The Korea Times

Reform and upgrade US alliance

By Stephen Costello Those who suggest a larger or bolder role for South Korea, toward either North Korea or its U.S. ally, are often met with objections bordering on hysteria. Their suggestions are equated instantly with “breaking the alliance” or “going it alone.” Similarly, the threats by U.S. officials to “bring U.S. troops home” if Seoul doesn't pay more seem to strike fear into the hearts of many otherwise thoughtful people, including some in Cheong Wa Dae, the National Assembly and the press. These are “straw man” threats. Not realistic, and not remotely possible. The small, slow and often uncoordinated policy initiatives by Cheong Wa Dae, along with contradictory messaging, may help provoke such misunderstandings. This is why the joint press conference Nov. 10 by presidential National Security Office (NSO) head Chung Eui-yong, Chief of Staff Noh Young-min, and Chief Policy Secretary Kim Sang-jo was so welcome.Let's hope there is more of this kind of well-thought-out presentation to come. Perhaps one will be forthcoming on the Nor

Nov 18, 2019By Stephen Costello

Downgrading Korea-Japan cooperation is not winning strategy

By Stephen CostelloWASHINGTON ― President Moon Jae-in suggested Aug. 5 that South Korean economic growth based on expanded North-South development could help overcome new trade restrictions by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.Predictably, this statement has been met with ridicule, derision and alarm by many commentators. If Moon's timing and his specific point about Japan seem impractical or naive, his frustration and his long-term strategic points are easier to understand.The Abe administration's public reasoning for announcing the new restrictions ― that it relates to distrust of South Korea's exports of sensitive materials to North Korea ― is difficult to believe. As multiple experts have pointed out, Abe's move is more likely political. It is generally understood to be a reaction to South Korean court rulings and Cheong Wa Dae actions asserting Japan's liability for wartime forced labor from South Koreans.Since Abe was elected prime minister, technical arrangements for settling the sex slavery and forced labor issues with Korea have been inextricably tied up with, and inseparab

Aug 14, 2019By Stephen Costello

New 3-way initiative is timely, urgent

By Stephen CostelloStatements emerging from a National Security Council (NSC) meeting at the presidential office Monday indicated that the South Korean government is thinking in detail about how to lead the parties back to a productive deal after the anticlimactic Hanoi summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. This is timely and very promising news.After almost two years of extreme efforts and remarkable diplomatic and bureaucratic coordination, many lessons must have been learned and much capacity must have been created in the Moon Jae-in government. Although there is still plenty to do, it is simply inaccurate today to say that in terms of diplomatic power South Korea is a “shrimp among whales.” Perhaps it is now more of a dolphin among sharks, but we should probably abandon this analogy before it's too late.Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha's quoted remarks are particularly relevant to today's strategic moment. An AP story characterizes her points this way: “Proposed new talks would help settle differences over how much sancti

Mar 6, 2019By Stephen Costello

Little at stake in Hanoi summit

By Stephen CostelloThe stakes at the summit in Hanoi between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un are not very big. This is largely because the possible downsides from the meeting are negligible, and greatly overstated. The upsides are potentially great, and are practically achievable, but National Security Adviser John Bolton, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and members of the U.S. Congress are in almost unanimous opposition to elements that would constitute a practical, win-win deal.President Trump is virtually alone in his apparent willingness to provide significant sanctions relief in exchange for meaningful rollback of nuclear and missile programs. Therefore, success should not be hard, but it is unlikely to be the breakthrough that it could be.The threat of a return to provocative U.S. exercises and North Korean nuclear and missile testing is exaggerated. It would also be an impractical reversal for both Pyongyang and Washington. Both have better options to pursue if they are unsatisfied with the Hanoi meeting. Because of better ties with China and Sou

Feb 25, 2019By Stephen Costello

NSC adviser: 'Mr. Invisible' no more

By Stephen CostelloNational security adviser Chung Eui-yong has emerged from obscurity, and he has offered three ideas for us to think about as we review developments on Korea during this past year. Of course, Chung has not been completely obscure during the 19 months of the Moon Jae-in presidency. From all accounts he has been intensively involved, in one of the most critical and responsible offices in the South Korean administration. The reference to him as “Mr. Invisible” most likely reflected his modesty and his low profile while in such a high-profile job.I knew Chung as the energetic leader of an Asian political party conference, founded 18 years ago. I still use the bag he gave me, bearing the International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP) logo. We had good discussions then, but I have not met him in many years.It was certainly surprising to see him in the glare of White House lights, announcing the most improbable news that Chairman Kim Jong-un had offered to meet, and President Trump had accepted, back in March. Considering what Chung has seen, and w

