InterviewKorea risks losing Gulf defense deals by doing 'nothing' in Hormuz crisis, expert says

Jang Ji-hyang, a principal fellow and director of the Center for Regional Studies of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies / Courtesy of Asan Institute for Policy Studies

Korea risks undermining its defense export ambitions in the Middle East if it fails to support key Gulf partners during the current conflict, a Middle East expert warned, arguing that trust built in times of crisis, not just technology, determines future arms deals.

Jang Ji-hyang, a principal fellow and director of the Center for Regional Studies at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, said Seoul has focused too narrowly on its alliance with the United States and its role as a middle power, while overlooking its strategic ties with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

“Many claim Korea should consider the Korea-U.S. alliance and take a responsibility as a middle power country, but what we are missing here is Korea’s relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia,” Jang said in a phone interview with The Korea Times, Wednesday.

Seoul holds a special strategic partnership with the UAE and a future-oriented strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia — yet is doing "nothing" while both countries endure the hardships of war, she said, likening Korea's stance to that of a "thief" toward its Gulf allies.

"There is a high chance that those Gulf nations, which are so surprised by the current situation, will go on a massive arms-buying spree after the end of this war. They will not buy arms from Korea if Seoul keeps pretending nothing is happening," she said. "Selling arms is not simply selling good functional weapons, but about long-built trust, which European nations are already demonstrating to the Gulf nations by sending missiles.”

When asked about sending Korean warships to the Strait of Hormuz, she anticipated that Korea would likely follow Japan's pattern, such as sending a minesweeping unit only after a ceasefire.

Her remarks came as U.S. President Donald Trump asks countries to join the U.S.-Israel war with Iran and help reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the key passage of energy, which Tehran has effectively closed. Negotiations between Washington and Tehran are reportedly ongoing, though Iran has rejected a 15-point proposal from the U.S. centered on curbing Iran's nuclear program.

Below is an excerpt of The Korea Times’ interview with Jang, edited for clarity and readability.

This handout natural-color image, acquired through MODIS on NASA's Terra satellite, Feb. 5, shows the Gulf of Oman and the Makran region, center, in southern Iran and southwestern Pakistan, the Strait of Hormuz, left, and the northern coast of Oman. AFP-Yonhap

Q. Should Korea send warships to the Strait of Hormuz?

A. We need to provide some help. And I wish Korea would stop talking about rebuilding and defense export when countries are hit hard by the war. Most people talk about the troop deployment issue — 99 percent of the reasoning is about the Korea-U.S. alliance, and the remaining 1 percent concerns how we, as a middle power, should act in the public interest as part of the global community. But for me, beyond that, there’s also our close relationship with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which is another factor worth considering.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been laying low but they were hit hard by the attack. So they are serious about joining a Hormuz operation. The UAE, in particular, announced that it would take part in the war. So we need to consider the relationships with the U.S. — we can’t just act as if nothing has happened.

Q. What will be the cost of not sending the troops to the Strait of Hormuz?

A. Our defense exports might not proceed as planned for the Gulf nations, or even fail in the future. Once the war ends, Gulf countries — extremely startled by recent events — will likely spend enormous amounts to build missile interception systems. When we tell them “buy Korean arms,” they will not. Defense deals are not just about a product’s capability. It is about building trust and a relationship. European countries are already making visible efforts to show it in that regard.

Q. Do you think Korea’s diplomatic response has been appropriate?

A. I don’t think so. Is there a consistent policy stance? We keep talking about postwar reconstruction projects and defense exports when they are at war. It’s embarrassing.

Our defense export competitors like France and the U.K. are at least offering lip service to the UAE and Saudi Arabia while sending fighter jets. Meanwhile, we’re doing practically nothing and that’s worrying. Officially, Korea and the UAE and Saudi Arabia are supposed to be exceptionally close — even Korea’s Akh unit is deployed in the UAE — yet we’ve done nothing in this situation.

When the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile system) was withdrawn from Seongju, North Gyeongsang Province, there was talk that it would be relocated to the UAE or Saudi Arabia. When the THAAD was being pulled out, we could have said something like, “Yes, this system is leaving Korea, but don’t worry — our security remains strong. Moreover, it will be used to help defend a country with whom we have a close partnership.” Even that level of statement would have shown partial solidarity, like what France or Australia has done.

Q. Do you expect a formal U.S. request for Korean troops and how should Seoul respond? The government says it is in close discussion with relevant countries.

A. In any case, the U.S. and Iran are said to be conducting very close and productive negotiations over five days — at least that buys us some time. If those talks fail, however, there seems to be a plan for the U.S. to take control of the Strait of Hormuz area. In that case, there will likely be U.S. pressure on Korea to contribute forces to help lift the blockade.

