Seoul's peace offensive clashes with geopolitics
Choo Jae-woo
Since its inauguration in 2025, the current South Korean administration has maintained a steadfast, yet increasingly scrutinized, focus on facilitating dialogue between the United States and North Korea.
This diplomatic agenda has been a recurring theme across a series of high-level engagements, including the South Korea-U.S. summits in August of last year and September this year, as well as critical meetings with Chinese leadership during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Gyeongju and January’s bilateral talks. Analysts suggest the government remains caught in a cycle of “hope torture,” driven by expectations that critics describe as detached from geopolitical realities.
During the first South Korea-U.S. summit in August 2025, President Lee Jae Myung positioned himself as a “pacemaker” and requested his American counterpart to act as a “peacemaker.” In doing so, he inflated his own expectations for the possibility of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attending the October APEC meeting. This was the result of being seized by the vague hope that because U.S. President Donald Trump also wanted it, while expecting that Chinese President Xi Jinping would play a “constructive role” as he iterated on numerous occasions.
The reason Seoul remains preoccupied with this is that another upcoming APEC summit in November is scheduled to be held in Shenzhen, China. Consequently, during the January summit with China and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Seoul in August, the South Korean government requested that Beijing play a role in for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Further, after Lee asked for Trump’s contribution during their September summit and the U.S. leader replied, “I will do so,” the former has been harboring even greater illusions.
However, reality is unfolding in the exact opposite direction for two main reasons.
First, news that dampened Lee’s expectations arrived just a week later. On Sept. 29, Yuri Ushakov, the Kremlin’s foreign policy advisor, confirmed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attendance at the APEC summit in November. The encouraging news he shared was that Xi is taking “measures” to host a trilateral summit between the leaders of the United States, China and Russia. He further expressed optimism on Oct. 1, stating it could happen “if things go according to plan.”
A key factor behind Russia’s proposal appears to be the fact that Putin is attending an in-person APEC meeting for the first time in nine years. He is also expected to meet Trump for the first time in two years. In any case, Putin seems intent on not letting this golden opportunity go to waste, appearing eager to assert his presence on the global stage.
This plan seems to have been set in motion during the recent diplomatic activities of the three nations. It can be inferred from their diplomatic schedules leading up to the U.N. General Assembly in September. While there is no public data or information explicitly discussing the trilateral summit, the process of the discussions can be surmised.
Xi and Putin held a meeting during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, from Aug. 31 to Sept. 1. It is highly probable that they discussed this matter there. Shortly thereafter, Xi made a state visit to the U.S. It is not outside the realm of possibility that Putin’s proposal was broached during the U.S.-China summit. Given that the announcement came from Russia, it is likely a Russian initiative. This provides grounds to view Kremlin’s remarks regarding a potential U.S.-China-Russia trilateral summit as the result of sequential summits between China and Russia and the U.S. and China.
Wang further cooled expectations for a North Korea-U.S. breakthrough during his August visit to Seoul, signaling that Beijing will not act as a primary mediator. Addressing reporters, Wang emphasized that dialogue remains a bilateral issue, asserting that a shift in Washington’s “hostile policy” is a necessary prerequisite for any summit. While maintaining a hands-off official stance, Wang noted that China would not remain a spectator, reiterating Beijing’s commitment to a constructive role in regional stability.
Given Wang’s high-level meetings with Kim and North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Pyongyang last April, his remarks may be viewed as a coordinated message reflecting North Korea’s current diplomatic position.
In a move that mirrors shifting diplomatic priorities, Trump ordered in August that the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercise be reduced from 11 days to just five. While Trump cited budget concerns, the timing suggests a strategic nod to Beijing’s recent demands for the U.S. to abandon its hostile policy. This comes amid reports that Washington attempted to initiate working-level talks in Europe earlier this year; however, North Korea reportedly rejected the outreach, arguing that traditional mediators like Sweden and Norway lost their neutrality upon joining NATO.
Despite the reduction in drills, Pyongyang has met the gesture with intensified rhetoric rather than a return to the negotiating table. Kim Yo-jong, the North Korean leader's powerful sister, in August and September, issued a series of sharp rebukes against U.S.-led regional maneuvers, including Pacific Vanguard and the Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral Freedom Edge exercises. Furthermore, she also criticized exercises involving South Korea and Japan — such as Cobra Gold, Pitch Black, RIMPAC and Super Garuda Shield — labeling them as “belligerent military movements,” “dangerous war games” and an “unchanging hostile policy.” She added the caveat that dialogue would only be possible if all such exercises were “suspended.”
North Korea is fundamentally redefining its stance on U.S. military activity, increasingly linking its own security to China’s regional interests. By categorizing U.S.-led efforts to contain Beijing as part of a hostile policy against the North, Pyongyang has effectively raised the bar for any potential diplomatic engagement with Washington.
This strategic shift was solidified during recent high-level summits in Beijing and Pyongyang, where North Korean leadership voiced explicit support for the “One China” principle and pledged to cooperate with China on Pacific stability. By expanding its opposition to include U.S. involvement in issues like Taiwan, North Korea has broadened the scope of its prerequisites for dialogue, signaling that it will continue to reject talks as long as the U.S. maintains its current regional military posture.
Choo Jae-woo is a professor at Kyung Hee University.