South Korea, US should not overreact to Russia-NK partnership

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began in 2022, the Russia-North Korea partnership has visibly expanded. Already since last year, North Korea has been accused by Western intelligence agencies of supplying arms and munitions to Russia’s military operations. Russia, in return, has used its veto in the U.N. Security Council to protect North Korea from international resolutions imposing new sanctions against its multiple missile tests.

The Russia-North Korea partnership advanced further with the recent bilateral summit. In September, North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un met with Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin in the Russian Far East and affirmed “full and unconditional support” for the latter. A month later, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited North Korea, expressed gratitude for North Korea’s “unambiguous support” for Russia’s military operation in Ukraine and declared that bilateral ties had reached a “new, strategic level.”

The signs of Russia and North Korea's increased partnership have caused predictions and concerns within U.S. and South Korean policy circles. How would the bilateral partnership impact the war in Ukraine? Or geopolitical security in East Asia? There are predictions that North Korea will increase its military support for Russia’s war and receive Russia’s technological and economic support for its satellite and nuclear programs. Some policy experts, in particular, have expressed worries that the Russia-North Korea partnership could cause strains in the U.S.-South Korea alliance. North Korea’s supply of arms to Russia could increase U.S. pressure on South Korea to send military aid to Ukraine. South Korea’s reluctance, however, to increase its risk of direct conflict with Russia could create tensions with the U.S. Additionally, Russia’s economic and technological support for North Korea could increase South Korea’s security vulnerability toward a “new cold war” in Northeast Asia, weakening South Korea’s confidence in its alliance with the U.S.

Though the recent strengthening of the Russia-North Korea partnership poses strategic challenges, it is important for U.S. and South Korean policymakers not to overreact in their strategic responses. Recognizing the constraints of the present Russia-North Korea partnership is important for the U.S. and South Korea to take policy measures without exacerbating the geopolitical tensions in Europe and East Asia or causing tensions in the U.S.-South Korea alliance.

First, North Korea’s supply of arms to Russia is unlikely to change the military situation significantly in Ukraine. Though recent satellite images have shown increased traffic of supplies leaving North Korea by rail and ships to Russia, the volume of arms being supplied is likely a fraction of the amount Russia’s military uses daily on the war front. U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley has also expressed skepticism on how much arms North Korea could contribute to Russia’s “tin cup.” As North Korea also relies on a large conventional military (together with its nuclear arsenal) for security deterrence against the U.S.-South Korea alliance, the regime will be forced to limit arms sent overseas unless it can expand its military output drastically.

Second, Russia’s economic and technological support for North Korea will likely be limited in volume. The war in Ukraine has already caused a decline of Russia’s influence in Central Asia and the Caucuses. Though Russia’s economic aid will help North Korea withstand international sanctions, Russia’s cost of fighting its current “special military operation” will severely constrain its resources in supporting its few remaining allies. With Russia’s military struggling to replenish its arsenals destroyed in Ukraine, it will also be difficult to deliver a substantial number of sophisticated weapons to North Korea’s large but technologically outdated military, not enough to change the military balance in the Korean Peninsula.

Third, Russia’s assistance with North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear development does pose challenges to the U.S. and South Korea’s efforts to maintain nuclear deterrence. However, it is not yet certain whether Russia will provide such assistance, as it is disadvantageous for it to trade its sophisticated technology for North Korea’s limited supply of conventional arms. Russia is more likely to make such concessions only if the military situation in Ukraine becomes dire. Paradoxically, should a decline in Russia’s military capacity necessitate selling its nuclear technology to rely on North Korea’s arms, the Russia-North Korea partnership will pose a weakened geopolitical threat to the West, South Korea and Japan. Even North Korea may not want such a weakened Russia as its ally.

Fourth, China has so far kept a distance from the Russia-North Korea partnership. Even China’s “self-interested neutrality” significantly constrains the bilateral partnership from expanding into a more formidable trilateral partnership. However, the expansion of the Russia-North Korea partnership could cause a counterproductive effect of increasing their distance from China, which is reluctant to be perceived as directly involved with Russia’s war in Ukraine or North Korea’s nuclear provocations.

Recognizing such constraints should encourage U.S. and South Korean policymakers not to overreact in their responses toward the Russia-North Korea partnership. North Korea’s arms supply to Russia need not necessitate South Korea’s reciprocal arms supply to Ukraine and cause tensions in the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Russia’s potential aid to North Korea is a disappointment for South Korea, but it need not cause anxiety about the shifting of security balance in Northeast Asia. Portraying the Russia-North Korea partnership as an extension of a trilateral partnership with China risks a “self-fulling prophecy.” It will be more effective instead to tolerate or even complement China’s tactical ambiguity to cause Russia and North Korea to become disappointed in their less reliable partner.

The Russia-North Korea strategic partnership may be a “growing wind” challenging the strategic security of the U.S.-Korea alliance, but it is not a “geopolitical blizzard.” With prudent responses, the U.S. and South Korea can also show Russian and North Korean policymakers the limited effectiveness of their strategic partnership.

Lee Jong-eun, Ph.D., is assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University.