I’m not sure how far that would go, but if the situation worsens, we might have to respond to the U.S. request. In 2022-2023, when the multinational coalition force launched operations in the Red Sea, Korea opted out. We only agreed to expand the operational scope of the Cheonghae Unit from the Gulf of Aden to the Strait of Hormuz — claiming that it would operate independently, without joining the coalition — partly because of limited naval capability. We asked for understanding then, but this time the situation seems far more serious.

If ceasefire negotiations don’t go well and the U.S. occupies Iran's Kharg Island to lift the blockade, I think in this case we should seriously consider a deployment. From a geopolitical perspective, taking into account the Korea-U.S. alliance and our responsibilities as a middle power in the multinational context, I think about Korea’s relationships with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

The UAE has been the only Gulf country to openly declare participation in the U.S.-led Hormuz operation. If Korea is deeply interested in defense and nuclear energy cooperation with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, when they’re in such a difficult situation, even a small gesture of support from us would be helpful later — especially for contracts in defense exports and nuclear power projects.

Pieces of missiles and drones recovered after Iran's strikes are displayed during a press briefing by the United Arab Emirates government in Abu Dhabi, March 3. AFP-Yonhap

Q. How does Japan's more proactive stance on the Hormuz issue affect Korea's calculus?

A. Japan has indeed taken an active stance in coordination with the U.S., as it often does. Japan has long-standing Middle East policies, a strong record of humanitarian engagement and well-established relations with various countries, including Iran. There’s even a hotline between their foreign ministers. Back during Trump’s first term, then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe personally carried a letter from Trump to meet with Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei to discuss a potential nuclear deal.

For Korea, our pattern has often been to watch what Japan does and then follow it. But this time, seeing Japan act so proactively makes it harder for us to just “read the room” and do the bare minimum as before.

Q. Do you think Iran will take a ceasefire deal?

A. Iran is likely to drag things out because it will be very hard for Tehran to accept all six of the conditions Trump has suggested. Still, I think talks will probably continue, and Iran will keep pushing for negotiations on its own terms.

Iran will table extensive demands, as when they had enriched uranium up to 20 percent purity, they demanded more. But now reaching up to 60 percent, Iran would want to achieve more.

Q. Some Koreans have expressed sympathy for Iran. How do you view that and what is actually happening inside the country?

A. I understand the emotional impulse, as Koreans tend to sympathize with the underdog and there is a strong dislike of Trump. But I find the open support for Iran's Revolutionary Guard genuinely shocking. These are the same people who massacred tens of thousands of their own citizens in January and are now firing drones indiscriminately into neighboring countries as if there were no tomorrow.

People here often reduce it to a simple frame — the U.S. and Israel are bullying poor Iran, so we side with Iran — without looking at the internal dynamics. The Revolutionary Guard is far weaker than some imagine. Much of its top leadership has been killed, its legitimacy is extremely fragile and after the bloody crackdown in January, the younger generation has turned against it.

The Iranian regime has threatened to shoot ordinary demonstrators on sight and U.S. and Israeli airstrikes continue, so protesters simply cannot come out of their homes. There is a real possibility for democratization in Iran; the young generation has a deep longing for democracy and this war became a trigger for that.

Vehicles drive under billboards showing portraits of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, foreground, and his son Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, his successor, along a highway in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday. AP-Yonhap

Q. Do you think the war will be escalated?

A. I don’t really see a high chance that this will escalate into a full-scale Middle East war. Both sides are already talking about a ceasefire and there have clearly been contacts from the Iranian side as well, while Trump, facing rising oil prices and negative domestic public opinion, did not intend a long war but needed a breakthrough.

Iran’s air defenses are being penetrated daily, and Israeli airstrikes continue, so even the hard-liners need some kind of escape hatch and time-buying mechanism, which is why talk of negotiations and a ceasefire has emerged. The U.N. Security Council is already considering a resolution, backed by more than 100 countries, on securing the Strait of Hormuz and condemning attacks and blockades there.

If Saudi Arabia and the UAE were to join the war, however, things could quickly spiral out of control, so the Gulf nations are suppressing it. These states, which have long promoted themselves as symbols of safety, stability, openness and globalization — think Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha — actually tried to dissuade Washington when they were told in advance that the U.S. was preparing for war, yet even after the U.S. and Israel went ahead, they did not openly criticize the U.S.

Only when Iran began striking Gulf energy facilities and civilian commercial targets did their anger boil over, but even now, they are calibrating their response very carefully instead of rushing into a region-wide war.