By Yi Wan-sik

The financial issues of the BDA (Banco Delta Asia) have been resolved between North Korea and the United States. Both countries reached an agreement that North Korea should freeze its nuclear programs in response to economic assistance including oil supply by the U.S.
Therefore, the international community pays attention to the deal between the two countries. If such obligations as inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into its nuclear facilities and completely freezing of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor are implemented smoothly, it is expected that South Korea would be more willing to support bilateral cooperation with North Korea.
However, public opinion in South Korea seems to be against the engagement policy pursued by the Seoul administration: a fragile basis for the current policy.
The primary aim in pursuing the engagement policy is to conduce North Korea to become a responsible member of the international community and help construct a self-sufficient economy. The engagement policy was initiated for the purpose of regime change in the North, as a result of which, the Stalinist state is expected to be reunified with its neighboring brother, South Korea, in the name of liberal democracy.
Since the late 1990s, the businesses in North Korea have been very restricted and limited in scale, such as the Mt. Geumgang tour, separated family reunions, and Gaeseong industrial complex, all of which have been developed by the Sunshine policy.
However, despite the South's one-sided efforts put into the businesses, there never was any "promised" regime change in return by the North. Instead, economic aid has been used primarily by high-ranking politicians for personal use and by the military for developing nuclear programs. Thus, antipathy against the engagement policy grows more and more in the people's sentiment due to North Korea's political corruption and South Korea's blind support.
In addition, assertion over essential conditions for abolition of the National Security Act and withdrawal of USFK (United States Forces Korea) from the hosting country (South Korea) in bilateral talks with the North, suspicion about militaristic diversion of relief supplies, and nuclear test operations also stirs up the growth of antipathy in the South.
Hostility like this in the South occurs because the government has not put adequate efforts to bring about public consensus for its political policies.
It seems that public trust should be recovered at this moment since the promotion of businesses with North Korea is crucial in the process of reconciliation. However, without public support, progress will not be successful.
Here are two suggestions for recovering public trust. First, ensuring transparency in the pursuit of the policy is necessary. Secretive transactions, as was the case with summit talks with North Korea in 2000, should never happen again.
Thus, the process and consequences of promotion of businesses must not only be well-managed but also made public at all stages by the government and the media.
In addition, the government must promote its project legally and politically on a public-centered basis. Performance of political policies has always been too government-centered, and now it is high time to change its inertia from populist-based policy to a more public-based policy.
In conclusion, only establishment of principles and consistent political enforcement can accomplish the recovery of public trust. Discretion depending on situations ultimately deepens on-going public distrust. Therefore, the government is advised to pool every effort with society in order to establish the desirable policy mechanism.
The writher has just graduated from high school in Canada, and now lives in Seoul. He is interested in international issues.