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By Lee Jong-eun
This year's spring has been a busy time of bilateral diplomacy between South Korea and Japan. In March, South Korean President Yoon Seok Yeol visited Japan to meet Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, marking the first bilateral summit in 12 years. The summit revived shuttle diplomacy between the two heads of state. In early May, Kishida visited South Korea for another summit and invited Korea's president again to Japan to participate in the G7 Summit later that month. During the G7 Summit, the two leaders visited a memorial in Hiroshima commemorating the Korean victims of the atomic bomb.
A number of international press and policy experts have positively evaluated the diplomacy between Yoon and Kishida to overcome historical as well as contemporary tensions between their two countries. The proponents of improved Korea-Japan relations have expressed hope that the two leaders will continue to show proactive leadership in strengthening the bilateral partnership over economic and security areas. Several observers have even compared Yoon-Kishida diplomacy to the diplomacy between President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi in the late 90s, attributed as having achieved major diplomatic breakthrough in bilateral relations.
There are also skeptics who have doubts about the durable success of the recent shuttle diplomacy. Recalling the cycles of rapprochement and conflicts that have characterized contemporary Korea-Japan relations, skeptical observers have expressed reservations that the next incident of bilateral dispute or controversy could halt or even reverse the progress from the two leaders' diplomatic endeavors.
For example, suppose South Korean domestic politics rally against the discharge of "treated" wastewater from Fukushima's nuclear plants into the ocean? Or suppose nationalist elements within Japan's domestic politics advocate vocally for territorial claims over South Korea's Dokdo islets? For Yoon and Kishida to succeed in establishing durable "future-oriented" bilateral relations, the two leaders face challenges from their respective domestic politics. And weaker the leader's political standing is within his country, the less political leverage he will have in restraining the domestic opposition to pursue substantive foreign policy actions.
For international negotiators, domestic political constraints on foreign policy negotiations are commonly described as a "two-level game." However, an important characteristic of the two-level game, often overlooked, is that foreign policy negotiations may provide policymakers with opportunities to overcome domestic political gridlocks. With foreign policy successes, the ruling government may gain political leverage to consolidate its domestic governance and policies.
Prime Minister Kishida benefited politically from the outcome of his bilateral diplomacy with President Yoon. Early this year, Kishida's government faced low public approval and criticisms for Japan's slow economic growth. Japan's domestic politics, however, have positively evaluated Kishida's outgoing diplomacies in the spring, including meeting with President Yoon, Ukraine's President Zelenskyy, and the hosting of the G7 Summit. As a result, Kishida's approval poll has risen to over 50 percent, strengthening his leadership over the ruling party and domestic politics.
The improvement in his popularity has bolstered Kishida's political agenda and has also expanded his political leeway in international diplomacy. During his visit to Korea, Kishida expressed personal remorse for the Korean victims of Japan's forced labor. At G7 Summit, Kishida became the first Japanese Prime Minister to commemorate Korean victims of the atomic bombings in Japan. Though these gestures might not be sufficient for the South Korean domestic political sentiment, they are indicators of Kishida's increased independence from the constraints of a more hardline faction within his government.
President Yoon, however, has not yet benefited politically from his diplomacy with Japan. The majority of South Korean domestic politics disapproved of Yoon's first summit with Kishida for making too many concessions. Even though the next series of shuttle diplomacy received more positive evaluations, Yoon's political approval has improved only marginally, hovering around 40 percent in the polls.
Japanese policymakers' common criticism of South Korea has been that the latter's foreign policy toward Japan frequently vacillates because of domestic political pressures. Japanese policymakers, however, should then ask themselves whether they could have been more effective in supporting their Korean counterparts who favor cooperative partnerships with Japan. Despite domestic criticisms, Yoon's government made concessions at the first bilateral summit, in part, based on a calculation to strengthen more moderate Kishida's leadership over more hardline members within Japan's domestic politics.
For the durable success of the bilateral partnership, however, the two governments should be mutually successful. If Japanese policymakers desire the diplomatic progress from the Yoon-Kishida partnership to continue, then Kishida's government should be proactive in supporting Yoon's government to become perceived as successful in the eyes of South Korean domestic politics.
For Kishida's government, supporting Yoon's government entails "denial of sticks, providing of crowns." Kishida's government should deny South Korean domestic opposition "sticks" to condemn Yoon's government's diplomacy toward Japan. Restraining the members of the Japanese government from provoking memories of historical grievance, is Kishida's responsibility in mitigating the South Korean government's vulnerability to domestic political backlash.
The success of the Kishida-Yoon partnership also depends on Japan's commitment to Yoon's foreign policy success in returning with "crowns" of achievements to South Korean domestic politics. Japan's endorsement of South Korea's hosting of the 2030 World Expo; the candidacy for a nonpermanent seat in the UN Security Council for 2024-2025 could be tangible demonstrations of Japan's support for its neighbor's rise as a "global pivotal state."
Will the Yoon-Kishida partnership achieve a durable Korea-Japan partnership? Or would it repeat the past patterns of progress and setbacks in bilateral relations? Only time will tell, but what is clear is that each leader has a stake in ensuring the success of the other partner. Though political constraints of the "two-level game" are still present, may the two leaders succeed in using their foreign policy partnership to transform together their countries' domestic politics.
Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu), a Ph.D. candidate, is an adjunct faculty member at the American University School of International Service. His research specialties include U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management and East Asian regional security.