ED When resources become weapons

An aerial view shows the Mountain Pass rare earth mine in California’s Mojave Desert in 2024. Yonhap

China’s decision to brandish resources as a geopolitical weapon against Japan has once again set off alarm bells across Northeast Asia. By announcing a sweeping ban on exports to Japan of so-called “dual-use” items — materials that can serve both civilian and military purposes — Beijing has made clear that economic interdependence will not restrain it when core political and security interests are at stake. Although rare earths were not explicitly named in the official announcement, Chinese state media has reported that export licensing for rare earths and other strategic minerals is being tightened. The message is unmistakable: China is prepared to choke off access to critical materials that underpin advanced industries.

The move is widely seen as retaliation for remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggesting possible Japanese involvement in a Taiwan contingency. Rare earths, strategic minerals and key substances for semiconductors and batteries are indispensable to Japan’s industrial base, and China dominates the global supply, accounting for more than 70 percent of worldwide production. With Japan relying on China for more than half of its rare earth imports, Beijing has deliberately targeted a known vulnerability. Analysts estimate that a three-month disruption alone could inflict losses running to trillions of yen, a pressure tactic aimed at stirring domestic backlash against Tokyo’s security posture.

This is not a bilateral issue confined to China and Japan. Of far greater concern is Beijing’s declaration that it will not tolerate using third countries to bypass their controls. Materials of Chinese origin that reach Japan via intermediaries will also fall under scrutiny, effectively amounting to a secondary boycott.

This places Korea squarely within the blast radius. Korean firms that import Chinese raw materials, process them and export them for use in manufacturing in Japan could find themselves exposed to punitive measures. Given the dense linkage of Korean and Japanese supply chains, disruptions in one country inevitably ripple through the other.

The timing of China’s announcement further sharpens its strategic implications. The export controls were unveiled during President Lee Jae Myung’s state visit to China, which is difficult to dismiss as a coincidence. At a joint appearance, Beijing urged Seoul to “stand on the right side of history,” language that sounded less like diplomacy than a warning. China’s pattern is by now familiar: When it perceives challenges to its “core interests,” particularly Taiwan, it responds with overt economic coercion. Countries with policies or alliances Beijing opposes may also face retaliation.

For Korea, the stakes are especially high. Nearly 80 percent of its rare earth imports come from China, and more than half of its so-called “absolute dependency” items — products overwhelmingly from on a single source — are Chinese in origin. Korea has already learned, at considerable cost, how fragile such dependence can be. Japan’s 2019 export restrictions on semiconductor and display materials, followed by China’s sudden curbs on urea exports in 2021 that triggered a nationwide shortage of diesel exhaust fluid, were stark reminders that supply chains can be weaponized with little warning.

The lesson from China’s latest move is that strategic complacency is no longer an option. In an era of geoeconomics, supply chains are inseparable from national security. Diversifying sources of rare earths and strategic minerals must therefore be treated as an urgent national priority. Partnerships with resource-rich countries such as Australia, Canada and Vietnam should be expanded, long-term procurement contracts strengthened and strategic stockpiles increased to cushion short-term shocks.

At the same time, Korea must invest aggressively in recycling and reprocessing technologies that allow rare earths and critical minerals to be recovered from used batteries, electronics and industrial waste. Building a viable “urban mining” ecosystem is not merely an environmental goal; it is a strategic imperative that can reduce external vulnerability over time.

Diplomacy, too, must be guided by clear principles and sober realism. Maintaining stable relations with China remains important, but stability cannot exist with one-sided dependence. Only by reinforcing the weakest links in its supply chains can Korea ensure that no external power can casually turn economic leverage into political coercion. In today’s strategic landscape, resilience is not a luxury. It is the price of sovereignty.