century The Failed Attempts of Korea’s First Railroads

By Robert Neff

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Korea rapidly modernized using Western technology. Soon, electricity, telephones, telegraphs and modern hospitals were all features of Seoul but perhaps one of the most important advances was the construction of the railroad.

Prior to the railroad, travel between Jemulpo [modern Incheon] and Seoul was long, arduous and, at times, dangerous. A large number of the travelers walked the 13- or 14-hour journey over the poorly maintained road that became nearly impassible during the rainy season.

Others chose to go in Korean chairs borne by 2 or 4 stout coolies but in some cases the weight of the rotund passenger either broke the chair or caused the exhausted bearers to quit leaving the passenger no other choice but to walk.

The adventurous rode cantankerous Korean ponies that “invariably afforded an unfailing source of amusement and irritation according to the temperament of the traveler.”

Those with money could rent rickshaws. Although they were more comfortable than the previously mentioned modes of transportation, they were slow and subject to breakdowns. The only other option was the small steamboats that plied the Han River, but they were prone to accidents and rarely maintained their schedules.

But in 1896, things changed. A concession was granted to an American businessman to construct the Seoul-Chemulpo (Jemulpo) Railroad (SCRR). The groundbreaking ceremony took place on March 22, 1897, and was attended by a great number of Korean officials, Western diplomats and leading businessmen. On Sept. 18, 1899, the SCRR was officially opened for traffic from Jemulpo to the south bank of the Han River near Yeongdeungpo. Railroad operations in Seoul did not begin until July 8, 1900, when the Han River was finally bridged.

Although the SCRR was a great success, it didn’t start out that way. One problem that plagued all enterprises in Korea was the “squeeze” or the siphoning off of money by Korean officials. The SCRR was no exception. According to its agreement with the Korean government, the SCRR was required to hire as many Koreans as possible for the manual labor. Considering the relatively generous wages that the SCRR paid its employees, the company had no problem in securing and hiring 150 Korean coolies to work on the railroad. Shortly after the work had commenced, the once very content coolies became enraged after discovering that a portion of their wages was being “squeezed” by government officials.

The coolies promptly went on strike and demanded higher wages to make up for their officials’ “squeeze.” The strike was quickly broken when the company threatened to replace the Koreans with Chinese.

But not all problems were caused by greedy Korean officials -- some were caused by abusive Westerners. When the SCRR was formed and construction began, there were only a few qualified Western engineers in Korea and the company was forced to accept whoever they could get. Even the 13-year-old son of the American minister to Korea was hired to assist the chief engineer.

Most of these engineers were well-adjusted men who quietly did their job and then left. Others spent the rest of their lives in Korea working at the gold mines or established their own businesses. But there were some whose expertise benefited the railroad but their fiery personalities proofed detrimental to the relationship between the railroad and the Korean community. One of these men was Phillips, who arrived at Jemulpo in Aug. 1897.

Phillips was a huge, rough and tough American, probably from California, who, at nearly six foot six inches, towered over the average five foot four inch Korean. But it wasn’t his size that inspired fear amongst the Koreans -- it was his deadly accuracy with a pistol.

William Franklin Sands, the secretary at the American legation in Seoul, described Phillips as being “one of the most beautiful efficient revolver shots I have ever seen. He could shoot the head off a flying bird without seeming to aim.”

Although Sands’ claim at first appears to be a gross exaggeration, there was some truth to it. In September 1897, Minister Allen was surprised when he received a polite complaint from the governor of Seoul. The governor accused Phillips of frightening the community with his wild antics of shooting the top-knots off pedestrians walking by ­ some at distances of nearly 100 yards.

Allen was shocked and alarmed at the audacity of the young American. At first he refused to believe that a fellow American could do such a thing, but deep down he feared it was true.

Allen sent a note of protest to the SCRR and demanded that Phillips cease his outrageous behavior of scaring the Koreans in the “manner of American cowboys with a ‘tenderfoot.’” Phillips was warned that if this type of behavior continued, Allen would have him disarmed and thrown out of the country. Then, somewhat softening, Allen assured Phillips that once he came to know the country and its people he would rue his harsh actions. Phillips readily complied.

Later, when questioned why he had shot at the Koreans, Phillips sheepishly explained, “he had only been afraid of getting out of (shooting) practice.”

Another abusive American engineer was W.H. Holmes from Chattanooga, Tennessee. Holmes was an expert bridge builder and had been hired to erect the Han River’s first permanent bridge.

At 2,070 feet long, the bridge was the most difficult section to complete of the SSCR and the subsequent railroads that radiated out from Seoul.

Most of the materials needed for the bridge and the railroad could not be obtained in Korea and had to be imported directly from the United States. This included 1,132,895 feet of Oregon timber, 10 steel spans for the bridge, and 2,144 tons of steel rails for the track.

One of the few materials that could be obtained in Korea was the stone needed for the construction of the bridge piers and the abutments. Holmes hired a large number of Chinese coolies to quarry the stone blocks needed for the construction of the bridge. Despite his best efforts, the bridge’s construction soon fell behind and Holmes was convinced it was because his Chinese quarrymen were not working hard enough. Like many Westerners at the time, he believed that beating his Chinese laborers would make them work faster ­ he was wrong. The Chinese, tired of their constant beatings, went on strike and further slowed the construction of the bridge.

Eventually, the SSCR was completed, but it wasn't completed by the Americans. Hampered by the increasing construction costs and the difficulties of constructing the bridge over the Han River, the SSCR was sold to a Japanese syndicate and handed over on Dec. 31, 1898. The Americans had failed but they weren’t the only ones.

On May 8, 1902, the groundbreaking ceremony for the Northwestern Railway (NWR) was held at Independence Park in Seoul. The French-operated railroad was to be financed by the Korean government and built by French engineers using French materials. It would connect Seoul with China by way of Kaesong, Pyongyang and then Uiju on the Yalu River. Many people, including Allen, were convinced the project was a “money-loser.” With a budget of only $50,000 dollars to complete the entire line, it was extremely underfunded. On the average, the Japanese-built Seoul-Pusan line cost nearly $50,000 dollars per mile!

By the summer of1902, construction of the NWR ceased. A British diplomat reported: “Lack of money is no doubt the reason. A Russian financier recently made an offer for the right to construct the line, but the Korean Government refused on the ground that they contemplated the completion of the undertaking themselves.” They never did.

By 1904 the Japanese military government was in full control of the NWR. This time it was well-funded. Nearly $800,000 was allocated for its construction along with 30,000 coolies and it was completed at the end of 1905.

Japan continued to lay track across Korea and by the 1910s, all major cities in Korea were connected by railway. In the long run, the railways were, according to Prof. Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University, “beneficial, even if the colonial authorities had developed them as part of the grand Japanese strategy in East Asia.”