pyongyang Sowing Seeds of Peace

This is the fourth in a series of articles on the forthcoming inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang. ― ED.

By Paul Chamberlin

South Korean voters will elect a new president on Dec. 19. Roughly two and a half months earlier from Oct. 2-4, their president plans to conduct a second inter-Korea summit meeting in Pyongyang with the son of North Korea's first and ``eternal'' president.

The stated purpose for their meeting is to improve inter-Korean relations. Can any good possibly come out of this summit?

The timing, venue and likely agenda are potentially problematic, according to critics.

They regard timing as an issue, because President Roh Moo-hyun will soon be out of office and unable to implement any commitments to North Korean Defense Committee Chairman Kim Jong-il.

Critics want the summit to be in Seoul per the June 2000 Summit Joint Declaration. The Pyongyang venue will give Chairman Kim ``home court'' advantage.

The agenda may be the biggest concern for critics. They are concerned that President Roh wants to help the progressive presidential candidate and enhance his legacy at the expense of the nuclear issue and the ROK-U.S. alliance.

As background, in mid-August summit planners agreed that the agenda will be ``based on the August 5th Agreement'' to hold the summit.

That might be fine if Seoul and Pyongyang had published identical versions of the agreement, but they didn't.

The purpose of the summit according to the South Korean version is ``…to expand and develop South-North relations a step higher based on the South-North Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000 and the spirit of the Korean nation, thereby crucially and significantly influencing the opening of a new phase in the quest for peace on the Korean Peninsula, common prosperity of the Korean nation and unification of the homeland.''

North Korea's version, however, states, ``The meeting between the top leaders of the North and the South will be of weighty significance in opening a new phase of peace on the Korean Peninsula, co-prosperity of the nation and national reunification by expanding and developing the inter-Korean relations onto a higher stage in accordance with the historic June 15 North-South Joint Declaration and in the spirit of `By our nation itself.'''

The inclusion of ``By our nation itself'' appears to be a red flag that Pyongyang aims to weaken South Korean support for the ROK-U.S. relationship.

On the same day that Pyongyang announced the summit meeting, it also called on Seoul to ``refrain from any acts that may becloud the atmosphere of dialogue and peace and strain the situation."

A named act was the annual ROK-U.S. military training exercise ``Ulchi-Focus Lens,'' which was scheduled for late August.

Seoul predictably ignored North Korea's call, but the fact that Pyongyang issued it merits some consideration, given the purpose of the summit.

While different versions of the same inter-Korea agreement are not unusual, the practice discourages confidence for a positive outcome.

It suggests the planners might regard the summit as a public relations opportunity rather than a serious diplomatic effort to improve inter-Korea relations.

Different objectives for Kim Jong-il and Roh Moo-hyun are to be expected.

Chairman Kim has not explicitly stated his agenda, but he will probably promote pan-Korean nationalism with a xenophobic call for South Koreans to resist influence by ``other countries,'' especially the United States.

Another likely goal will be to persuade South Korean voters that Pyongyang will cooperate more with South Korean progressives than conservatives.

President Roh, on the other hand, has said his agenda would include ``the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, inter-Korean peace, arms control and cross-border economic cooperation.''

What ``arms control'' discussion should we expect, and what would be the implications for ROK defense spending, force deployments, and the ROK-U.S. alliance?

President Roh promotes the summit as ``… an occasion to normalize inter-Korean relations… and … help the six-party talks make progress, while facilitating development of multilateral ties that should ensue in the future in Northeast Asia.''

He has also said the time had come to put four major inter-Korea agreements ``into practice.''

The four agreements are the July 4, 1972 Joint Communique, the 1991 South-North Basic Agreement, the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the June 15, 2000 South-North Joint Declaration.

The fact that these agreements are not guiding inter-Korea relations is meaningful.

Given the above background and North Korea's reluctance to substantially improve relations with the South since the 2000 summit, the 2007 summit has potential to be a public relations exercise that will create more problems than it will solve.

Can any good actually come out of this high-level meeting?

Actually yes, the second summit could be historically significant if _ a big if _ the participants finally come to grips with fundamental realities and produce a more mature inter-Korea relationship that rests on transparent, verifiable, and mutually beneficial agreements.

Perhaps the most important reality is the existence of two competing, sovereign Korean governments that each claims the Korean Peninsula as its sovereign territory.

With its allies, each has fought to unify the peninsula, killing millions. Unresolved concerns about the other's intentions have fueled persistent instability on the Korean Peninsula for over 60 years.

This is the heart of the so-called ``Korea question.''

The Korea question has persisted despite U.N. and multinational efforts to resolve it in the late 1940s followed by the bloody 1950-53 Korean War, the 1953 Armistice Agreement, and post-war agreements.

Currently, the six parties call for a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Historically, the Armistice Agreement signatories acknowledged that the unresolved Korea question was the root cause of the Korean War.

They stipulated in Article V that the Armistice Agreement ``shall remain in effect'' until the Korea question is peacefully resolved.

History teaches that only Koreans can resolve the Korea question.

There is a role for friends, but Koreans must courageously take the lead, hopefully in coordination with their allies.

Resolution will lay the foundation for a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

The second inter-Korea summit provides an opportunity to come to grips with the fundamental source of tension on the Korean Peninsula.

A summit accomplishment of profound importance would be a formal agreement by the two Koreas to recognize one another as sovereign, pre-unified Korean governments with jurisdiction within agreed boundaries to be determined pending peaceful unification.

Appropriate confidence building measures to flow from this historic agreement would include the exchange of diplomatic missions and adjustments to basic documents, including each Korean constitution.

Parties to the 1953 Armistice Agreement should then inform the United Nations Security Council that all conditions necessitating the Armistice Agreement since 1953 have been resolved and the agreement can be terminated.

Cross-recognition and the other measures should have no bearing on either sincere unification strategies or existing alliances.

The root cause of tension on the Korean Peninsula is the unresolved Korea question. Only Koreans can resolve it. The second summit provides an opportunity to sow realistic seeds of peace and ultimately end the Korean War.

Paul Chamberlin is an adjunct fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, business consultant, and former U.S. Army Foreign Area (political-military) officer, specializing on Northeast Asia and U.S. relationships with both Koreas. ― ED.