US Security Umbrella Bolsters Korea’s Growth
By Michael Breen
If the main driver of the phenomenal rise of South Korea from its history of backwardness and poverty was the vision of its leader Park Chung-hee and his ability to persuade and force businessmen and workers in his direction, then another crucial factor was the supporting role played by the country's main ally, the United States.
That role did not begin smoothly. While Washington had prepared for the defeat of Japan during the World War II, it gave little consideration to the Korean Peninsula. The Americans did not know Korea.
In contrast to the Soviet Union, where the army had included Korean units, there was no "Free Korean" contribution to the war effort that the allies could naturally turn to after the war.
Indeed, the Koreans they had come across during the war were either soldiers in the Japanese army or guards in its prison camps, who were notorious for being more brutal toward POWs than the Japanese guards.
Thus, while the Soviets skillfully placed one of their young Korean army officers, Kim Il-sung, to the fore in Pyongyang, the Americans in Seoul dismantled local political organizations and ran the country themselves.
Their pragmatic use of police and officials who had served the Japanese without any process of reckoning and reconciliation to allow for popular acceptance, and their support for the elderly nationalist Syngman Rhee, who had been an expatriate for 40 years, cast a moral shadow over the founding of the Republic of Korea.
But, during the Korean War (1950-53), the U.S. government stood by its ally, and brought the democratic world to join in common cause with the republic under the flag of the United Nations.
At one point in the conflict, when the Americans recaptured Seoul, their legendary general, Douglas MacArthur, staged a ceremony formally handing over control of the city to Rhee, in the bomb-damaged Capitol Building (on the site of today's restored Gyeongbok Palace) in central Seoul.
"By the grace of a merciful providence, our forces fighting under the standard of the greatest hope and inspiration of mankind, the United Nations, have liberated this ancient capital city of Korea," he began.
Then, as he recited the Christian "Lord's Prayer," shards of glass crashed to the floor from the building's shattered dome. No one was hurt and, typically, MacArthur did not skip a beat in his prayer.
With tears in his eyes, Rhee grabbed MacArthur's hand. "We love you as the savior of our race," he said. No words better capture the feelings toward Americans that lie in the hearts of South Koreans who experienced the war. But, unseen by outsiders, this emotion mixed with their suffering, their shame at their own weakness and their resentment against authority and big powers.
After the war, Korea's recovery was slow and painful. U.S. assistance served as a life support for the economy. The United States Operations Mission Korea worked with the Ministry of Reconstruction to allocate around $200 million in aid-financed imports of raw cotton, wheat, barley, raw wool, sugar and other items that represented more than half of the total government budget.
At that time, in the mid-50s, salaries for bureaucrats were so low ― covering only around 20 percent of basic living expenses ― that corruption was rampant.
A section chief, for example, earned the equivalent of $12 a month. But the small team of planning officials came from very well-to-do families and did not have to rely on their salaries. They were also among the few bureaucrats who spoke English and could work closely with the USOM officials.
By the end of 1957, the economy had regained its pre-war level thanks mostly to rapid growth in industries producing cotton cloth, wheat flour and sugar. But it showed no signs of further improvement.
At this time, USOM warned the ministry that because of Rhee's unpopularity in Washington, the U.S. Congress planned to cut aid. The Americans advised the government to develop a long-term economic development plan.
Officials developed a Five-Year Plan, but it was nixed by Rhee who said it sounded too much like an idea cooked up by Stalin, then South Korea's communist enemy.
Thus dismissed, long-term planning became taboo until Rhee's fall from grace in 1960, after which the plan was revived by the short-lived parliamentary Cabinet government of Prime Minister Chang Myon (titular president Yoon Po-sun), and then finally implemented by successor Park Chung-hee who seized power in May 1961.
After initial doubts - the Kennedy administration thought that Park's takeover was a communist coup and absent any requests by the deposed government for intervention to restore democracy, the U.S. accepted Park.
He understood the importance of the American alliance for Korea's protection from North Korea, which was the stronger country at the time.
The U.S. security umbrella, based on the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, which was concluded under the Syngman Rhee government after the 1953 armistice with North Korea, laid the cornerstone in sustaining Korea's fast economic growth and social stability for decades.
Indeed, even today the continued American security umbrella, although perhaps militarily unnecessary given the formidable modernization of the South Korean armed forces, continues to give investors the confidence to commit their money, assets and people.
Park also understood that his own position depended on American support.
But America was no China. It did not offer permanency to a little brother. Indeed, the withdrawal from Vietnam in the mid-70s confirmed the relative fickleness to the East Asian mind of a country whose government changed every four years, instead of every four hundred years. Park knew that he had to build his own industrial base, and resist or ignore the Americans when they appeared to stand in the way. Thus the Koreans' growth was of their own making. America was the market, the model and the matron.
Koreans learned directly from the experience of working with Americans, who were great teachers and examples of professionalism for so many of the political, academic and business leaders who were key in the country's development.
Their greatest influence was on the military. Officers were trained in American management practices. During the period of military-backed rule, hundreds of these officers took executive posts in state-run companies and organizations, not simply because it was jobs for the boys, but because they knew how to organize and lead.
There have been tensions and difficulties in the U.S.-Korea relationship. Most, it may be said, derive from the Contradictory combination of fierce nationalism and near-dependence. One consequence of this was that for a long time, American support was understood by Koreans as altruism, with the soldier, missionary and Peace Corps volunteer as representative Americans. In fact, the alliance represented what any alliance should represent - a convergence of national interests.
The benefit to Korea was that it was both in American strategic interest and a natural consequence of American values as a nation born in opposition to imperialism, that its once client state grow economically and politically from near-total dependency to equal partnership.
America did not start the growth. But it provided a continued security umbrella that enabled it to happen. It also demonstrated by its own wealth and freedom what Korea, too, could become.
From that perspective, Korea's rags-to-riches story may be seen, without offense to Koreans, as an American success story too.