South Korea's fateful nuclear choice

By Park Jung-won

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden held a summit at the White House on April 26, announcing the Washington Declaration, which calls for strengthening the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence.

As part of the Washington Declaration, the two leaders agreed to establish the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), through which the two countries will discuss closely and regularly potential retaliation measures against North Korea, using U.S. nuclear weapons if the North launches a nuclear attack. Experts worry that the NCG's remit will fall short of that of a similar body, NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). However, the NPG also entails a consultation process rather than a detailed plan for the use of nuclear weapons, given that the U.S. has the ultimate authority over the use of such arms.

One key difference is that aircraft belonging to NATO member states on which U.S. nuclear weapons can be deployed are currently used in training exercises to carry out nuclear retaliation missions in case of that contingency. However, in Northeast Asia the U.S. Air Force maintains that immediate nuclear retaliation is currently possible without South Korea's participation; if the North Korean nuclear threat becomes more serious in the future, South Korea could then actively participate in nuclear retaliation missions after appropriate consultations with the U.S.

The two leaders also agreed to enhance the visibility of strategic assets deployed to the Korean Peninsula, as evidenced by the impending dispatch of a U.S. nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) to South Korea for the first time since the 1980s. It is said that a single U.S. SSBN's arsenal is equivalent to the total nuclear stockpiles of some lesser nuclear powers. An SSBN deployment to South Korea means that it will regularly operate around the Korean Peninsula and can send a strong signal of deterrence to North Korea.

Having said that, these "optimistic" assessments may be nothing more than wishful thinking given the harsh reality of conditions on the Korean Peninsula. After all, what ultimately gives the Washington Declaration teeth is the expectation that if South Korea is hit by North Korea's nuclear weapons, the U.S. will retaliate with its own. But no one knows if the U.S. will really carry out its pledge when the time comes.

Moreover, the unpredictability of U.S. politics, especially as next year's presidential election approaches, could turn the declaration into a meaningless piece of paper. In this regard, it is shocking that President Yoon gave up his country's right to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which would allow it to produce its own nuclear weapons, at a time when North Korea's tactical nuclear threat against South Korea is becoming manifest. Did President Yoon not have the determination to carry out diplomatic brinksmanship with the U.S., as President Syngman Rhee once did?

Since persuading North Korea to denuclearize through diplomacy now seems a virtual impossibility, it is essential for South Korea to resolve the nuclear asymmetry between the two Koreas through some form of nuclear balance as soon as possible. For now, the simplest way to establish this balance would be the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. The U.S., however, has rejected such a measure, perhaps believing that the placement of such weapons in stationary bunkers in South Korea rather than in mobile and stealthy aircraft or submarines makes less sense militarily and would create very tempting targets for North Korea.

But the permanent presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea would make a huge difference in terms of the psychological threat felt by North Korea. Moreover, rather than leaving ambiguous the possibility of South Korea's future independent nuclear armament, the declaration makes clear the deliberate U.S. intention to prevent South Korea's nuclear armament under any circumstance.

Before the summit, many South Korean security experts hoped for a formal U.S. commitment to automatic nuclear retaliation "without hesitation" in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack on South Korea, but the final declaration did not go so far. In other words, the diplomatic wrangling which led to the Washington Declaration may end up having been just another "talkfest" of little substance despite the declaration's apparently stronger pledges.

In order to take advantage of U.S. nuclear capabilities at the level that South Korea wants, there are many issues that South Korea needs to resolve on its own first. South Korean society has become very polarized over perceptions of North Korea's nuclear threat, and political factions have been arguing over the essence of the "North Korean issue" within a dual conservative/progressive framework.

Hopes for a bipartisan, unified stance by South Korea towards North Korea's nuclear threats, which could send a strong message to the U.S. in terms of the will of the South Korean people, seem like a pipe dream under the current political environment. Given this sad reality of a divided South Korean society, it is hard to conclude with confidence that this summit's aims to strengthen the alliance and enhance deterrence of North Korea's nuclear weapons program will be achieved. Importantly, the Yoon government must confront the fact that it still has much to do when it comes to dealing with North Korea's nuclear threat through "real substantial deterrence."

The South Korean people must also recognize that it will be difficult to manage the alliance, let alone respond to North Korea's nuclear weapons program effectively, if they fail to reach a consensus on national security matters. In the event that South Korea does suffer a catastrophic nuclear attack by North Korea, it will be hard to blame any single politician or party for the outcome. Because it will have been the result of choices made by the South Korean people overall.

Park Jung-won (park_jungwon@hotmail.com), Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics (LSE), is a professor of international law at Dankook University.