By Hwang Jae-ho
Tomorrow (Apr. 27), President Moon Jae-in and north Korean leader Kim Jong-un are holding a sensational summit at Panmunjeom, the village which represents the division of the two Koreas.
Following the summits of Kim Jong-il with Kim Dae-Jung, and Kim Jong-il with Roh Moo-Hyun, this is the third summit between leaders from the South and North.
This time it has several significant points; first, from a short term perspective, it could bring about sustainable and regularized Inter-Korean talks as well as a successful U.S.-North Korea Summit; second, it could be the beginning of peace building on the Korean Peninsula over the long term.
The ultimate purpose of the April 27 summit is way more meaningful than a simple meeting between the two Koreas' leaders; it is a symbolic but practical process for denuclearization, a mutual agreement on principles regarding the peace regime, a military detente and trust-building measures, and exchanges and cooperation on a civic level can be anticipated.
The core of the summit is peace and security.
First, a remark about denuclearization directly from Kim Jong-un will clear up not only North Korea's will and promise on denuclearization, but also the meaning of the gradual and conditional denuclearization North Korea has mentioned.
Second, the further disposal of ICBMs, which is of critical interest to the U.S., can be confirmed. Though a practical dismantlement, verification and inspection of North Korea's denuclearization must be the best case, at least we will get to know North Korea's position on "CVID."
Third, it will be an opportunity to tap the necessity for a newly upgraded Six-party Talks framework, and the potential possibility for North Korea's reinstatement in them.
Fourth, the current Korean peninsula status and related multilateral security will be comprehensively discussed regarding the peace regime.
Fifth, an approach which accompanies the denuclearization in a virtuous cycle might be recommended. Summing up, in order to settle a peace regime on detente, a symbolic and substantial outcome needs to be derived.
Besides the security issue, exchanges and cooperation in sport, culture and art will be revitalized. In addition, along with efforts on specifying and expanding humanitarian aid, considerable positive impacts will spill over to unexpected sectors.
However, since South Korea's independent economic cooperation with North Korea is not feasible under current international sanctions on the North, the approach will be cautiously held to a limited, selective, and gradual way.
Nevertheless, the pace and the spectrum of the field are expected to increase depending on the results of the U.S.-North Korea Summit.
As soon as the inter-Korean meeting ends, the government must be ready to get back to reality, preparing for later circumstances.
Coordinating the potential obstacles of U.S.-North Korea Summit is a priority. To begin with, prior consultations regarding denuclearization and a peace regime should be delivered to the U.S. in order to successfully complete the talks.
Furthermore, a plan needs to be established to implement any inter-Korean agreement while maintaining and institutionalizing the inter-Korean communication channel at the same time.
Above all, the agenda and systems for various measures should be arranged: U.S.-South-North Korea, China-South-North Korea, U.S.-China-South-North Korea talks or others. In this sense, another Inter-Korean Summit after the U.S-North Korea Summit is a crucial necessity.
So far, China and both Koreas have been the main actors in Korean peninsula issues; however, this was converted into the U.S. and two Koreas leading during the PyeongChang Olympics.
An uncomfortable situation for China referred to as "China Passing" has taken place. In spite of such dynamics, China's role as ever remains critical in that North Korea will not change without its participation. In other words, China is still the key-player here as we witnessed through the China-North Korea Summit.
The international condition requires China's more clear and expanded role. For instance, it should adhere to its present standpoint toward North Korea until the U.S.-North Korea Summit, in order to prove it has not released any of the sanctions on the North.
Since the "Freeze for Freeze" and the "Dual-Track Approach" is actually going on, implicit cooperation with South Korea is essential to sustain these routes.
Before actual multilateral talks, China must work on determining the form of a peace regime agreement: either US-South-North Korea?combination which allows China's guarantee or a U.S.-China-South-North Korea simultaneously.
Today's Northeast Asia is very complicated, adding North Korea issues to the U.S.'s diplomacy, security and trade policies toward China and South Korea.
Considering Trump's personal political crisis and the off-year election in November, both the U.S.-China and U.S.-South Korea relations are unpredictable.
China should promote foreign policies which receive positive perceptions in South Korea.
In South Korea, on the other hand, China is often recognized as an irresponsible defect in sanctions on North Korea or is supportive to North Korea.
Therefore, until a tangible outcome in North Korea is proven, it seems necessary to make China a close and reliable friend of South Korea: China as a responsible power.
