Respect, responsibility and future of Korea-US alliance
Chun In-bum
The Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance has endured for more than seven decades because it has always been about more than money. Yet today, there is a danger that both Washington and Seoul are losing sight of that fundamental truth. Public criticism, transactional diplomacy and domestic politics are beginning to overshadow the strategic value of one of the most successful alliances of the postwar era.
There is an important cultural dimension to this problem. Public criticism and public pressure do not work particularly well in Asia. Face, respect and the manner in which disagreements are handled still matter. This does not mean avoiding difficult conversations. Allies must speak frankly with each other. But there is an important difference between frankness and public humiliation.
China has repeatedly learned this lesson the hard way. Its economic and diplomatic pressure on Korea may sometimes have produced short-term effects, but coercion has also generated lasting resentment. Bullying can force a country to calculate the immediate costs of resistance, but it rarely creates genuine friendship or trust. Pressure is not the same thing as influence.
The United States should be careful not to fall into a similar trap. U.S. President Donald Trump's public statements about Korea are not appreciated by many Koreans. Questions about defense spending, trade, military deployments and burden-sharing are entirely legitimate. Washington has every right to raise them. Indeed, some of these conversations are overdue. But allies will inevitably disagree, sometimes seriously, and those disagreements are generally better handled through consultation and negotiation than through public threats or humiliation.
At the same time, Koreans should resist the temptation simply to blame Trump. Korea's progressive political forces should also consider whether some of their own rhetoric and policies have contributed to the present friction. Alliances involve two parties, and actions produce reactions. Seoul cannot expect Washington to accommodate every Korean domestic political consideration while simultaneously demanding unquestioned American commitment to Korea's defense. Responsibility rarely belongs entirely to one side.
More importantly, both countries need to remember what this alliance represents.
Americans and Koreans have fought together, trained together and deterred aggression together. Americans died defending the Republic of Korea during the Korean War. Korean forces fought alongside Americans in Vietnam and contributed to international operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For generations, soldiers from both countries have served together on the Korean Peninsula.
These sacrifices cannot be reduced to an accounting exercise.
The two countries share democratic values, security interests, technology, intelligence, military interoperability, economic interests and decades of institutional and personal relationships. The alliance helped prevent another major war on the Korean Peninsula and provided the security environment in which Korea transformed itself from a devastated country into a prosperous democracy and major economic power.
We therefore have far more to share than dollars and far more to lose than economics.
President Trump should remind himself of a basic strategic truth: Nobody can do it alone.
Even the world's most powerful country needs reliable allies. America's network of alliances is one of its greatest strategic advantages. American power is multiplied by bases, access, intelligence, logistics, technology, interoperability, diplomatic support and partners willing to stand alongside it.
China and Russia possess formidable military capabilities, but neither has an alliance network comparable to that of the United States. Washington should therefore be careful about treating allies primarily as customers purchasing American security. The important question is not simply how much an ally pays. It is also what America would lose strategically if that alliance disappeared.
But there is another side to this argument, and Koreans need to hear it: There is no free lunch.
The Republic of Korea in 2026 is not the Korea of 1953. We are no longer a poor, war-torn country dependent on others for survival. Korea is a major economy, a technologically sophisticated democracy, an increasingly important defense producer and a nation with substantial military capabilities. Success brings obligations.
Korea cannot demand an unconditional American commitment while avoiding difficult responsibilities of its own. We cannot expect American soldiers to risk their lives defending Korea while treating every security challenge beyond the Korean Peninsula as somebody else's problem.
A mature alliance must work both ways.
Korea should carry its fair share of the defense burden, continue strengthening its military capabilities and be prepared to assume greater responsibilities when its interests and those of the alliance require it. As Korea's economic and military power has grown, so too should its willingness to contribute to regional and international security.
That does not mean automatically following Washington. Alliance does not mean obedience. Korea has its own national interests, geography, political realities and relationships. There will inevitably be occasions when Seoul and Washington disagree. But strategic autonomy cannot mean enjoying the protection and advantages of an alliance while avoiding its obligations.
The same principle applies to Washington. Leadership is not domination. A capable ally should be treated as a partner, not as a subordinate or simply as a customer receiving a security service. This is the bargain that both countries need to rediscover. The Korea-U.S. alliance cannot be sustained indefinitely by bullying from one side or dependency from the other. Washington owes Seoul respect. Seoul owes Washington responsibility.
Both governments should also remember what is at stake. The alliance has survived war, authoritarian rule, democratization, economic crises, changes of government and serious disagreements between Seoul and Washington. It remains one of the foundations of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and an increasingly important component of security in the Indo-Pacific.
Short-term political advantage should not be allowed to damage something that took more than seven decades of sacrifice and trust to build. The Korea-U.S. alliance is neither charity nor a commercial transaction. It is a strategic partnership between two sovereign countries that have discovered, sometimes through painful experience, that they are safer and stronger together.
Washington should show greater respect. Seoul should accept greater responsibility. And both should remember the simplest strategic lesson of all: Nobody can do it alone.
Retired Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum is the former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command.