Former North Korean diplomat peels back curtain on Pyongyang’s foreign policy apparatus

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, front row center, attends the Ninth Party Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in Pyongyang, Feb. 19, in this photo published by the Korean Central News Agency the following day. Yonhap

North Korea’s diplomats are often seen delivering rigid statements from behind podiums, but a new insider account suggests the real work of Pyongyang’s foreign service happens far from public view.

Drafting reports for Kim Jong-un. Navigating turf battles between rival state and party organs. Moving hard currency through overseas embassies under mounting pressure.

That is how Han Jin-myung, a former third secretary at North Korea’s embassy in Vietnam who defected in 2014, describes the inner workings of Pyongyang’s foreign policy apparatus, based on a series of conversations with Nicholas Levi, a senior researcher at the Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures at the Polish Academy of Sciences.

Those accounts underpin a new English-language book, “I Was a North Korean Diplomat: Inside the Secret World of Pyongyang’s Foreign Service,” published independently in late March. It offers a rare inside look at one of the world’s most opaque diplomatic systems, portraying North Korea’s embassies and foreign ministry as instruments of regime survival as much as channels of statecraft.

Han joined the Foreign Ministry in 2008 and later served in Vietnam before his defection more than a decade ago. His extensive testimony, while difficult to independently verify in parts, aligns with years of U.N. investigations and reporting that have linked overseas missions of North Korea to both diplomatic and revenue-generating roles.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, front row center, takes a group photo with ambassadors and foreign ministry officials following the two-day Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) session, March 23, in this photo provided by the North's Korean Central News Agency the following day. Yonhap

Power behind the podium

To outside observers, North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) serves as the public face of the country’s diplomacy, issuing statements, hosting delegations and dispatching envoys abroad.

But Han says that image can be misleading. While the institution appears on paper as a conventional bureaucracy organized by region and function, its outward structure is “essentially a façade,” masking a far more opaque system shaped by political priorities.

In practice, he said, the ministry operates alongside other key institutions — including trade, military and party bodies — that all contribute analysis feeding into Kim Jong-un’s inner circle.

“The role and influence of the MOFA in shaping foreign policy are, in fact, more limited than one might assume from the outside,” Han said in the book. “It participates in drafting, coordinating, and implementing, but it does not hold ultimate authority.”

Instead, he said, final decisions rest with Kim Jong-un and the institutions surrounding him, including his personal secretariat and senior party bodies.

The book cover of former North Korean diplomat Han Jin-myung's and co-author Nicolas Levi’s book, "I Was a North Korean Diplomat: Inside the Secret World of Pyongyang's Foreign Service" / Courtesy of Amazon

Rival centers of influence

Han’s account also highlights persistent competition inside North Korea’s foreign policy apparatus — depicting a largely behind-the-scenes struggle for influence.

“In reality, foreign policy is shaped primarily by the leaders of two institutions,” he said. “The International Affairs Department of the [Workers Party of Korea] and MOFA. These two bodies are engaged in a constant institutional rivalry for influence over the country’s external orientation.”

That rivalry, he suggests, has long defined how policy is made, with authority often concentrated not in formal titles but among senior figures who have led either institution.

Han points to past officials such as Kim Yong-il and Kang Sok-ju as emblematic of this dynamic — one asserting party dominance over the ministry, the other attempting to preserve a degree of bureaucratic autonomy.

The dynamic helps explain why the foreign minister’s position can appear prominent internationally while carrying limited influence internally.

Instead, real political guidance is typically exercised by deputy ministers and senior Workers’ Party officials, particularly those tied to the International Affairs Department.

That structure also shapes how current Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui is deployed. While she has extensive experience, including involvement in high-level negotiations with the United States, Han suggests her role today is more representative than directive.

Her prominence, he added, serves an additional purpose.

“Her public profile, fluency in English, and status as a woman in a traditionally male-dominated leadership structure contribute to presenting a more moderate and modern image of North Korea abroad,” Han said.

“This image management function should not be underestimated.”

A North Korean flag flies atop a government building in Pyongyang, Sept. 4, 2015. Courtesy of NK News

Embassies under pressure

Han’s testimony in the book also casts North Korea’s overseas missions as critical economic nodes as well as diplomatic outposts.

“North Korean embassies abroad are often expected to be financially self-sufficient and, in some cases, to send so-called loyalty funds back to Pyongyang,” Han said.

That expectation, he suggests, shapes careers and daily life.

“For diplomats below ambassadorial rank, postings typically last three years. However, this duration is highly flexible and directly linked to a diplomat’s capacity to generate loyalty funds,” he said. “Professional competence alone is insufficient.”

“Officially, we were sent abroad to represent the state and strengthen diplomatic relations,” he added. “But in reality we were also expected to generate foreign currency for the regime.”

Han describes a system in which financial output was embedded in diplomatic work, with embassy staff adapting to local conditions — from trade and logistics in some countries to commercial and property-related activities in others.

His account echoes years of reporting and U.N. findings linking North Korean missions to sanctions evasion and overseas revenue schemes. Pyongyang’s embassies have long been viewed as key hubs in those efforts, with diplomats frequently engaged in facilitating banned arms deals, moving cash and goods across borders, and trafficking commodities such as gold and wildlife products to raise hard currency.

That model, however, has come under strain in recent years. A wave of embassy closures in 2023 pointed to a shrinking diplomatic footprint, a sign of mounting financial pressure under sanctions and reduced global engagement following the COVID-19 pandemic.

Controlled exposure to the outside world

Even diplomats tasked with engaging foreign governments operate under strict internal controls, according to Han.

“Internet access did exist within MOFA, but it was strictly regulated and tightly monitored,” he said. “Only a limited number of computers were connected, and even those connections were restricted to specific websites authorized by the authorities.”

Han also described a generational reshuffle under the country’s current leader, with younger cadres replacing older diplomats.

“Under Kim Jong-un, there has been a visible generational shift,” he said. “Older diplomats are gradually replaced by younger cadres perceived as more dynamic, more obedient, and better adapted to the evolving requirements of overseas postings.”

The shift reflects a broader push to tighten control while adapting the diplomatic corps to changing external demands, prioritizing loyalty and flexibility in a system where exposure to the outside world remains tightly managed.

Recent state media images analyzed by NK Pro, particularly group photos released after the March sessions of the Supreme People’s Assembly, point to a more centralized and selectively deployed diplomatic apparatus, with a continued emphasis on key relationships with China and Russia — while keeping the U.S. within its diplomatic radar.

North Koreans read newspapers in a subway station, in this September 2018 file photo. Courtesy of NK News

Window into a closed system

Han’s account offers a rare glimpse into the inner workings of North Korea’s foreign policy machinery — one that operates less like a conventional diplomatic service and more like a system designed to preserve regime stability.

From tightly controlled reporting channels to institutional rivalry, his testimony portrays a structure in which diplomacy serves multiple functions at once: gathering information, managing elite competition and securing resources under pressure.

For readers seeking a deeper understanding of how Pyongyang engages the outside world, Levi and Han’s book provides a detailed, if partial, window into that system — and a reminder that in North Korea, the most important decisions are often made far from the podium.

Read the article at NK News.