Alliance, deterrence and nuclear capabilities

By Chun In-bum

Chun In-bum

South Korea is a dynamic and fast-paced society. Anyone who doubts this need only look at Korean politics and its often turbulent nature. One issue currently dominating Korean politics is the debate over an indigenous nuclear deterrent for South Korea. Major political leaders from the ruling party have convened at the National Assembly to advocate for either a nuclear-armed South Korea or enhanced nuclear weapons capability.

Polls reveal conflicting data concerning South Korean society's perceptions about homegrown nuclear weapons. One poll found that only 15 percent of Korean "experts" were in favor of a nuclear-armed South Korea, while most public polls show more than 70 percent and even 90 percent support among educated groups. Regardless of these figures, it is evident that Koreans are deeply concerned.

American experts and some South Koreans argue that distrust in the United States and its extended deterrence is the key reason behind the push for a homegrown nuclear capability. However, a more fundamental reason is the pervasive uncertainty in today's global landscape. Despite efforts by the U.S. Joe Biden and South Korea's Yoon administrations, including advancements in the Nuclear Consultative Group and the U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group Framework signed Friday, uncertainties remain, stemming not only from North Korea but also from broader international affairs.

In pursuing its case for an indigenous nuclear capability, South Korea must carefully articulate its case. First, it must make it clear that it does not intend to abandon the ROK-U.S. alliance for nuclear weapons. This is crucial in the choice of words and logic. For instance, the ruling party's movement advocating for nuclear latency named itself the Mugunghwa (Rose of Sharon) Forum. While the Rose of Sharon is Korea's national flower and the name of a clandestine 1970s nuclear weapons project, this association may send the wrong signal internationally. Many advocates of South Korean nuclear weapons are dangerously close to presenting themselves as willing to abandon the ROK-U.S. alliance or pursue an independent capability. No nation can defend itself alone.

Second, South Korea has legitimate reasons for recycling nuclear fuel. The country has built numerous nuclear plants since the Kori plant in Busan began operations in 1978. With five sites and 26 reactors, nuclear energy accounted for 29.6 percent of South Korea's power mix in 2022. However, nuclear waste management remains a significant challenge. Producing approximately 600 metric tons of nuclear waste annually, South Korea lacks a long-term disposal solution. Reprocessing used nuclear fuel will offer economic benefits and a waste solution but also opens the door to weaponization.

Third, while the Non-Proliferation Treaty has provided many benefits, it failed to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear state. The North Korean nuclear threat is not the sole cause of Korean concern but a final tipping point. The main worry stems from South Korea's geopolitical relations with mainland Asia and emerging international political challenges.

Finally, South Korea is a reliable U.S. ally, consistently demonstrating its commitment to the partnership through combat in Korea and Vietnam as well as Iraq and Afghanistan and various joint military exercises, diplomatic cooperation and economic ties. Any military or nuclear capability developed by South Korea should be viewed as an extension of U.S. deterrence, similar to the strategic dynamics observed with NATO and France, where allied nuclear forces complement the broader deterrent umbrella provided by the United States. Assisting South Korea in enhancing its deterrent capability could also bring transparency to its nuclear ambitions, fostering greater international trust. This collaboration would involve rigorous safety protocols and joint oversight, ensuring that any advancements are in line with global non-proliferation norms. Moreover, such assistance could facilitate the sharing of best practices and advanced technologies, thereby improving the overall safety and security of South Korea's nuclear infrastructure. By reinforcing South Korea's defense posture in this manner, the U.S. would not only strengthen a key alliance but also contribute to regional stability and deter potential adversaries through a united front.

For Koreans, the question is not merely whether South Korea should possess nuclear weapons but also how to maintain the ROK-U.S. alliance while securing nuclear capabilities. Simultaneously, South Koreans must recognize that nuclear weapons will not address all security concerns and understand the significant responsibility that comes with such capabilities. It is crucial to approach this issue with a balanced perspective, acknowledging the strategic benefits and potential risks. Transparent communication and collaboration with international partners will be vital in ensuring that South Korea's actions are not misinterpreted and that global non-proliferation norms are upheld. By doing so, South Korea can enhance its security while contributing to regional and global stability. Ultimately, the pursuit of a nuclear deterrent must be carefully weighed against the broader goals of peace, stability, and the enduring strength of the ROK-U.S. alliance. This careful consideration will help ensure that South Korea's actions align with its long-term national interests and the collective security framework of the region.

Chun In-bum (truechun@naver.com) served as a lieutenant general of the ROK Army and commander of Special Forces Korea.