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Carrot-and-stick policy necessary for NK

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Members of the Korean Resident’s Union in Japan hold up signs in protest against North Korea’s third nuclear test in Tokyo, Wednesday, outside the headquarters of Chongryon, an association of North Korean residents in Japan. / Yonhap

By Kim Tae-gyu

North Korea’s third nuclear test conducted on Tuesday sent the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) scrambling to draw up sanctions against the Stalinist state.

However, the 15-nation council seems to have few effective punitive measures to discourage Pyongyang from pursuing its nuclear ambitions.

Against this backdrop, an increasing number of pundits say that the nuclear issue should be seen from the perspective of weighing up the North’s needs and creating incentives to stop the Stalinist nation resorting to nuclear weapons.

In other words, they are saying that it is all about economics, not politics _ Kim Jong-un, the third member of his family to rule the North, will not abort a nuclear program unless costs outweigh benefits.

“The North spent billions of dollars for the third test so it risks losing food and fuel aids from international society, a lifeline for the impoverished country. These are significant costs,” said Chang Yong-seok, a researcher at the Institute for Peace and Unification affiliated with Seoul National University.

“In comparison, it believes that its nuclear capability will provide leverage during talks with the United States as well as protect the country from outside threats. Plus, it helps Kim strengthen his grip on his kingdom. These are the benefits.”

Yang said there are two ways to make Kim change his tactics _ reduce the benefits or increase the costs. The former would take longer to achieve but the latter can happen in the short-term.

Hard to raise costs

“Sanctions including exerting a financial squeeze or maritime interdictions are all about increasing the costs of the nuclear program. But these will have limited effects without the proactive participation of China,” Chang said.

“And China is unlikely to drastically cut its aid to the North in consideration of the country’s strategic and geographic significance. Well aware of China’s dilemma, North Korea is betting China will not miss its buffer against the U.S.”

Indeed, China has been credited with greatly helping impoverished North Korea feed its 24 million people and keeping the fragile social infrastructure intact.

The specific quantity is not known but large amounts of Chinese aid are provided to North Korea in the form of food, oil and coal every year. In addition, Chinese officials condone smugglers going into and from North Korea.

A number of North Koreans work in Northeast China and send their income to their hometowns. Moreover, Chinese tourists account for the largest proportion of visitors to the reclusive state.

These are all significant sources of hard currency necessary for the cash-strapped North to survive.

China can trouble North Korea by withdrawing these forms of support, directly or indirectly, but the consensus is that the incoming power headed by Xi Jinping will adhere to traditional friendly policies to the North.

Some even say that North Korea is already ready for the worst-case scenario under which China could withdraw all its assistance.

“In the wake of the Banco of Delta Asia (BDA) case, the North appears to have prepared for the possibility of China turning its back,” said Prof. Yang Moo-jin at the University of North Korean Studies.

“The North would face a big blow in the event of China stopping all assistance. But the shockwave would not be strong enough to shake the stability of the regime. It would be a hard pill to swallow but the North does not live in fear of it.”

In 2005, the U.S. government identified BDA as a money-laundering outfit, which led to the freezing of North Korean assets worth around $25 million. The action against the Macao-based lender is believed to have been backed, or at least condoned, by China.

It generated great pains for Pyongyang and is cited as one of the major reasons why it exploded a nuclear device in 2006.

Ways to trim benefits

In a nutshell, many watchers think that the “carrot” is better than the “stick” when dealing with the nuclear issue as amply demonstrated by the fact that past UNSC sanctions failed to deter the North from accelerating its development of missiles or nuclear weapons.

Put another way, it is a better way of changing the strategies pursued by Kim Jong-un and his top lieutenants.

“South Korea and the United States maintain the overwhelming dominance in conventional weapons. Fears about this imbalance are a key reason that prompts Pyongyang to stick to its nuclear project,” Yang said.

“Curtailment of conventional weapons in any form would be a good example of shrinking any benefits gained by the North testing a nuclear bomb or conducting a rocket test.”

He added that the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula would undercut the position of hawkish military elites, thus eliminating incentives to continue weapons development.

The worst tactic would be that both the international community and the North would adopt tit-for-tat strategies so that the two sides end up playing a game of chicken,” he said. “Eventually, Seoul would have to engage with Pyongyang in talks.”

Others contend that the South can reduce the attractiveness of nuclear warheads for the North by making the latter engage on economic issues so that its Swiss-educated new leader becomes willing to focus on economic reform rather than take a path similar to those pursued by his grandfather and father.

Then, they believe that Pyongyang would not feel forced to develop a “miniaturized” bomb, necessary to become a warhead on a ballistic missile that could reach the United States mainland.

In a conference late last month, Prof. Kim Byung-yeon of Seoul National University branded such efforts as “globalizing the North Korean economy,” an initiative that the current government failed to achieve.

Park’s approach

Under the stewardship of incumbent President Lee Myung-bak during the past five years, the relationship between the two Koreas has continued to sour because they have been confrontational throughout the duration.

Lee depended on the “stick” rather than the “carrot,” which observers say proved not to be very successful.

President-elect Park Geun-hye is expected to take a more proactive approach.

Although she has yet to disclose details of her administration’s North Korea policies, she promised to resume humanitarian aid and establish trust on the Korean Peninsula.

In the wake of the nuclear test, however, she raised concerns whether such an approach is viable.

Paik Hak-soon at Sejong Institute said that Park should not repeat the mistakes of her predecessor.

“The Park administration will have to join the collective force of the international society to punish North Korea. At the same time, she has to make efforts to start inter-Korean talks,” Paik said.

“It will not be easy. But without such a flexible, two-track initiative, she will follow in the footsteps of President Lee, whose North Korean polices simply fell apart.”