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Yoo Euy-sang, ambassador-at-large for geographical naming / Korea Times photo by Choi Won-suk
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"Justification and Practical Interests of Korean Diplomacy toward Japan"
By Oh Young-jin
Sometimes history can feel as close to reality as the present.
Such is the case with Korea’s 14-year effort to extract reparations from Japan for its 1910-45 colonial occupation.
In the lead-up to the signing of the treaty to reset their relations in 1965, Korea was forced to settle for less than what it wanted because it was neither strong enough to have its voice heard nor smart enough to persuade others in the world how the law of the jungle worked in this part of the world.
Ambassador Yoo Euy-sang retraces the process of the 14-year negotiations in his recent book, “Justification and Practical Interests of Korean Diplomacy toward Japan,” forcing us to confront the question: Have we grown strong enough to decide our fate?
The ambassador does not try to answer the question in his book but it is inevitable to find similarities between now and then. Some facts Yoo puts forward gives a chilling déjà vu, making one wish sincerely that history will not repeat itself.
“The treaty is not just the result of the two countries’ negotiations but is part of a bigger picture of global politics,” said the ambassador, a Japan expert with two tours in Japan and director of Japan affairs, during a recent interview.
Now working as ambassador at large for naming geography, he said his book is a tribute to the diplomats who did their best on limited resources, calling the treaty “not the best but still an achievement.”
He is not wide of the mark but it is still deplorable to be reminded that Korea did not have much say in setting its own course.
Korea was not even included in a group of nations that were entitled to compensation from Japan.
The rationale was that its provisional government’s 1941 declaration of war against Japan was not recognized. Japan’s claim that Korea did not fight for independence and was liberated as a colony as the result of its World War II defeat was, by and large, accepted by the United States and other allied nations.
Still, Korea had high hopes for gaining justice over Japan’s illegitimate annexation but those hopes were dashed by the onset of the Cold War, pitting the U.S. against the Soviet Union. Initially, the victor nations wanted to force Japan to pay heavily in reparations and restitution to the point of depriving it of all its abilities to wage war again. Perhaps adding to the shift was the experience of World War II that saw Germany rise up in arms in anger over unbearable war penalties imposed on it at the end of World War I. Last but not least, the U.S. and other leading victorious nations were colonial powers like Japan, with their world views likely similar to each other.
In 1947, Ambassador Edwin Pauley, head of the U.S. Reparations Mission to Japan, made a tangible suggestion to the effect that Japan should be rebuilt so as to use it as the bulwark against the southward advance of the communists.
The communist takeover of China proper was complete in 1949. The following year, the three-year Korean War started as the Soviet-backed North Korea invaded the South.
It is notable that this old Cold War reset of the regional order is still valid perhaps, except for the Soviets being replaced by China vis-à-vis the United States. Japan is happy to be obliging the U.S. request to join in an effort to contain China in return for allowing it to regain its ability to wage war.
History shows a militarized Japan often attacking its neighbors. It is natural that Korea is worried but what can it do to stop Japan? Is Korea as helpless now as it was then? Or is it strong enough now so that others will listen to its concerns?
In the Cold War context, the U.S. virtually freed Japan from colonial war compensation, encouraging Korea to settle for assets left behind by Japan. A quoted estimate showed 90 percent of the assets in Korea belonged to Japan.
The U.S. military rule in Korea sold some of those assets to finance its operations.
There were a couple of interesting anecdotes. First, as the reparations negotiations began, Japan demanded Korea pay for damages done to its assets in Korea during the Korean War, a shrewd move aimed at winning an advantageous position over Korea. Second, Britain opposed Korea’s entry to the list of 48 signatories to the Peace Treaty with Japan in San Francisco in 1951. Britain inexplicably cited the exclusion of communist China.
Then, what about the ongoing North Korean challenge?
Is it déjà vu? Many claim the U.S. and China are making all the decisions and South Korea is being pushed to the margins. Or are they too stuck in the past to appreciate how big Korea has grown in strength and wisdom? In the thick of the rapidly developing North Korean nuclear issue it is hard to tell for sure, but it is important to keep asking ourselves these questions to find the answers on which our future may depend.
Lastly, the book contains a surprise remark made by Park Chung-hee, the father of current President Park Geun-hye. Before starting talks with Japan after his successful May 16, 1961, coup, he said: “Expecting Japan to apologize for the past and come to the negotiating table with more sincerity doesn’t fit this age. I don’t think that’s the way we can normalize our relations. I think that it is wise to let bygones be bygones and establish diplomatic ties as long as neither of us incurs big losses.” The irony is that today, no leader in his or her right mind would dare make such a remark. Does it mean that the two countries are continuing on a perpetual circle without any chance of making peace with each other?
Just by raising all these questions, the book is worth reading in searching where our nation stands now and where it should go.
Oh Young-jin is The Korea Times’ chief editorial writer. Contact him at foolsdie5@ktimes.com.