Hwang Jae-ho is a director of the Global Security Cooperation Center, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul.
.jpg/dims/resize/740/optimize) |
Following the summits of Kim Jong-il with Kim Dae-Jung, and Kim Jong-il with Roh Moo-Hyun, this is the third summit between leaders from the South and North.
This time it has several significant points; first, from a short term perspective, it could bring about sustainable and regularized Inter-Korean talks as well as a successful U.S.-North Korea Summit; second, it could be the beginning of peace building on the Korean Peninsula over the long term.
The ultimate purpose of the April 27 summit is way more meaningful than a simple meeting between the two Koreas' leaders; it is a symbolic but practical process for denuclearization, a mutual agreement on principles regarding the peace regime, a military detente and trust-building measures, and exchanges and cooperation on a civic level can be anticipated.
The core of the summit is peace and security.
First, a remark about denuclearization directly from Kim Jong-un will clear up not only North Korea's will and promise on denuclearization, but also the meaning of the gradual and conditional denuclearization North Korea has mentioned.
Second, the further disposal of ICBMs, which is of critical interest to the U.S., can be confirmed. Though a practical dismantlement, verification and inspection of North Korea's denuclearization must be the best case, at least we will get to know North Korea's position on "CVID."
Third, it will be an opportunity to tap the necessity for a newly upgraded Six-party Talks framework, and the potential possibility for North Korea's reinstatement in them.
Fourth, the current Korean peninsula status and related multilateral security will be comprehensively discussed regarding the peace regime.
Fifth, an approach which accompanies the denuclearization in a virtuous cycle might be recommended. Summing up, in order to settle a peace regime on detente, a symbolic and substantial outcome needs to be derived.
Besides the security issue, exchanges and cooperation in sport, culture and art will be revitalized. In addition, along with efforts on specifying and expanding humanitarian aid, considerable positive impacts will spill over to unexpected sectors.
However, since South Korea's independent economic cooperation with North Korea is not feasible under current international sanctions on the North, the approach will be cautiously held to a limited, selective, and gradual way.
Nevertheless, the pace and the spectrum of the field are expected to increase depending on the results of the U.S.-North Korea Summit.
As soon as the inter-Korean meeting ends, the government must be ready to get back to reality, preparing for later circumstances.
Coordinating the potential obstacles of U.S.-North Korea Summit is a priority. To begin with, prior consultations regarding denuclearization and a peace regime should be delivered to the U.S. in order to successfully complete the talks.
Furthermore, a plan needs to be established to implement any inter-Korean agreement while maintaining and institutionalizing the inter-Korean communication channel at the same time.
Above all, the agenda and systems for various measures should be arranged: U.S.-South-North Korea, China-South-North Korea, U.S.-China-South-North Korea talks or others. In this sense, another Inter-Korean Summit after the U.S-North Korea Summit is a crucial necessity.
So far, China and both Koreas have been the main actors in Korean peninsula issues; however, this was converted into the U.S. and two Koreas leading during the PyeongChang Olympics.
An uncomfortable situation for China referred to as "China Passing" has taken place. In spite of such dynamics, China's role as ever remains critical in that North Korea will not change without its participation. In other words, China is still the key-player here as we witnessed through the China-North Korea Summit.
The international condition requires China's more clear and expanded role. For instance, it should adhere to its present standpoint toward North Korea until the U.S.-North Korea Summit, in order to prove it has not released any of the sanctions on the North.
Since the "Freeze for Freeze" and the "Dual-Track Approach" is actually going on, implicit cooperation with South Korea is essential to sustain these routes.
Before actual multilateral talks, China must work on determining the form of a peace regime agreement: either US-South-North Korea?combination which allows China's guarantee or a U.S.-China-South-North Korea simultaneously.
Today's Northeast Asia is very complicated, adding North Korea issues to the U.S.'s diplomacy, security and trade policies toward China and South Korea.
Considering Trump's personal political crisis and the off-year election in November, both the U.S.-China and U.S.-South Korea relations are unpredictable.
China should promote foreign policies which receive positive perceptions in South Korea.
In South Korea, on the other hand, China is often recognized as an irresponsible defect in sanctions on North Korea or is supportive to North Korea.
Therefore, until a tangible outcome in North Korea is proven, it seems necessary to make China a close and reliable friend of South Korea: China as a responsible power.
Hwang Jae-ho is a director of the Global Security Cooperation Center, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul.
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