How Kim Jong-un’s leadership playbook is borrowing from Xi Jinping

Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un shake hands at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Sept. 4. Reuters-Yonhap

China provides a model for how to tighten party control, but there are limits to how far North Korea can go

At North Korea’s biggest political event, Kim Jong-un showed that he has absorbed lessons from one of the world’s most entrenched leaders: Chinese President Xi Jinping.

One of the more obvious signs at the Ninth Party Congress was the use of Chinese-style name badges, which suggested that DPRK officials are copying the format of the Chinese Communist Party’s meetings.

But a far more important parallel came in Kim’s push to reshape governance by incorporating his “five-point party-building line” into the Workers’ Party rules, seeking to reinforce what Pyongyang calls the “monolithic leadership system” revolving around the ruling family.

Experts say that Kim appears to be studying the playbook of the Chinese president, consolidating authority by tightening domestic control, centralizing decision making and placing a party-first governance model at the heart of Pyongyang’s policies.

But major differences between the two countries — most crucially China’s record of economic success under Xi — still limit Pyongyang’s ability to crib from Beijing’s model as Kim modernizes his family’s dynastic rule.

Following Xi's footsteps
Kim’s five-point party-building line shows notable parallels with Xi’s approach to strengthening the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), particularly the themes outlined in the Chinese leader’s 2018 speech on party organization.

Both leaders place political authority and party discipline at the center of governance.

When Kim introduced the five-point line in 2022, he said political construction “should always be given priority” and guide other aspects of party building. Four years earlier, Xi expressed a nearly identical principle, declaring that the party must “adhere to putting the party’s political construction in the first place.”

Centralized leadership is another core theme.

Kim’s five-point line solidifies his long-held stance that “the monolithic leadership system of the Party Central Committee” must be reinforced so that the entire party functions as “one head and one body.” Xi likewise stressed in 2018 that upholding the authority of the party center and maintaining “centralized, unified leadership” is the highest principle of party rule.

Both leaders have also positioned party organization as the backbone of governance in their respective countries.

Xi has argued that “the party’s strength comes from its organization,” calling for a tightly structured hierarchy extending from the center down to grassroots units. Kim similarly emphasizes consolidating party committees at all levels to ensure unified political action.

Peter Ward, a research fellow at the Sejong Institute, told NK News that the similarities suggest Kim may be consciously studying aspects of China’s governance model, much like his predecessors’ repurposed ideas from Mao Zedong.

But Xi’s drive differs crucially from Mao’s in one crucial aspect, according to Aadil Brar, an independent analyst covering Asian geopolitics and international security.

“Mao’s ideology was mobilizational — he wanted the masses in constant revolutionary motion,” he told NK News. “Xi’s ideology is disciplinary — he wants the party apparatus in lockstep, not in motion.”

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un shake hands at a military parade during China’s 80th Victory Day celebrations in Beijing in this photo released by the Korea Central News Agency, Sept. 4. Courtesy of NK News

Xi’s sweeping anti-corruption campaign may also offer an ideological control model for Kim, who has been vocal in his quest to wipe out corruption within his ranks.

“Xi Jinping has executed the most audacious internal power consolidation in China since Mao by weaponizing two instruments simultaneously — the anti-corruption campaign and constitutional ideology,” Brar said.

He explained that Xi came to power by framing the party as having lost its ideological core after years of technocratic governance under Hu Jintao, with economic growth weakening political conviction.

He argued that corruption reflected a deeper crisis of belief among officials, prompting Xi to enforce ideological loyalty and raise the costs of deviation — much like Kim seeks to do through the five-point line.

“He didn’t just purge rivals; he changed the rules of the game,” Brar said.

The expert added that measures such as the “Two Establishes” and “Two Upholds” — which put Xi at the core of the CCP — made dissent against the president’s authority not only politically dangerous, but “constitutionally impermissible.”

Corruption exists in both systems, but Ward said the problem is more acute in North Korea, where officials often rely on corruption as a “means of survival” due to limited legal economic opportunities.

Ward also said Kim appears to be experimenting with limited forms of delegated authority, taking inspiration from China’s governance system that gives local and regional officials greater agency in implementing policies.

“He often assigns officials responsibility for major projects, allows them to manage implementation, and then evaluates their performance,” he said. “If they fail, they can be demoted, disciplined or sent for reeducation.”

Where Kim and Xi differ

Both leaders’ governance ideologies are ultimately designed to advance their economic and administrative agendas, but differences in the two countries’ institutions mean their approaches will vary.

Kim is unlikely to use his personal ideology to pursue economic reforms on the scale seen in China’s reform era, according to Ward. While Xi has encouraged innovation and competitiveness in the private sector, Kim has been reluctant to take comparable political risks.

“Expanding markets too far would shift economic power toward actors outside the state, which could threaten political control,” Ward said.

North Korea’s “economic delegation or experimentation will likely remain tightly bound within a system dominated by the state and the ruling party,” he added.

As Kim looks to reshape party organization, Brar said he will encounter challenges emerging from lower-level officials’ self-interest.

“Kim Jong-un faces the same fundamental challenge as Xi — mid-level cadres whose personal economic interests diverge from the center’s political interests — but with almost none of Xi’s structural advantages,” he said.

Unlike China, which has a growing economy and built-in systems that reward loyalty, North Korean cadres largely survive by “extracting informal fees from market activity,” Brar explained.

“You cannot run a serious anti-corruption campaign against people whose corruption is the only thing keeping them from defecting,” he said.

Brar said the greatest divergence between the two leaders ultimately lies in the basis of their political legitimacy, with China’s model grounded in decades of economic success that North Korea cannot replicate.

“You can impose Xi’s party architecture on a system like North Korea’s, but you cannot manufacture Xi’s foundational asset: the credibility that comes from having actually delivered growth,” he said.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is seen with lower-level officials at the site of disaster recovery efforts in this image released by Rodong Sinmun, Aug. 22, 2023. Courtesy of NK News

Kim's path forward

As Kim seeks to reinforce his personality cult and move out of his predecessors’ shadows, he could take inspiration from Xi, balanced by his own ambitions.

Embedding his leadership ideology into the Workers’ Party rulebook and appointing members of his inner circle to key positions allows Kim to clear obstacles to realizing his personal vision of military and economic development.

Kim appears set to push ahead with his economic agenda centered on regional and rural development, construction projects and improving food security.

While the scale of North Korea’s plan differs greatly from China’s, Brar said Kim can borrow Xi’s “organizational grammar without the economic enforcement.”

He explained that Kim’s five-point line is designed to tighten the feedback loop between Pyongyang and the provinces. Furthermore, Kim’s existing policies of rotating cadres, intensifying “self-criticism” and expanding the definition of “political violations” already act as low-cost instruments reinforcing the party’s directives.

The Ninth Congress’ emphasis on “bureaucratic inertia” and “chronic lack of responsibility” within the party represent a shift from identifying external factors like sanctions as the main impediments, according to Brar.

“By moving the locus of failure from the enemy outside to the cadre within, Kim creates the ideological justification for exactly the kind of internal disciplinary campaign he needs — without triggering a national conversation about whether the system itself has failed,” he said.

But regardless of how much Kim Jong-un repurposes the Chinese model, it ultimately serves to reinforce his own personality cult, according to Ward.

“Borrowed ideas are reframed as personal innovations of the leader,” he said.

“Even when foreign influences are present, they are absorbed into North Korea’s longstanding ideological framework.”

Read the article at NK News.