Will President Yoon follow in de Gaulle's nuclear footsteps?

By Yun Byung-se

Just two years ago, a very unusual report was released by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) titled, "Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Reassuring America's Allies." It was the product of a special task force comprised of 16 former top policymakers ― prime ministers, foreign and defense ministers including myself, national security advisers as well as a former NATO commander and heads of global think tanks (IISS, MSC, FRS and CCGA).

As the title indicated, it was an alarm bell to remind the United States that the time has come to think the unthinkable ― that nuclear options could be pursued not just by rogue states, but also by close U.S. allies in Europe and Asia in the coming decade.

In essence, it was a contemporary reminder to the U.S. of the late French President Charles de Gaulle's question posed to President J.F. Kennedy in 1961: "Would the U.S. really be willing to trade New York for Paris or Hamburg?" That question represented Western European allies' fear of possible abandonment by the U.S.

The CCGA report came up with about two dozen specific recommendations for the Biden administration to strengthen not just longstanding nuclear deterrence, but also reassurance for European and Asian allies.

Many of those recommendations were relevant to the U.S.-South Korea alliance as well. They included, among others;
- Proactively raise the salience of nuclear weapons issues in U.S. alliance relations and involve allies in the nuclear planning process from the outset.
- Increase alliance crisis management exercises, involving alliance leaders at the highest level in regular war gaming.
- Review U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons posture to assure the adequacy of its forward-based systems and commitments in a careful yet serious manner.
- Create an Asian Nuclear Planning Group to reassure its three regional allies ― Australia, Japan, and South Korea ― as the U.S. has in the NATO context.
- Reestablish strong trilateral security cooperation among the U.S., Japan and South Korea.
- Consider an eventual inclusion of South Korea in the Quad Security Dialogue.

Within a short span of two years, CCGA TF's concern about thinking the unthinkable as well as its recommendations have been echoed by many senior policymakers and think tank experts at home and abroad. It has been vindicated by the worsening threat environment as follows:
First of all, North Korea's fast-growing nuclear and missile capabilities, including tactical nuclear weapons and its preemptive use policy. Second, the heightening tensions in the Taiwan Straits and China's commitment to unification even by military means. Third, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its willingness to use nuclear weapons, which led German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to declare "Zeitenwende" (turn of an era). Finally, the explicit or implicit collaboration among China, Russia and North Korea on strategic posturing, including at the U.N. Security Council.

Such developments have impacted the views of South Koreans on their nuclear options. A February 2022 poll by the CCGA showed that over 50 percent of South Koreans favor the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula and over 70 percent support going nuclear. The latest poll by Chey Institute this January showed a 76.6 percent support rate ― the highest in recent years. The nuclear options debates are ongoing still.

It was probably against this backdrop that President Yoon Suk Yeol remarked last month on Korea's possible nuclear options in the case of an existential threat by North Korea. While it was not intended to change the official position of extended deterrence, it reflected the sentiment of the South Korean public.

From my standpoint, it boils down to the essence of the decision that any responsible leader has to face in view of the gravity of the threat looming across the horizon. In that sense, it echoes the question raised by President de Gaulle 62 years ago. Or you may call it a Korean version of German Chancellor Scholz's Zeitenwende.

It is no wonder that U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres eloquently reminded U.N. Members on the dire international security situation in his opening remarks to the U.N. General Assembly last week, quoting this year's Doomsday Clock statement. "The Doomsday Clock is now 90 seconds to midnight, or total global catastrophe, the closest the clock has ever stood to humanity's darkest hour ― closer than even during the height of the Cold War." The Russian invasion of Ukraine and rising nuclear threats from the likes of North Korea are key triggers for such a sobering statement.

In this sense, the latest report by the CSIS Commission on the Korean Peninsula released last month rightly assessed that "new levels of doubt among U.S. allies call for Washington to devise new ways to restore the credibility of extended deterrence ― both to reduce Japan's and South Korea's sense of vulnerability and to ensure that U.S. alliances in Asia remain a force for stability long into the future."

The report introduced a new concept "community of shared fate," which forms the core of extended deterrence and is a signal of U.S. resolve to protect its allies from external aggression, even at the risk of its own cities. More specifically, it recommended, among others, the creation of a NATO-type joint nuclear planning framework for nuclear weapons use ― bilaterally and trilaterally (with Japan) ― as well as the consideration of pre-decisional tabletop exercises for the possible redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea.

Against this background, it is noteworthy to see the U.S. government making two-track efforts to prevent the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons and reassure both European and Asian allies. The Munich Security Conference starting today will be a timely occasion to discuss all these and other challenges among key allied leaders, including Foreign Ministers of the U.S., South Korea, Japan and Europe.

Between U.S. and South Korea, non-stop high-level meetings have been underway intensively since early this year. President Yoon's visit to the U.S. in the coming months will be a crowning moment, marking the seventieth anniversary of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Various aspects of extended deterrence will be high on the agenda.

I hope that President Yoon's visit will be a milestone not only in bolstering the ROK-U.S. alliance into the next decades, but also in upgrading U.S. extended deterrence to South Korea to a new height without the need to cross the proliferation threshold. If the two leaders can reassure that "we go together" ― the famous slogan of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command ― even at the fatal moment, one shared nuclear umbrella should be enough to dispel de Gaulle's anxiety revisited in Korea.

Yun Byung-se, a former foreign minister of South Korea (2013-2017), is now a board member of the Korea Peace Foundation and a member of several ex-global leaders' forums and task forces, including the Astana Forum and its Consultative Council as well as the Task Force on U.S. Allies and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.