![]() |
One hundred years ago this Sunday ― at 11 o'clock, on Nov. 11, 1918 ― the guns fell silent across Europe. An armistice had been signed, ending World War I. In the title of Remarque's famous novel there was "All Quiet on the Western Front."
Much of Europe was devastated. Millions had died, both in combat and of starvation. Vast swathes of land were churned into mile upon mile of cratered, poisoned mud. These apocalyptic "deathscapes" have been captured in art, photography and poetry.
Such had been the extent of the destruction and carnage that many believed World War I was "The war to end all wars." Of course, it was not.
Armistices in the east in 1917, and in the west in 1918, were followed by peace treaties: At Brest Litovsk, in 1918, and in Versailles in 1919. Despite these armistices and treaties, war would return to Europe in 1939.
This was because the core issue ― notably the place and role of a powerful and ambitious Germany in Europe ― had not been adequately addressed by the treaties. Moreover, a hideous and lethal new element ― ideology ― had been added to the powder keg.
In Europe, the major combatants in World War II were largely (though not entirely) the same as World War I: Germany squared off against the U.K. and France in the west, and against the Soviet Union in the east. Once again, America would join the war after years of fighting had already taken place.
Things were different in Asia: Turkey stayed neutral, and Japan, which had fought with the western powers in World War I, sided with Germany in World War II.
Overall, the death toll was even greater. World War I killed some 40 million; World War II killed as many as 80 million.
World War II, however, ended the cycle: There would not be a World War III.
Why so? It is critical to recognize that World War II did not end with armistices and peace treaties: It ended with the military defeat and unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. After the war ended, their armed forces were disbanded, and they were occupied by the victorious allied powers.
Post-war, the Allies, predominantly the United States, wielded both political clout and economic muscle to remold both defeated nations' polities. It proved astonishingly successful. West Germany and Japan grew into stable democracies and economic powerhouses with significantly pacifistic outlooks. It is virtually unthinkable today for either of these nations to launch an aggressive war.
One hundred years after World War I ended, it is germane to consider the situation on the Korean Peninsula, where fighting was halted on the ground by a 1953 armistice, but where the war on paper never ended.
For decades, North Korea has demanded a peace treaty to bring to a de jure end to a war that, de facto, ended in 1953. (Despite occasional flare-ups into real, lethal violence.) Today, amid inter-Korean good vibes, there is talk about a declaration or treaty being signed to end the war.
I see no good reason why Washington should not offer a peace treaty to Pyongyang: After all, it is merely a negotiated piece of paper. And if it reduces North Korean paranoia, and builds a foundation of trust ― why not?
But let us not assume that a peace treaty will solve the core problem: the existence of two separate states, with two separate governments, systems and armies, on the Korean peninsula. Just as the Brest Litovsk and Versailles treaties failed to prevent an even bloodier war breaking out in Europe, a Korean War peace treaty will not end national division. As long as the Koreas covet each others' land and people, no real solution is likely.
For an endgame solution, it is not the World War 1 model of armistice and peace treaty, but the World War II model of unconditional surrender, occupation and national re-modeling that provides a better benchmark. Whether such an outcome can be arrived at without conflict is a big, troubling question for thinkers and policymakers.
Andrew Salmon (andrewcsalmon@yahoo.co.uk) is a Seoul-based reporter and author.