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Will Seoul go back to Sunshine Policy? Not likely

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Lack of impact on economy by NK belligerence seems most effective counter-attack

By Kim Tong-hyung

What can South Korea do with the belligerent North Korea?

The current government has been talking tough about Pyongyang but its options are limited as shown in the aftermath of its recent attack on the island off the West Sea. So is returning to the old ways of reconciliation in dealing with the Kim Jong-il regime an alternative?

Seoul’s conundrum is that it can’t, considering the change will fundamentally throw doubts on its political identity.

Besides, it can’t be 100 percent certain that the “Sunshine Policy” of unilaterally giving all the North wants, as the current conservative government accuses the late liberal President Kim Dae-jung, can work at this time.

But one consolation for the current government is that all these North Korean acts of provocation do not seriously affect South Korea’s economy. In other words, the government can continue the current North Korean policy, if it can afford to swallow the hurt pride of fighting the North with its hands tied.

North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, which left two South Korean soldiers dead and scores of houses destroyed, represents its second warlike provocation just this year, following its sinking of a South Korean naval vessel in March.

And South Korea could do as much about the recent assault as it did when it was hit by the deaths of 46 sailors aboard the Cheonan frigate: no proportional retaliation.

President Lee Myung-bak has stressed about preventing the situation from escalating into something more serious.

Still, it’s hard to deny that the uncertainties have become greater at a time when South Korea appears to have entirely lost its leverage to control the behavior of its wayward neighbor, which draws a murkier long-term picture.

Bang Tae-seop, an expert on Northeast Asian affairs at the Samsung Economic Research Institute, downplayed the attacks on Yeonpyeong Island as having an immediate and visible impact on the South Korean economy, but offered a more cautious outlook for the future.

``It could be said that that the South Korean economy has acquired a tolerance for the North Korean proactive tricks. The response by South Korea and the United States have been stern and swift ― elevating their surveillance alert to Watchcon II ― and it’s extremely unlikely that North Korea has a follow-up act, so at least in the short term, there won’t be any visible impact on the South Korean economy,’’ Bang said, pointing out that the stock market appears to be rebounding quickly.

``That said, one would have to say that this brings back all the talks about the `Korea discount,’ which refers to the way foreign investors deal with Korean companies or in making investment decisions. It has become clear for them that North Korea is a variable that is utterly unpredictable and out of control,’’ he said.

The economic effects of the Yeonpyeong Island attacks will likely wear off in the next two or three days, according to market watchers. The impact will be even more marginal than that of the Cheonan incident, which garnered rapt media attention for months due to the rescue efforts and the delayed raising of the ship, they say.

Many observers believe that North Korea’s recent attacks, as well as its unveiling of a previously unsuspected uranium enrichment facility, could be linked to its efforts to boost the credentials of Kim Jong-un, the youngest son of ailing North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, as they prepare to extend their dynasty to the third generation.

Other possible motives of North Korea’s military brinkmanship include forcing the resumption of the six-party talks between the two Koreas, the United States, China, Russia and Japan, which have stalled since 2008, having international sanctions withdrawn and securing more aid in return for denuclearization. North Korea has been hanging onto its nuclear weapons program as its only international leverage to secure the survival of its regime and salvage a decaying economy.

``North Korea had shown aggression in the early 1990s when Kim Jong-il was coming up, or in the late 60s, when his father, Kim Il-sung, was establishing his one-man leadership. The attack on Yeonpyeong Island, as well as the revealing of the uranium enrichment facility, could be interpreted similarly,’’ said Hamm Taek-yeong, a professor at Seoul's University of North Korean Studies.

``The act was obviously carefully calculated, as creating military tension would have been considered an effective way to pull the people into one direction as the leadership prepares for the power transition. The talks of multi-polar leadership or a compromised political control of the North Korean military seems far-fetched, as it’s hard to imagine the military acting alone to pull off an attack of such a scale under the North Korean system.’’

Perhaps, the biggest concern for South Korea involves the way it continue to lose its options for controlling and channeling the events on the Korean Peninsula, as it becomes increasingly clear that China is the only power that truly wields influence with North Korea.

This has some arguing that the Lee Myung-bak government’s move to discard the ``Sunshine Policy,’’ which was as much an economic decision as a political one, is proving a mistake.

``It’s hard to imagine the geopolitical risks, which have continued throughout several decades here, having a massive impact on the Korean market. But should the tension heighten, it could have a negative impact on foreign exchange markets and Korea’s credit ratings. The situation has to be closely monitored, as there is a possibility that it could escalate into a conflict between North Korea and Japan, as well as other situations,’’ said Hong Soon-jick, a researcher from the Hyundai Economic Research Institute.