Authoritarian countries have alliance problems also
In August, the leaders of the United States, South Korea and Japan held a historic trilateral summit at Camp David. In a joint statement, the three leaders pledged comprehensive cooperation over the economy, technology, missile defense and maintaining the status quo “in the waters of Asia-Pacific” against China’s “dangerous and aggressive behaviors.” After the summit, some policy experts, however, raised concerns about the sustainability of the trilateral partnership, observing the continued conflicts between Korea and Japan and the two countries’ anxiety over the future reliability of the U.S. government.
In September, the leaders of Russia and North Korea held a summit in the Russian Far East. Though the summit did not see the release of a joint statement, there are predictions that North Korea will provide greater military support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, while Russia will provide economic and technological support for North Korea’s nuclear development. The international media has also portrayed the Russia-DPRK summit as strengthening the trilateral alliance between Russia, China and North Korea.
The governments of China, Russia and North Korea appear to recognize that they face common ideological and security pressures from the U.S.-led alliance. China and Russia have vetoed U.N. Security Council resolutions against the DPRK’s ballistic missile tests. China and North Korea have refused to condemn Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russia and North Korea have affirmed China’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. Countering the U.S.-led “hegemonic forces,” the revisionist powers may strategize supporting each other until the divisions within the U.S.-led alliance eventually cause the pressure to subside.
The three authoritarian regimes, however, also face challenges in managing an alliance. Past authoritarian alliances have often been less successful than democratic alliances in maintaining unity. During World War II, neither Japan nor Germany consulted each other in critical strategic decisions, such as the invasion of the Soviet Union and the bombing of Pearl Harbor. During the Cold War, the USSR and China engaged in armed border conflicts and eventually experienced a breakdown of their alliance, with China aligning instead with the United States against “Soviet hegemony.” North Korea advocated “Juche” (self-reliance) and kept its distance from the USSR and China.
Two common challenges for international alliances are the risks of abandonment and entrapment. A state might fear its security interests will be abandoned by its allies. Alternatively, a state might fear its allies will create a security crisis and entrap the former into the crisis. These risks pose serious obstacles today for the trilateral partnership between the U.S., South Korea and Japan. Many South Koreans fear Japan and the U.S. could entrap South Korea into an adverse conflict with Russia and China. Some in the U.S. and Japan fear the future South Korean government could become a “soft link” in the partnership and pursue an independent policy driven by “nationalist sentiments” toward Japan and North Korea.
However, the risks of abandonment and entrapment also threaten the alliance of authoritarian regimes. It might be tempting to assume that authoritarian regimes are more effective than political democracies in managing their alliances because they are less vulnerable to domestic political resistance against the regime’s foreign policy. However, the lack of domestic political restraints could cause an authoritarian regime’s foreign policy to be more unpredictable and intensify distrust among allies.
In a political democracy, the need for consensus among domestic constituents creates deterrence against sudden and drastic shifts in foreign policy. For example, during the trade conflict between Korea and Japan in 2019, the South Korean government continued the agreement to share military intelligence with Japan. Despite growing domestic advocacy for amending Japan’s pacifist constitution to establish a formal military, Japan’s government has been cautious in the scope of the amendment process. In the U.S., the Trump administration faced domestic pressures to restrain the scale of the “trade war” with China, negatively impacting U.S. businesses and the agricultural community.
In contrast, authoritarian regimes are more likely to risk drastic foreign policy actions. Putin surprised even Russia’s political institutions and China by launching “special military operations” against Ukraine. North Korea has rarely consulted with China or Russia on the timing and magnitude of its nuclear and missile tests. Such “policy independence” weakens the credibility of the alliance commitment. Could Russia use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine without consulting China and North Korea? Could China cut a deal with the U.S. and pressure Russia to end the war with an unfavorable settlement? Could North Korea change its foreign policy strategy again if Trump is reelected as U.S. president?
During the Cold War and post-Cold War period, the three countries committed multiple betrayals against each other. Under the “new Cold War” environment, the three countries will continue to be wary of each other’s motives and policies. Perhaps paradoxically, the revisionist states opposed to the “rule-based international order” face the challenge of establishing and enforcing rules for cooperation in sharing strategic responsibilities and resources.
In politics, there is a saying that one side wins by making fewer mistakes than the other side. Similarly, a successful international alliance is often relative to less successful alliances. The trilateral partnership between the U.S., South Korea and Japan faces multiple challenges and will likely face setbacks and conflicts in several policy areas. South Korea might refuse the U.S.'s request to send military aid to Ukraine. The U.S. might impose trade restrictions against South Korean companies. The course of East Asian geopolitics, however, will be impacted by whether the U.S.-ROK-Japan partnership will ultimately be more effective and cooperative than the Russia-China-DPRK partnership.
Will the first partnership achieve greater predictability and trust among partners? Will the first partnership be more efficient in allocating resources and responsibilities? For those who worry about the limitations and challenges of the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral partnership, it might be reassuring that this relative standard might be an easier benchmark to achieve.
Lee Jong-eun, Ph.D., is assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University.