Nuclear Consultative Group: What should be done in 2024?

It’s a new year. We come across a lot of geopolitical and economic forecasts for the new year: tensions in U.S.-China relations; wars continuing to rage in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip; major elections in more than 40 countries, including Korea and the United States; and how all of these developments will impact Korea’s security and economic landscape.

Amid all these forecasts and concerns, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un raised the level of threat against South Korea through his statement at the Central Committee Plenary Meeting held in Pyongyang at the end of December. He redefined relations between the two Koreas as hostile and belligerent, and vowed that North Korea would make every possible effort to overpower the whole of South Korea's territory, employing all the available capabilities and resources, including nuclear weapons.

This heightened threat from Kim himself will lead to increasing calls in South Korea for the re-deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, or even South Korea’s own nuclear weapons development program. However, for the time being, the most realistic measure we can take is to fully implement and utilize the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), which was launched in July last year. The NCG had its second meeting in Washington, D.C., last December. At the meeting, the NCG adopted the work plan for 2024, which clearly reflected its commitment to timely and full implementation.

First of all, the NCG agreed to work out by this coming June the guidelines necessary to regulate the nuclear consultation processes in times of crisis and contingencies. Before the NCG, there was an important credibility issue with the U.S.' extended deterrence. It was because of the perception that the extended deterrence was a unilateral offer by the U.S. over which South Korea did not have any say. The adoption of the guidelines must help to meet the objective of “joint planning and joint implementation,” and remove the credibility gap.

Second, the NCG agreed to continue to develop security and information-sharing protocols. However, in the multi-faceted security consultations between Korea and the U.S., one piece of information, that the U.S. does not share with Korea, is the information concerning U.S. nuclear assets and their operations. The NCG’s work on security and information-sharing protocols is expected to lead to enhanced sharing of quality information with Korea, an essential element for the success of the NCG.

Third, through the NCG, it was agreed that the expansion of exercises, simulations and training between the two militaries will be implemented. Military commanders repeatedly emphasize the importance of training and exercises. That is generally true. With respect to the NCG in particular, the importance of training and exercises cannot be overemphasized for the simple reason that extended deterrence against North Korea involves two militaries and weapons under systems of conventional nuclear integration (CNI). It is a highly sophisticated operation.

Other than the three points summed up above, the 2nd NCG reviewed progress and adopted a work plan for such important topics as strategic communications and risk reduction practices. The NCG’s progress so far has been solid and credible, which hopefully will continue in the new year. On top of them, I wish to make several suggestions for the future progress of the NCG.

First, when we complete the work regarding the guidelines for nuclear consultation by June, we will have to work out the operational plan for CNI in accordance with those guidelines. The Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) for Korea was amended after 10 years on the occasion of the Security Consultative Meeting held in Seoul last November. At the time, General Shin Won-sik, Korea’s Minister of National Defense, said that the TDS would be further developed to an “operational level.”

Second, in order to ensure the effective implementation of the guidelines and the operational plan, Korea must expedite and complete its plan to modernize and enhance its conventional capabilities based on the three pillars of its Kill Chain for preemptive strikes, the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) program. It is encouraging that the Korean Ministry of National Defense’s Mid-term Plan for 2024-28 designated the three pillars as the top priority of the plan.

Third, for the effective sharing of nuclear-related information, it is necessary to detach Korean officers to work at the U.S. Strategic Command. A Working Group has been set up under the NCG. Korean officers at the Working Group must be sent to the U.S. Strategic Command to work together with their U.S. counterparts, modeled on the way the officers of the two countries have so successfully worked together at the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command in Korea since 1978.

The author is chair professor at Kyungnam University. He served as Korean ambassador to the U.S. and vice foreign minister.