Dec 30, 2018By Stephen Costello

Moon and Trump at the UN

By Stephen CostelloIn Seoul this month I talked with government officials, politicians, civic leaders, journalists and infrastructure professionals. My main impression is that the policy environment in the Korean capital feels different from that of previous years. I've been coming here since 1990, so my contacts form a broad cast of characters. Now that President Moon Jae-in has lobbied President Donald Trump in New York, pressures inside the U.S. government are rising. Three responses from Koreans put the current moment in context.ExcitementThe unprecedented dimensions of inter-Korean contact are both obvious and hard to evaluate. They are obvious because many images since the PyeongChang Olympics are just groundbreaking and myth-challenging. These images also produce fear and disorientation among important groups in Seoul and Washington. Even non-professional observers in Korea ― and a few in the U.S. ― are moved and intrigued by the possibilities that have been tantalizingly glimpsed in the past nine months.Putting aside much overheated rhetoric from interested parties, the

Sep 26, 2018By Stephen Costello

Two Koreas on their own

By Stephen CostelloThere is no reason why the two Koreas should have to push ahead with an end to the Korean War and the beginnings of a peace regime on the peninsula all by themselves. North Korea's phased abandonment of nuclear capabilities would have to proceed in parallel with those projects, and such a scenario seems within reach.Advantages to the region and beyond would be both multidimensional and quickly valuable. Beyond the Koreas, China, Japan and Russia, those advantages would pay handsomely to the U.S., in view of its past investments, current needs, and future interests.This would all seem to be obvious. But it is not clear to many members of the government, expert and journalist communities in key capitols ― many of them are deeply conflicted about the prospects ahead.It's important to take such reactions seriously, because they affect not only administration and public debates, but also the ability of leaders to act. As another period of intensive meetings and opportunities approaches this month, three leaders in particular are important to watch.U.N. Secretary-Ge

Sep 4, 2018By Stephen Costello

'The Spy Gone North'

By Stephen Costello“The Spy Gone North,” the new movie by director Yoon Jong-bin, is slow-moving and lacks the shock and awe of almost any other film of this type. It is absolutely riveting, however, if one lived through the 1990s connected in any way to the politics and policies of South Korea.I found myself worrying during the screening at the Woodrow Wilson Center near the White House in Washington, D.C. Would this audience hang on to the end? They must be interested in the Korean or U.S. policy implications, or in the security dimensions of the story. But it was unlikely that they cared as much as I did about this slice of history. Or so I thought.But they did hang on. To the end. That may be one of the great achievements of the director, cinematographer and actors ― to pull an audience with widely differing interests all the way through a drama with complex political, ideological and historical messages. After all, some were not yet born in 1992. No shootings, no car chases, no sex.But wow. Even acknowledging deviations from the real record, this movie shines a

Aug 17, 2018By Stephen Costello

Moon's gamble on Trump

By Stephen CostelloWASHINGTON ― U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley spoke with Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha and with reporters at the U.N. this week. As a result, we now know much more about the U.S. position on North Korea, seven weeks after the Singapore summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un.Mystery of the Singapore summitOne great mystery during this time has been: What did Trump and Kim say directly to each other? Another was: What did Trump and Pompeo think they could accomplish in post-Singapore negotiations? The basic text from the Singapore meeting was promising, because it contained the balance ― between what the U.S. wanted and what the DPRK wanted ― that had been lacking in the North Korea-U.S. relationship for over a decade.But public statements from Trump administration figures since Singapore repeatedly cast the North as a defeated country. Both Joseph Yun and Robert Gallucci have warned that complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) is dangerous, wishful thinking. U.S. administrat

Aug 2, 2018By Stephen Costello

Pompeo can practice diplomacy or fantasy - but not both

By Stephen CostelloThe fundamental concepts at the heart of U.S. policy toward North Korea have been wrong for 17 years, and clearly so. Now President Trump will either make new U.S.-DPRK agreements using older, more realistic concepts or he will surrender to the Bush/Obama failed playbook. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's talks in Pyongyang last week suggest the choice between these two is becoming more urgent.The key concept that the U.S. has relied on is that the North needs pressure and coercion in order to “change its calculations” and embrace denuclearization. But it has indicated its preference for economic development over nuclear weapons for years, and demonstrated it. American journalists and specialists have also swallowed a deliberate misreading of U.S.-DPRK negotiating history. It was the U.S., not the DPRK, that destroyed the working Agreed Framework, and it did so for political and ideological reasons, as the principals' books make clear. This was a regional and generational catastrophe. Trump now has created an opportunity to begin walking the U.S. back fr

Jul 11, 2018By Stephen Costello

Stephen Costello