Denuclearization - Quo Vadis?

By Kim Sang-woo

After a year of war in Ukraine, transatlantic and Indo-Pacific security can no longer be discussed separately. The reality of a predatory authoritarian power in Europe launching a war of conquest against a weaker neighbor has shaken the United States and its Indo-Pacific friends and allies out of complacency.

Vladimir Putin, a revanchist, who dreams of restoring the Tzarist Russian Empire, started the Ukraine war, so could Xi Jinping, who has revanchist ambitions and dreams of reviving a neo-Tianxia order in Asia, resort to force to put a democratic self-governing Taiwan under the Chinese Communist Party's rule.

At the Munich Security Conference in February, the Ukraine war dominated most of the conversation. As expected, Western nations expressed continued support for Ukraine despite the mounting costs and risks. But the most important issue was the deepening divide between the United States and China on the Ukraine war.

Surprise and irritation was expressed by many transatlantic leaders that members of the Global South were not more aligned against Russia. The Global South countries view the Ukraine-Russia conflict more as a "proxy war" between Russia and U.S.-led NATO. And many think that NATO's expansion is one of the main causes of the war.

As victims of centuries-long Western colonization and decades-long Cold War politics, the Global South is acutely sensitive about being entrapped by great power conflicts. While expressing sympathy for Ukraine, some question why Western powers did not provide the same degree of support and assistance in other conflicts and refugee crises elsewhere.

Speaking in Munich, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg argued that the conflict in Ukraine was a global fight, not a regional one, and that the very fate of the international order depends upon what happens in Ukraine.

Indeed, acquiescence to Russia's aggression could have a real impact on international norms, emboldening not only Putin, but potentially China, North Korea and others that may aspire to alter the territorial status quo.

On Feb. 23, 141 U.N. member states voted in favor of a General Assembly resolution calling for Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine, with just 7 member states voting against it. In this sense, overall global solidarity against Russia's war of aggression remains strong.

However, if the transatlantic leadership is to maintain this broad coalition against Russia's invasion over time, it will need to do a better job of understanding how the conflict is seen outside of Europe and the United States.

Today's global order is not the same as that of the Cold War, and framing alignment as an "us versus them" proposition fails to take into account the dynamics of the current system.

The Munich security report 2023 calls for a "Re:Vision" of the global order. To be successful, it must be more than preserving the past, but rather a vision for the future and a more inclusive and equitable world order for all.

The really scary prospect is that there is a real chance that Putin's nuclear saber-rattling might turn to the actual use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine: He cannot afford to lose this war, but has few options to win, and has shown no compunctions about slaughtering the innocent. Moreover, Putin has suspended Russian participation in the New START treaty further jeopardizing efforts to reduce nuclear dangers.

The war in Ukraine has led South Koreans to think that only the possession and presence of nuclear weapons can deter an invasion, observing that a nuclear-armed Ukraine would not have been invaded in the first place.

The perceived similarities between South Korea and Ukraine both facing a nuclear neighbor that relies on nuclear threats to prevent U.S. involvement ― despite the fact that South Korea is a U.S. treaty ally and Ukraine is not ― have lent credence to South Korean arguments that it must develop a self-reliant defense strategy consisting of nuclear weapons.

The prospect of the denuclearization of North Korea and hopes for a successful dialogue are at their lowest point in decades. While the U.S. alliance provides both conventional and nuclear deterrence, South Korea's public opinion calls for a defense posture where South Korea does not have to depend entirely on outside help for its survival.

In an age of unpredictable nuclear usage and weakening of nuclear taboos, a growing number of South Koreans believe only the possession of nuclear weapons can properly prepare the country for the unpredictability and instability that will follow North Korea's actual deployment of both tactical and ICBM nuclear weapons.

Moreover, South Korea is closely watching Taiwan where there have been parallels drawn between the two. Both countries are being targeted by nuclear-armed countries with historical and revisionist aims toward reunification.

The two primary constraints preventing South Korea from going nuclear are the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The fact that only South Korea is tied to the principle of the 1992 agreement, while North Korea blatantly disregards it, makes it increasingly difficult to justify to the South Korean people why we should continue to stand by the agreement.

The NPT has been the main international agreement constraining South Korea's nuclear armament. But now, nuclear advocates argue, the sophistication and offensive nature of North Korea's nuclear weapons are a clear and present danger to the survival of South Korea. And this meets the conditions outlined by Article 10 of the NPT that allows the withdrawing country to avoid international sanctions.

While the Yoon Suk Yeol administration has so far maintained the country's commitment to the NPT principles, it is likely that supporters of a nuclear South Korea will continue to call for the government to invoke Article 10 and formally withdraw from the NPT ― Quo Vadis?

Kim Sang-woo (swkim54@hotmail.com), a former lawmaker, is chairman of the East Asia Cultural Project. He is also a member of the board of directors at the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation.