plutonium, as opposed to holding out for a much more desirable but unattainable agreement that would require full disarmament.''

With the last assumption, the possible halfway house between President Bush and Kim will have been reached. There is a possibility that the U.S. might tacitly permit North Korea's limited nuclear power to the extent that North Korea cannot export nuclear tactics to other countries.

In that case, North Korea could continue its role of creating and maintaining enough tension in the region to unofficially aid the U.S. Isn't it the perfect neo-realistic solution?

President Bush served the ball of nuanced meaning of his compromise into Kim's court. Now, we will again judge Kim on whether he is an eligible rational counterpart to play on the court of `give and take' realism.

Lee Jeong-hoon is attending a master's program of international affairs and national security at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University. He can be reached at rokking@hanmail.net.