Could Japan propose "grand bargain" on past history, future security to South Korea?

By Lee Jong-eun

Recently, foreign ministers of South Korea and Japan held a bilateral meeting while attending the Munich Security Conference. The foreign ministers discussed two topics. First, they condemned North Korea's latest conducting of an ICBM missile test. Second, the foreign ministers continued the bilateral negotiations on resolving the issue of compensation for the South Korean victims of wartime forced labor.

Since 2018, when the South Korean Supreme Court ruled that Japanese companies should pay reparations to their former South Korean laborers for the forced extortion of labor, the issue became one of multiple obstacles in the bilateral relationship and contributed to tensions between the South Korean Moon Jae-in administration and Japan's Shinzo Abe government.

Since last year, the new leaders of the two states, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida have attempted to improve bilateral relations. On resolving the issue of wartime forced labor, the South Korean foreign ministry has recently proposed a framework where Japanese companies would donate to a private foundation that would directly provide compensation to the former forced laborers. Additionally, the Japanese government would convey an apology to the victims.

Japan's government, however, has been reluctant to endorse South Korea's proposal. Japan's official stance is that monetary compensation for historical issues was resolved with the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations Between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Many within Japan's domestic politics oppose providing additional compensation, even indirectly, to South Korean victims. Japan's domestic politics is also skeptical that even if Japan endorsed South Korea's proposal, a future South Korean government could demand additional compensation and apologies.

Despite South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin's plea for Japan to make a decisive political decision, the Kishida government has been cautious in response, reluctant to confront opposition within Japan's domestic politics. As the Yoon administration also faces domestic pressures to not compromise on this politically sensitive issue, without Japan's reciprocal display of commitment to achieving a settlement, there is a danger that bilateral negotiations would lose momentum under a familiar diplomatic gridlock.

What could motivate Japan's government to actively seek a settlement on wartime forced labor despite domestic political constraints? The critical factor is how much strategic value and opportunity Japan perceives in expanding its security partnership with South Korea. As Japan's national security strategy changes in order to face growing security challenges from North Korea, China, and Russia, South Korea holds undeniable importance for Japan's security as a "strategic shield."

In deterring North Korea's missile launches in the East Sea, countering China's naval activities in the East and South China Seas, and balancing Russia-China joint military exercises in the Pacific, South Korea's naval, air and intelligence partnership provides a valuable asset to Japan's own strategic defense. This recognition is displayed in Japan's 2022 National Security Strategy document, which refers to South Korea as a "highly important neighboring country" to Japanese security.

A counterargument could be that Japan does not need to rely on a strategic partnership with South Korea, as Japan already has a military alliance with the U.S. However, South Korea's strategic ambiguity, or the disconnect between the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliance, creates uncertainties and handicaps for Japan's geostrategic security. Can Japan rely on South Korea to share real-time intelligence for counterstrike measures against North Korea's missile threats? Would South Korea's ambiguity on China's naval activities near the Taiwan and Senkaku Islands constrain U.S. military forces in South Korea?

Is the U.S. holding separate military exercises with the ROK and Japanese navy, limiting the logistical effectiveness of trilateral coordination? Finally, would the South Korean government unilaterally advocate for independent nuclear armament, triggering additional security anxiety within Japan's domestic politics? As Kishida's government navigates strategic and political risks and uncertainties in charting a new path for Japan's national security, strategic clarity and support from neighboring South Korea would positively boost his foreign policy.

However, the dispute over past historical issues poses challenges for the present and future bilateral security partnerships. Due to historical memories, South Korean domestic politics is ambivalent, even critical toward Japan's military expansion. Providing a "strategic shield" for Japan's security brings uncomfortable memories for South Koreans who historically experienced being exploited by Japan's geopolitical interests. Even if the present and future strategic interests largely determine countries' foreign policies, past memories also impact the political legitimacy and diplomatic trust, which governments need to implement sweeping foreign policy decisions.

Japan's government has an opportunity. The current South Korean government shares many similar foreign policy objectives, including the desire to improve bilateral and trilateral security partnerships. South Korea's most recent domestic opinions toward Japan also appear to be improving from past anti-Japanese sentiments. Boldly seizing the opportunity, Japan should consider proposing a "grand bargain" on past historical grievances and future security partnerships.

Even if it deviates from Japan's diplomatic principle, it accommodates South Korea's demands for compensating and commemorating the victims of forced wartime labor. In return, they should urge the South Korean government to establish a comprehensive security partnership with Japan in areas ranging from cyber security, economic security, missile defense, and nuclear deterrence. To use a classic dilemma, "moral justification vs. practical interest," accommodates South Korea's pursuit of moral justification over past historical grievances and achieves Japan's practical interests for present and future security.

I acknowledge that deals between South Korea and Japan will not be easy to achieve. Japan's "fatigue" from South Korea's pursuit of past historical grievances and South Korea's "anxiety" toward Japan's military rearmament are significant barriers. However, each country holds the key to the other's barrier. If Japan unlocks Korea from the grievances of the past, and Korea unlocks Japan toward the security of the future, the barriers between Korea and Japan could be unlocked; if they make mutual choices together.

Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu), a Ph.D. candidate, is an adjunct faculty member at the American University School of International Service. His research specialties include U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management and East Asian regional security.