By Andy Jackson
As soon as Cheong Wa Dae announced August 8 that a second inter-Korean summit was going to take place only three weeks later, politicians began tripping over each other in an attempt to curry Pyongyang's favor.
Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung hinted that Seoul may be willing to give in to Pyongyang's demands that the Northern Limit Line (NLL), which marks South and North Korean controlled waters in the West Sea, be shifted south.
In a meeting with National Assembly members on August 10, Lee said, ``I don't think that the NLL is basically a territorial concept." despite the fact that the NNL has been the de facto maritime border between the Koreas since 1953.
The Ministry of Defense postponed the Hwarang exercise war games set to take place late this month to ``create an atmosphere for a successful inter-Korean summit."
Not to be outdone by military and possible territorial concessions, there is talk of massive economic aid to North Korea following the summit.
Former Prime Minister and current presidential candidate Lee Hae-chan, who is a confidant of President Roh Moo-hyun, told reporters that plans were in the works for major economic aid projects costing tens of billions of dollars.
While details have not been worked out, the possible projects include road and power line construction, four Gaeseong-style industrial complexes and two or more tourist traps like the one at Mt. Geumgang.
Administration officials claim that much of the economic aid will come from international lending institutions and private funding. However, the high risk associated with investing in North Korea dictates that the bulk of the funds will come either directly or indirectly from the South Korean government.
Then there is the matter of how the aid money would be spent. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Economy Kwon O-kyu said that aid packages for North Korea would be sent ``transparently."
We can try to have faith that the Roh administration will work the summit and any deals reached at it with some degree of transparency, but its conduct so far does not inspire confidence.
While Cheong Wa Dae was vigorously denying throughout the summer that it was secretly seeking a second summit, National Intelligence Service chief Kim Man-bok was in clandestine meetings with his North Korean counterpart in Pyongyang doing just that.
So the summit delay is a golden opportunity for South Korea's body politic to more calmly assess the upcoming summit and to find out exactly what Roh's plans for the summit are.
Hopefully the National Assembly will take advantage of the delay to step up and require some accountability from President Roh during his sojourn in Pyongyang and to temper the exuberance of his more excitable staff members.
The best way to do that would be to make the administration present what plans they have to the National Assembly. Knowing that some secrecy before negotiations is necessary, Cheong Wa Dae could present its ideas to National Assembly members in informal closed meetings, although open meetings would certainly do more to allay worries about their plans.
The exact format of the presentation is not important so long as it includes assemblymen from all parties who are ready to ask the administration serious questions about its summit plans. A partial list of questions could include:
_ How much money does the administration plan to offer to Pyongyang? What concessions will it ask for in return for all that money?
_ Where will the money come from to pay for the proposed projects? Tax increases? Defense cuts? Debt?
_ Will workers at the proposed new industrial complexes be paid directly or will employers continue to be forced to send dollars to the Pyongyang regime?
_ Is the administration considering giving in to Pyongyang's demands on the NLL? What concessions will it seek in return?
_ Will the administration try to do anything to improve the abysmal human rights situation in North Korea?
Whatever plans Cheong Wa Dae has, it must be honest with the public about its costs before it inks a deal with Pyongyang.
It must strictly control how all aid money is spent to prevent any funds from financing North Korea's ``military first'' policy. Even a small portion of tens of billions of dollars can buy a lot of rocket fuel and mustard gas.
The presidential office must also learn to stop treating reciprocity like a dirty word. It is not too much to ask for Pyongyang for concessions in exchange for all the aid that Cheong Wa Dae is considering giving to it.
How about releasing some political prisoners? What about taking down some of the missiles aimed at Seoul?
The summit delay gives government officials six more weeks to plan. Let's hope they use it wisely.
Andy Jackson teaches American government in the Lakeland College bridge program at Ansan College, Gyeonggi Province. He can be reached at andyinrok@lycos.com.