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The first rationale for a robust relationship is pragmatism. Simply put, both the ROK and Japan are status-quo oriented and do not seek to change the current regional equilibrium maintained in the post-World War II era. Both countries have benefited most from it. This pragmatism for stability is also supported by shared security and economic interests (realism) and shared values for democracy and market economy (idealism).
The alignment of the trinity of pragmatism, realism and idealism is indeed rare in bilateral relations between the neighboring countries. In international relations, the opposite examples seem to be the norm between the neighbors, dominated by the zero-sum calculation of interests and the misaligned value judgement. The ROK-Japan relationship has also been no exception.
At the heart of this failure lies the inability of Japanese leaders to make an unequivocal break with their nation's recent past under the military regime before and during World War II. This is in big contrast to what German leaders had done. As a result, Japan has paid a heavy diplomatic price. One vivid example is much weaker support of Asian countries for Japan's claim to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council than that of European countries for Germany.
It is also costly for the region. Lingering suspicions about the possible resurgence of a militaristic and expansionist Japan is one of the negative political factors hindering efforts to promote regional unity in Northeast Asia. Despite the rising intra-regional interdependence in economic, environmental and social areas, the region remains a missing link in Asian regional integration, which lags far behind other regions like Europe, Africa and the Americas.
But political leaders in Japan's neighbors are not immune from criticism, either. When confronted with the ill-advised nationalistic words or deeds coming from Japan, vote-seeking politicians are more prone to riding on nationalistic sentiments and exacerbating, rather than controlling, the damage. This tendency of politicization may be hard to change in the democratic electoral systems of both Japan and the ROK.
That said, however, the result is a costly loss of win-win opportunities for both the ROK and Japan, squandered by the politicization of foreign policy. Political leaders on both sides must give diplomacy a space to work out differences arising from historic conflicts. The public also needs to be reminded of negative diplomatic costs of politicization so that they can correct the irresponsible behavior of politicians through votes.
Given the deep emotional intensity attached to the historical issues, this is easier said than done. It takes tremendous courage for the intellectual communities of both countries to stand up to the challenge and to make pragmatic arguments for a forward-looking ROK-Japan relationship. It is eventually up to the two peoples of the ROK and Japan whether and how to join hands.
A robust ROK-Japan relationship will bring immediate tangible benefits to the two countries in deepening mutual trade and complementary supply chains, countering China's conventional pressure tactics of divide-and-rule, and coordinating responses to the common security threats and Cold War legacies on the Korean Peninsula. It will even allow both countries to better cope with the Trumpian style bullying of the United States if and when it comes back in pressing the allies in the process of the alliance management.
Other countries in the region stand to gain from a stronger alignment of the ROK and Japan as the anchor for regional stability. This is particularly true for the U.S. as the ally with both countries. It is precisely for this reason that the U.S. has acted as an honest broker behind the scenes to talk to both countries to patch up their differences when serious bumps arose from the past history.
Trump's transactional hands-off attitudes contributed to the prolongation of the recent ebb in the ROK-Japan relationship. Quiet but proactive and impartial diplomacy of the U.S. vis-a-vis its two allies will continue to be critical, in the collective self-interests of the three countries.
Politics of history is always complicated. History does matter in both domestic and international politics. Lessons of history should not be forgotten. They should be remembered as the wake-up call for the public and the political leaders alike to prepare for the worst-case scenario which happened in the past, and make the best possible efforts to prevent it from recurring.
But they should not be allowed to overcloud the realities of the present and spoil the chances of a better future. One of the frequent wrong lessons we draw from history is our tendency to presume that the immediate future would be an extension of the most recent past. This presumption may or may not hold, depending on the choices we make.
Let us learn the right lessons from history. Let us be cool-headed and creative in applying those lessons for a future that's safer, more secure and better for us and the region. For that, let us depoliticize diplomacy and restore a space for diplomacy to work.
Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under secretary-general of the United Nations and the high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as secretary to the ROK president for foreign affairs. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Future Consensus Institute (Yeosijae) and a member of the Group of Eminent Persons for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO).