Korea should join Hormuz mission but avoid combat role, experts say
Summary
Korea should contribute to international efforts to secure the Strait of Hormuz, experts said in Foreign Affairs, but only in noncombat roles. They said Seoul should avoid direct confrontation with Iran and frame any move as protecting freedom of navigation and energy supplies. The experts also urged careful timing and broader international coordination. Possible roles include maritime patrol aircraft, a logistics support vessel and mine-detection capabilities.
Key Facts
- Min Jeong-hun said about 60 percent to 70 percent of Korea’s crude oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
- The experts said Korea’s role should be limited to noncombat missions such as maritime patrol aircraft, a logistics support vessel and mine detection and clearance capabilities.
- Shin Beom-chul said Korea should consider joining maritime security efforts led by countries such as the United Kingdom and France rather than U.S. combat operations.
- Jang Ji-hyang said Korea’s participation should be presented as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy and maritime security commitment, not as an attempt to curry favor with Washington.
- Shin said Washington’s pressure over Hormuz was partly linked to delays in Korea’s promised investment in the U.S.

ROKS Soyang, an 11,000-ton logistics support ship of the ROK Navy, is seen during its commissioning ceremony in 2018. The vessel is being considered for deployment to the Strait of Hormuz as part of a possible military contribution to the U.S.-led mission. Yonhap
Korea should make a military contribution to international efforts to secure the Strait of Hormuz but limit its role to noncombat missions, experts said, citing the need to manage its alliance with the United States, protect the country’s energy and maritime interests and uphold freedom of navigation.
Experts stressed that Korea should avoid direct military confrontation with Iran, ensure that its contribution is not perceived as joining the war and carefully consider the timing of its involvement.

“Korea will need to make some contribution, considering its relationship with the U.S.,” said Min Jeong-hun, a professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy.
“At the same time, Korea has sufficient justification for contributing, given its direct interest in maintaining freedom of navigation and stable energy supplies,” he added, noting that around 60 percent to 70 percent of the country’s crude oil imports pass through the strait.
Jang Ji-hyang, a senior research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, similarly said participation would be consistent with Korea’s longstanding commitment to maritime security and freedom of navigation under its Indo-Pacific strategy, rather than describing the move as an attempt to curry favor with Washington.
“As a middle power and an advanced country directly affected by the situation, Korea has a role to play when the international community acts to ensure freedom of navigation,” she said.
However, Jang cautioned against terms such as “sending troops” or “joining the war,” stressing that Korea’s role should be presented as part of a broader international effort based on established principles.
Shin Beom-chul, a senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute, supported participation in principle but said Seoul should not rush into a deployment.
“Korea should instead consider joining maritime security efforts led by countries such as the United Kingdom and France, with an emphasis on international cooperation and postconflict stabilization rather than participation in U.S. combat operations,” he said.
The experts broadly favored limiting Korea’s military role to noncombat missions, with all three citing maritime patrol aircraft, a logistics support vessel and capabilities for mine detection and clearance as possible options.
“Such a contribution would likely be sufficient to meet Washington’s expectations,” Shin said.
As for Iran, which has effectively controlled the strait since the U.S. and Israel began the war, Min said Seoul should maintain close communication with Tehran and explain that its involvement is necessary to protect Korea’s interests in the waterway, while making clear that it would not deploy combat forces or engage in direct military confrontation.
Jang said Seoul should also broaden the basis for its contribution beyond relations with the U.S. and Iran by highlighting Korea’s ties with Gulf countries.
“The Gulf countries are directly affected by regional instability, and Korea’s military contribution could be framed as helping key regional partners as well as protecting freedom of navigation,” she said.
Min said responding to U.S. President Donald Trump’s demands for a military contribution could create room for Seoul to seek progress on pending issues between the two allies involving security, diplomacy, investment and trade.
“If we do what Trump wants most, then we can ask for what we want as well,” he said, adding that such reciprocal steps could help “open the way” for broader cooperation.
Shin offered a somewhat different assessment.
He argued that Washington’s pressure over Hormuz stemmed partly from delays in Korea’s promised investment in the U.S. and that Seoul should therefore prioritize resolving the investment issue before moving ahead with any deployment.
“If we deal with the U.S. investment first, Trump may no longer demand a deployment,” Shin said, pointing out that Washington has not placed the same demand on Japan.
He said Korea should first coordinate with Trump on investment and other bilateral issues, while slowing the pace of discussions over Hormuz and pursuing any eventual participation through a broader international framework.
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