AnalysisWhat's behind North Korea's sudden push to deepen ties with China, Russia?

A passenger train from Pyongyang arrives in the northeastern Chinese border city of Dandong in Liaoning province, after crossing the Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge over the Yalu River, which marks the border between the two countries, March 24. Train service between North Korea and China resumed on March 12, about six years after a hiatus. AFP-Yonhap

North Korea has launched a diplomatic sprint in recent weeks, deepening ties with both China and Russia in what experts describe as a calculated bid to strengthen its bargaining position ahead of any engagement with the United States.

Long regarded as one of the world's most isolated states — a reputation reinforced by years of pandemic-era border closures — Pyongyang moved quickly to normalize relations with its two most important partners while quietly maintaining outreach to Southeast Asian nations.

The moves come against the backdrop of a planned U.S.-China summit in May that is expected to touch on North Korea's nuclear program and growing speculation about the possibility of a U.S.-North Korea summit in the second half of the year.

Restoring China channel

On the China front, North Korea has moved to mend ties after years of pandemic-era isolation. Passenger train services between Pyongyang and Beijing resumed on March 12, followed by the return of direct flights on March 30, both after six years of suspension. The countries' two leaders have also maintained a steady exchange of congratulatory messages on major state occasions, including Kim Jong-un's recent reappointment as head of state.

Experts say the renewed transportation routes mark a return to pre-pandemic normalcy rather than a qualitative shift in the relationship, but the symbolism matters.

Kim Jong-won, research fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy, said Pyongyang is anticipating expanded trade with Beijing as its primary avenue for economic development.

"North Korea, which wants to develop its economy, is preparing for that and seeking business ties with China, expecting more trade," Kim said.

He added that Pyongyang's coordination with Beijing also has a more immediate strategic objective: having China raise North Korea's nuclear agenda at the upcoming U.S.-China talks, scheduled for May.

Russia President Vladimir Putin, left, shakes hands with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui during a meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow in this file photo from Oct. 27, 2025. Yonhap

Deepening Russia ties

Relations with Moscow have evolved along a separate but parallel track. After Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, North Korea signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in 2024 and dispatched troops to support Russia's war effort, steadily expanding cooperation across multiple sectors.

North Korea's state newspaper Rodong Sinmun reported on April 5 that the North Korean embassy in Moscow hosted a celebration for the 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on March 31. Around the same time, Russia disclosed details of talks held with the North's transport minister from April 1 to 3 on constructing a footbridge between the two countries, a small but symbolic infrastructure project.

Yet Pyongyang appears to be managing the tracks carefully.

“North Korea and Russia have very good relations. But Pyongyang didn’t want to make it too obvious in order to diplomatically chase two rabbits — China and Russia,” Joung Eun-lee, research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, told The Korea Times.

Kim of the Institute for National Security Strategy framed the strategy differently, describing the Russia engagement as part of a broader push toward what he called multipolar relations centered on North Korea's own interests.

"After the Russia-Ukraine war ends, Russia may scale back what it offers in return," Kim said. "This is about reducing dependence on any single partner and pursuing a multipolar framework that serves Pyongyang's interests."

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko gestures as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un applauds during their meeting in Pyongyang, March 26, in this picture taken and released by the Belarusian presidential press service. AFP-Yonhap

Nuclear recognition endgame

Beneath all the diplomatic maneuvering, experts identify an overarching objective: recognition as a nuclear-armed state.

"The entire goal for the North is to be recognized as a nuclear state and therefore to secure regime stability," Kim said. He noted that Pyongyang views the Trump administration — whose unconventional approach to diplomacy has upended expectations before — as a potential partner in achieving that aim.

"The North strategically expanded its diplomatic moves so it can have more bargaining power, backed by China and Russia, when having talks with the U.S.," he said.

North Korea's outreach extends beyond its two principal allies. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made his first-ever visit to Pyongyang on March 25 and 26, meeting Kim Jong-un and signing a new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that formally upgraded bilateral ties. Belarus, as a close partner of both Moscow and Beijing, fits into Pyongyang's strategy of building relationships across the China-Russia orbit.

Joung also pointed to Pyongyang's strong ties with Vietnam — the site of the 2019 Kim-Trump summit — and broader engagement with Southeast Asian nations, where scrutiny of North Korea's activities is comparatively lighter.

"Southeast Asian countries tend to be less restrictive in their dealings with Pyongyang, whereas the relationships with China and Russia come with more constraints, particularly around sanctions," Joung said.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump cross south of the Military Demarcation Line that divides North and South Korea, after Trump briefly stepped over to the northern side, in the Joint Security Area of Panmunjeom in the Demilitarized Zone in this file photo from June 30, 2019. AFP-Yonhap

South losing leverage

The North's diplomatic flurry raised concerns about the South's diminishing ability to shape developments on the Korean Peninsula. Some experts note that Seoul currently lacks meaningful leverage to draw Pyongyang into dialogue.

Kim suggested that inter-Korean progress could depend on external openings. "In the short term, we can find a breakthrough when Pyongyang and Washington have talks. Otherwise, South Korea may be able to find ways when other countries engage with the North," he said.

Cha Du-hyeogn, vice president of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, agreed that North Korea's courtship of China and Russia ultimately serves its pursuit of nuclear state recognition. But he argued that Seoul is poorly positioned to respond, lacking meaningful leverage to draw Pyongyang into dialogue.

"To the North, South Korea doesn't appear to have influence over the Trump administration and the Seoul-Washington alliance remains unchanged, meaning North Korea has no reason to talk to the South," Cha said.

He stressed that offering goodwill gestures alone is insufficient, calling for a mix of diplomatic outreach and stronger deterrence, including stepped-up military activities.

"It's not enough to offer only carrots. Sticks are needed too," Cha said. "If the South maintains a strong defense posture, it creates conditions where the North may need to engage on military matters and that opens room for dialogue."