Missed Nuclear Deadline Shows Long, Tough Road Ahead
We don't need to quote various old sayings here to stress the importance of a good start in doing things. It is therefore all the more regrettable North Korea's denuclearization process did not reach the first step by the agreed deadline of Saturday. Each country might have something to say about it, but every one of them is responsible in different ways. The biggest responsibility, however, lies with Pyongyang, which also has the most to lose from its inaction.
Looking back, it appears all the six countries were just busy wrapping up a deal rather than discussing its detailed implementation. The United States should have been more careful to have better looked at the international financial practices. China can hardly be said to have been eager to persuade some domestic banks to take up the fund transaction, either. Japan did not join the deal from the start, citing the North's abduction of its people. South Korea was too hasty in its preparation to send economic aid, wasting taxpayers' money.
North Korea, however, did not have to make all its partners fools by not taking the initial action of shutting down its plutonium reactor and inviting international inspectors back. By doing so, Pyongyang could have won the trust and sympathy of international society. But the Stalinist regime opted for the ``action-for-action'' course in its strictest sense, thus reconfirming its inflexibility and even raising doubts about its sincerity. Others made technical blunders, but Pyongyang's were substantial _ and intentional.
Foreign Minister Song Min-soon said that what matters most is not the time limit, but the implementation of the accord. As seen in the case of the Agreed Framework in 1994, however, repeated missing of deadlines could put the accord itself into a coma. The action-for-action principle may have to be kept, but without confidence in one another's intentions, the Feb. 13 agreement is unlikely to go anywhere. It would be equally meaningless here to argue whether Washington is responsible for the safe remittance of the funds.
Pyongyang's seeming disinterest in meeting the deadline has already backfired, with Seoul moving to call off the provision of heavy oil. In Washington, the North's inaction has sharply reduced the doves' maneuvering room, with hardliners criticizing the Bush administration for being tamed by Pyongyang instead of taming it. One or two more failures to keep to agreed schedules would increase the U.S. hawks' calls for revoking the landmark deal and returning to strong-arm tactics.
Fortunately for Pyongyang, its partners in the deal have decided to give it another chance. But time is pressing for the reclusive regime, which should act by mid-week at the latest. One of the strongest _ and weakest _ points of North Korean strategy is its undue adherence to bilateral accords, even verbal ones, with Washington. Pyongyang must know, however, the Feb. 13 deal was a multilateral one and should act accordingly.