By Kim Won-soo
The allied powers victorious in World War II, led by the United States, created the United Nations as a universal institution with three objectives: stable peace, sustainable development and universal human rights. The inter-linkage of these objectives, as well as the scale and intensity of the tasks they involve, make clear that they cannot be met by any single country no matter how powerful it is.
For this very reason, multilateralism has been carefully nurtured at both the global and regional levels, since the end of World War II. This path was previously exceptional in international politics, as multilateralism, rather than unilateralism or bilateralism was chosen by the new hegemon of the world.
Ever since then, I would argue that multilateralism has gone through three phases: 1) "Multilateralism 1.0," under the bipolarity of the U.S. and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War period (1945-1991); 2) "Multilateralism 2.0," under the uni-polarity of the U.S. in the initial post-Cold War period (the 1990s); and 3) "Multilateralism 3.0," under a uni-/multi-polarity that began at the start of the new millennium ― the 21st century.
Due to the interplay of realpolitik among the major players involved during each period, the track record of multilateralism has been mixed. Multilateralism 2.0 was the shortest phase, though also the least confrontational and most effective. Multilateralism 1.0 was the longest phase, but the most confrontational and least effective, while 3.0 stands in-between.
Examples of the efficacy of Multilateralism 2.0 abound. They include the increase and expansion of the U.N. peace operations, the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Beijing Declaration on Women's Rights, as well as the Millennium Summit outcomes: the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).
Unfortunately, however, the initial optimism about "the end of history" proved to be short-lived. The rising tension and rivalries between the major powers exposed the structural weaknesses of the form of uni-/multi-polarity, in which the U.S. is at the top but challenged by China, Russia and other emerging powers. The key instruments of multilateralism are showing signs of stress and fatigue on all fronts.
Politically, the U.N. Security Council has remained paralyzed concerning Syria for over a decade. Economically, the World Trade Organization (WTO) became even more irrelevant amidst the rising trade friction between Trump's U.S. and Xi's China. On the disarmament front, the entry into force of the CTBT has been delayed for well over two decades.
The critical NPT review process is drifting at the doubly important milestone moment of the 50th anniversary of its entry into force and the 25th anniversary of its indefinite extension. On the health security front, the COVID-19 pandemic has compounded many aspects of human life. The pandemic highlights the weakness of the World Health Organization (WHO), paradoxically at a time when its role is needed most.
The root causes of this failure are the twofold divides prevalent in the international community in terms of wealth distribution (Global North vs. South) and value perception (global West vs. East). These two divides have weakened the base for any global consensus and thus caused the global governance deficit to grow. The second divide of value perception was expected to dissipate with the end of the Cold War, but it did not. In many areas, it poses more serious hurdles than the first divide.
Now the world is moving from one of uni-/multi-polarity to one of uni-/bi-polarity, in which China continues to catch up close with the U.S. in terms of aggregate economic power, and U.S.-China competition is heating up in all areas, beyond mere trade and technology. Multilateralism in the new period (4.0) has yet to take shape.
Depending on the choices the U.S. and China will make, "Multilateralism 4.0" can become either inclusive or confrontational. For the rest of the world, an inclusive path will be preferred. But that will not be easy to achieve unless the U.S. and China find common grounds for mutual compromise. The lack of consensus between the U.S. and China, mainly due to the value divide, bodes ill for Multilateralism 4.0.
Meanwhile, global challenges are worsening, threatening the very survival of humanity. Waiting is no longer an option. Global solutions must be sought through renewed multilateralism. For that, the Biden administration's slogan of "America is back" is good news.
Now is the time for the Biden team to translate it into action. Particular care needs to be taken in presenting a new frame of relations with China, both rule-based and multilateralism-supported. The sooner it is done, the less likely that it spirals out of control. Of great concern are the recent reported remarks by the Chinese leadership regarding perceived foreign intervention.
Times have changed. But the Multilateralism 4.0's new form remains uncertain. Getting it right will require the collective efforts of the international community. South Korea has both a high stake and a bridging role to play. Multilateralism is the best strategy for Korea to take in dealing with its bigger neighbors. Korea should facilitate processes to explore new avenues for multilateralism and strengthen existing ones.
One example of a new path for multilateralism is to create a new process to revive negotiations concerning the North Korea nuclear issue.
Another example of strengthening an existing path is to contribute to renewing various international institutions so as to be able to meet new challenges. Korea can raise its voice by forming issue-based coalitions of like-minded countries. Such coalitions will help Korea chip in to expand the common ground for a more stable U.S.-China relationship. These efforts will also contribute to making Multilateralism 4.0 inclusive and effective.
Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under secretary-general of the United Nations and the high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as secretary to the ROK president for foreign affairs. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Future Consensus Institute (Yeosijae) and a member of the Group of Eminent Persons for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO).
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For this very reason, multilateralism has been carefully nurtured at both the global and regional levels, since the end of World War II. This path was previously exceptional in international politics, as multilateralism, rather than unilateralism or bilateralism was chosen by the new hegemon of the world.
Ever since then, I would argue that multilateralism has gone through three phases: 1) "Multilateralism 1.0," under the bipolarity of the U.S. and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War period (1945-1991); 2) "Multilateralism 2.0," under the uni-polarity of the U.S. in the initial post-Cold War period (the 1990s); and 3) "Multilateralism 3.0," under a uni-/multi-polarity that began at the start of the new millennium ― the 21st century.
Due to the interplay of realpolitik among the major players involved during each period, the track record of multilateralism has been mixed. Multilateralism 2.0 was the shortest phase, though also the least confrontational and most effective. Multilateralism 1.0 was the longest phase, but the most confrontational and least effective, while 3.0 stands in-between.
Examples of the efficacy of Multilateralism 2.0 abound. They include the increase and expansion of the U.N. peace operations, the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Beijing Declaration on Women's Rights, as well as the Millennium Summit outcomes: the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).
Unfortunately, however, the initial optimism about "the end of history" proved to be short-lived. The rising tension and rivalries between the major powers exposed the structural weaknesses of the form of uni-/multi-polarity, in which the U.S. is at the top but challenged by China, Russia and other emerging powers. The key instruments of multilateralism are showing signs of stress and fatigue on all fronts.
Politically, the U.N. Security Council has remained paralyzed concerning Syria for over a decade. Economically, the World Trade Organization (WTO) became even more irrelevant amidst the rising trade friction between Trump's U.S. and Xi's China. On the disarmament front, the entry into force of the CTBT has been delayed for well over two decades.
The critical NPT review process is drifting at the doubly important milestone moment of the 50th anniversary of its entry into force and the 25th anniversary of its indefinite extension. On the health security front, the COVID-19 pandemic has compounded many aspects of human life. The pandemic highlights the weakness of the World Health Organization (WHO), paradoxically at a time when its role is needed most.
The root causes of this failure are the twofold divides prevalent in the international community in terms of wealth distribution (Global North vs. South) and value perception (global West vs. East). These two divides have weakened the base for any global consensus and thus caused the global governance deficit to grow. The second divide of value perception was expected to dissipate with the end of the Cold War, but it did not. In many areas, it poses more serious hurdles than the first divide.
Now the world is moving from one of uni-/multi-polarity to one of uni-/bi-polarity, in which China continues to catch up close with the U.S. in terms of aggregate economic power, and U.S.-China competition is heating up in all areas, beyond mere trade and technology. Multilateralism in the new period (4.0) has yet to take shape.
Depending on the choices the U.S. and China will make, "Multilateralism 4.0" can become either inclusive or confrontational. For the rest of the world, an inclusive path will be preferred. But that will not be easy to achieve unless the U.S. and China find common grounds for mutual compromise. The lack of consensus between the U.S. and China, mainly due to the value divide, bodes ill for Multilateralism 4.0.
Meanwhile, global challenges are worsening, threatening the very survival of humanity. Waiting is no longer an option. Global solutions must be sought through renewed multilateralism. For that, the Biden administration's slogan of "America is back" is good news.
Now is the time for the Biden team to translate it into action. Particular care needs to be taken in presenting a new frame of relations with China, both rule-based and multilateralism-supported. The sooner it is done, the less likely that it spirals out of control. Of great concern are the recent reported remarks by the Chinese leadership regarding perceived foreign intervention.
Times have changed. But the Multilateralism 4.0's new form remains uncertain. Getting it right will require the collective efforts of the international community. South Korea has both a high stake and a bridging role to play. Multilateralism is the best strategy for Korea to take in dealing with its bigger neighbors. Korea should facilitate processes to explore new avenues for multilateralism and strengthen existing ones.
One example of a new path for multilateralism is to create a new process to revive negotiations concerning the North Korea nuclear issue.
Another example of strengthening an existing path is to contribute to renewing various international institutions so as to be able to meet new challenges. Korea can raise its voice by forming issue-based coalitions of like-minded countries. Such coalitions will help Korea chip in to expand the common ground for a more stable U.S.-China relationship. These efforts will also contribute to making Multilateralism 4.0 inclusive and effective.
Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under secretary-general of the United Nations and the high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as secretary to the ROK president for foreign affairs. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Future Consensus Institute (Yeosijae) and a member of the Group of Eminent Persons for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO).
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