Xi's planned Pyongyang visit reflects China’s influence bid, NK's nuclear ambitions

Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspect an honor guard during a farewell ceremony at Pyongyang International Airport in Pyongyang, in this June 21, 2019, photo, released from the Korean Central News Agency. Yonhap

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit to Pyongyang is drawing attention not only as his first trip to North Korea in seven years, but also because it reflects the different strategic goals Beijing and Pyongyang hope to pursue through closer ties.

Xi was scheduled to arrive Monday for a two-day visit — his first to the North Korean capital since June 2019 — coming nine months after he met North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Beijing during events marking the 80th anniversary of China's victory in World War II.

Analysts say Beijing is seeking to reassert its influence over North Korea at a time when Pyongyang has deepened military cooperation with Russia and accelerated the expansion of its nuclear arsenal.

Pyongyang, meanwhile, appears intent on using the summit to widen diplomatic space for its claim to permanent status as a nuclear-armed state.

Seoul has publicly expressed hope that Beijing will play a constructive role in issues related to the Korean Peninsula. The Ministry of Unification has likewise said it hopes Xi’s visit will contribute to peace and coexistence in Northeast Asia.

Analysts, however, say the summit is likely to be driven more by strategic calculations than by prospects for diplomatic breakthroughs.

Yang Moo-jin, a distinguished professor at the University of North Korean Studies, described the visit as less a ceremonial goodwill trip than an opportunity to revive and deepen China-North Korea cooperation.

“Rather than a simple friendship visit, it is closer to a turning point for restarting bilateral cooperation,” Yang said, predicting that Pyongyang would showcase the relationship through lavish state ceremonies and extensive domestic propaganda.

North Korea has already begun preparations for a large-scale welcoming ceremony in central Pyongyang. During Xi’s previous visit in 2019, the North staged an elaborate reception that included mass rallies, military honors and a newly constructed state guesthouse reserved for the Chinese leader.

Many analysts view the timing of the visit through the lens of North Korea’s growing alignment with Russia.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, tours a newly operational nuclear material production facility in this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency, Thursday. Yonhap

Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said Beijing appears to be moving beyond a passive approach toward North Korea and adopting a more active strategy for managing relations with Pyongyang.

According to Hong, North Korea’s growing strategic value — driven by its advancing nuclear capabilities and closer ties with Moscow — has increased the need for China to maintain influence over developments on the Korean Peninsula.

Kim Yeoul-soo, head of the Security Strategy Office at the Korea Research Institute for Military Affairs, offered a similar assessment.

“China likely concluded that North Korea had moved too far toward Russia and felt it needs to pull Pyongyang back closer to its side,” Kim said.

Pyongyang has signaled its own priorities clearly. On Sunday, Kim Yo-jong, the North Korean leader's sister and a key policy voice, reiterated that the North's status as a nuclear weapons state was nonnegotiable and dismissed any prospect of denuclearization. Her remarks came a day before Xi’s arrival and followed a series of recent public disclosures by Pyongyang highlighting uranium enrichment facilities and missile production capabilities.

Kim Yeoul-soo interpreted those moves as a message directed not only at Washington but also at Beijing.

“The timing itself was a performance aimed at China,” he said. “It was a signal that China should stop demanding denuclearization and instead treat North Korea as a nuclear state.”

Hong likewise argued that Xi’s visit could indirectly strengthen North Korea’s efforts to normalize its nuclear status internationally.

“Even if China does not formally endorse North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the visit itself and any expansion of cooperation could carry the effect of tacit acceptance,” he said.

Still, analysts do not expect Beijing to formally recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.

Kim said Xi is likely to emphasize peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, rather than endorse Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions.

“The most concerning scenario for South Korea would be if China were to appear to tolerate or implicitly recognize North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapons state,” he said.

Views differ, however, on whether Xi’s visit could have implications for future dialogue on the Korean Peninsula.

Hong dismissed expectations that China would act as a mediator or help revive inter-Korean engagement, calling such interpretations detached from current realities.

Kim was somewhat more cautious.

“What gives us hope is the possibility that Xi could encourage North Korea to resume dialogue, whether between the two Koreas or between North Korea and the United States,” he said.