By Sunny Lee
Korea Times Correspondent
BEIJING ― The complexity of the North Korean issue and the concerns that the international community has over North Korea's nuclear ambition have now entered a U.S. high school classroom.
``Why is North Korea going it alone?'' is a topic for politics class, offered online by the U.S. educational broadcaster PBS.
But North Korea could be a very challenging topic for a 10th grader, given that even some of the world's brightest diplomats from an odd coalition of five countries ― the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea ― have been almost flunking the course after many years of racking their brains, often divided internally over their different interests.
What is worse, the situation appears to be deteriorating, as seen from Tuesday's tense encounter in Gaeseong where the two Koreas were at odds over procedural wrangling. At the meeting, North Korea demanded changes in the way the inter-Korean joint industrial complex operates ― a move that some analysts see as a ploy to undermine the troubled industrial park.
Indeed, there are many lessons to be learned when it comes to dealing with North Korea. However, lessons are not just for high school students but also for the top policy makers in South Korea, according to Selig Harrison, the director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, and the author of the influential book, ``Korean Endgame.''
For Harrison, the North's latest confrontational posture is, in ultimate analysis, a mere symptom of a bigger and more fundamental problem, which is mysteriously overlooked in South Korea. That is, the South's unilateral revocation of the past rapprochement agreements with the North and also its obliviousness of what impact it had on the mindset of the North's leadership.
Harrison says North Korea sees President Lee Myung-bak's retracting from the commitment as a sign that the South Korean government intends to destabilize the North, bring about its collapse and absorb it, so that unification would occur under South Korean domination.
Then South Korea sent another ``wrong signal'' to Pyongyang when it voiced the need for a ``post-Kim Jong-il plan'' surrounding the North Korean leader's stroke last year which was perceived as a plot for regime change, leading to further mistrust toward the South's leadership, according to Harrison.
A frequent visitor to Pyongyang, who was able to hear the country's more unconcealed wishes and fears, Harrison says the most important step in creating a positive inter-Korean vibe is for President Lee to clearly indicate his commitment to honoring the past two agreements of inter-Korean engagement and gradually work together toward unification.
Here is the transcript of his interview with The Korea Times:
In your dialogue with Pyongyang's leadership, what was their perception of President Lee?
I found that there was a great impact in North Korea caused by the change in policy by President Lee. I don't think it was realized in South Korea and the U.S. The main point is that Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun had two summit meetings in Pyongyang and there were declarations. The first declaration by Kim Dae-jung was taken particularly seriously in North Korea. North Koreans regarded it as a fundamental change of the South Korean policy on the North.
Before Kim Dae-jung went to North Korea, the North Korean perception was that South Korea wanted to destabilize North Korea, bring about its collapse and gradually absorb it so that unification would occur under South Korean domination.
They then considered the summit declaration as the fundamental change in its relations with the South because it talked about confederation. So this was very important in the North.
The main question is Lee's basic intentions toward North Korea. When Lee became the President, he said South Korea would review these two summit declarations. That was like a nuclear bombshell to North Korea. I don't think people in South Korea and the U.S. recognized what that meant to North Korea.
Now, that commitment has been called into question by North Korea. For Pyongyang, that change meant that Lee would go back to the policies of Park Chung-hee and Kim Young-sam in which South Korea sent agents to North Korea to destabilize the government.
Where should we go from here?
No significant progress in the North-South relations can be made until President Lee says in very clear terms that he accepts the June 2000 Summit declaration, including its provision regarding the confederation as the objective of the two sides. That's the basic issue. And, certainly, nobody in Washington understands this issue. And I don't think it was understood very much in the South.
North Korea perceives the South as being insincere. How about North Korea? Is North Korea sincere?
They are realistic. They are very weak compared to South Korea. It's a poor, struggling and pathetic country. They don't want to be absorbed by South Korea. They are very sincere in their desire not to be absorbed by South Korea. They want the process of reunification to occur slowly and gradually.
So when they see balloons being sent from South Korea, and when they see human rights groups are arousing the public against the North, that gave them the idea that the objective of the South is to bring down the regime.
When people discussed the scenarios of the North Korean collapse and what to do, North Koreans didn't think it was a contingency plan, but they thought about it as a preparation to bring about the collapse.
The other important thing is that Kim Jong-il has had illness and there were important changes in the leadership at the Supreme People's Assembly. They are very much concerned that the U.S., South Korea and Japan would take advantage of the situation in North Korea to bring down the regime. So they were in a very defensive frame of mind.
The Lee administration has made various conciliatory gestures?
Yes, but he hasn't made the most important one. The main question in the mind of North Koreans is the long-term intentions of South Korea. That's why I emphasize the importance of the two summit declarations. I think it's the basic acceptance on the goal of confederation on equal terms, and the process of unification in which the South does not absorb the North, but co-exists. That's the basic question. I think when Lee makes that clear, that would have a big impact in North Korea and gradually improve its behavior.
In your attempt to explain the North Korean position to others, you could be perceived as advocating the North's logic.
I am simply expressing a realistic assessment of the situation. I don't think of it as a zero-sum game where there is the North Korean side on one hand and there is the South Korean side on the other hand. I've also always felt that the unification of Korea is (in) the American interest.