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By Sandip Kumar Mishra
The idea of an Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), which was initially considered to be an impossible proposition, appears to be increasingly becoming more real. Although it is still not a definite strategy and there are multiple names for it such as strategy, outlook, vision, idea or framework, in recent years there are more and more countries that have declared their IPS and South Korea has joined the club.
It is an open secret that an IPS is meant to deal with the rise of China's "revisionism" or "assertiveness." So, China has been unhappy with the IPS and does not want it to take off. Actually, the IPS so far has been so loose, wishful and bereft of the existing complex interconnectedness of modern-day inter-state relations that even though China has just stood by and watched, it had very little possibility to get realized. However, China has acted contrary to it and the biggest push for the IPS has been Chinese behavior in recent times.
The first part of China's acts which pushed many countries of the Indo-Pacific region has been its attempt to redraw the economic order of the region. China wants to replace the existing economic institutions and arrangements in the region. China's initiatives such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are considered to be the two big steps in this direction.
It led many countries to question China's intentions but many of them also felt that these initiatives could also be seen as opportunities and should not be considered necessarily problematic. Even though there were apprehensions about China's deliberate ploy of "debt-traps" in this reordering, it gave limited impetus to the IPS.
The second part of China's acts is considered to be its military 'assertiveness' in the South China Sea (SCS) and the East China Sea, the Taiwan strait, the Indian Ocean and the India-China border. In the last decade, China has increased its presence in the SCS, building artificial islands and other infrastructure. China has said that SCS is its "core interest" and the nine-dash line must be respected by the region's countries.
China has refused to honor the international arbitration court's orders. In the East China Sea also China has unilaterally declared its own Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and its activities around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have become very frequent and intense. In recent years, its activities across the Taiwan Strait have also been a thing to be noticed. China's activities in the Indian Ocean and its border standoffs/clashes with India have also been indicative for many countries.
These activities, unlike economic reordering, make countries of the region uncomfortable about China in a more substantial way. These activities significantly push these countries to actively look forward to a counterstrategy such as the IPS. China's roles in the Ukraine crisis and North Korean nuclear and missile crises are also seen as non-constructive.
The third part of China's acts is more immediate but quite damaging to China's reputation. These activities are related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The way China allowed millions of people to visit and leave China during the Chinese New Year in January 2020 despite knowing of the presence of the virus has been considered to be very irresponsible. It was also said that China did not provide sufficient or accurate data about the virus.
Furthermore, China relied on its own less-effective vaccines, rather than going for better vaccines in the market (in the initial phase there may be justification for the two Chinese vaccines). Also, when most countries, through vaccination and real infection in a controlled way, are implementing a strategy of "living with COVID," China stubbornly stuck to its "zero-COVID" policy. When popular resentment grew, China moved to another extreme and suddenly opened up the country which has led to a huge surge in COVID-19 cases in China.
There are worries that it may lead to another wave of the pandemic worldwide and may lead to the emergence of another deadly variant of the coronavirus. Moreover, a few days back, China decided not to give daily figures regarding infections and deaths in the country which would definitely create uncertainty in other countries.
These irresponsible acts have damaged China's credibility and they would definitely give another push to the realization of the IPS. Actually, most countries see China in light of all three sets of Chinese behaviors linking them together. Also, they are aware of the growing cult of personality in China and its extreme and inconsistent behaviors. It would definitely make the demand for the IPS stronger. Thus, if the IPS becomes a more overt multilateral military mechanism against China in the future, though it is still far from reality, the biggest credit would go to China.
The author (sandipmishra10@gmail.com) is associate professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.