By Lee Seong-hyon
There is a view that President Donald Trump is getting impatient with the slow progress in North Korean nuclear negotiations. With that, a question arises as to how long can Trump accommodate Kim Jong-un if the current stalemate persists.
He is already under a heavy domestic backlash for holding a summit with Kim in Singapore that was widely viewed as symbolically important yet lacking in substance on denuclearization.
Trump recently released a letter he received from the North Korean leader, touting the "great progress" in talks with Pyongyang. Some analysts argue that making the letter public itself shows how much Trump is cornered domestically, even to the degree that he felt compelled to publicize the letter, going against the usual diplomatic decorum.
Going forward, the dreadful thing is when Trump doesn't have anything to show and what he might do.
Already, there are two scenarios in the policy market. One is the so-called "October crisis." Trump's most immediate priority is to win the midterm elections in November. Midterms are usually seen as a referendum on the sitting president.
If Kim doesn't "help" Trump win the elections by making significant denuclearization step, it will certainly hurt their relationship. It's similar to the initial positive bonding between Trump and Xi Jinping of China that however has subsequently deteriorated.
In the worst case, a military option might be carried out against North Korea prior to the midterm elections, the view goes.
Second is the so-called "post-midterm crisis." That is, Trump is likely to wait, at least, until the November elections, in trying to "manage" the North Korean negotiations and keeping it on a positive spin. If Trump wins the elections, that's fine. However, if Trump loses, then there might be a Pandora's box waiting to be opened.
Domestically unpopular, entrenched by the Russian scandal, alienating his NATO friends, confronted by a defiant Xi Jinping in a trade war, the unpredictable Trump might do something. And "North Korea" may be an easy scapegoat where he can easily score big with overwhelming U.S. military power. After all, Trump threatened the North with "fire and fury" like the world has "never seen before."
The U.S. Congress is likely to oppose Trump's waging a war with North Korea, particularly if the Democrats win the midterm. But it appears there are other ways within the executive power of a U.S. president to deploy "kinetic" options against North Korea, without having to officially declare a war. One such case is the so-called "bloody nose" operation, which was a heavily discussed item last year.
Meanwhile, there are some observers who count the military option as an already defunct option, rationalizing that Trump "lost" the card the minute he signed a joint statement with Kim in Singapore in which he committed to "establish new U.S.-DPRK relations" that promote peace.
In addition, China clearly opposes a U.S. military attack on North Korea. Russia disproves of it too. And President Moon Jae-in of South Korea, a U.S. ally, declared last year "there will not be another war on the Korean Peninsula."
We don't know the tipping point for Trump's patience with Kim. In fact, Trump himself may not know what he will do with North Korea, if the current stalemate persists. He may decide something drastic in the fit of the moment.
But so far, he has been remarkably patient with Kim, restraining himself from personally criticizing the North Korean leader on Twitter ― his most favored communication channel to the world. That's a relief. For the moment.
Come to think of it, we also realize that the issue encompassing the whole debate is due to the fact that Washington and Pyongyang have not yet agreed upon a "denuclearization timetable." Doubts and bad faith arise accordingly.
The old pessimism in negotiating with North Korea has been rehabilitated back to the public sphere because we don't have the timetable. The idea for a military option has resurfaced because we don't have a timetable either.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reportedly demanded the timetable. This was rejected by the North. Instead, Pyongyang demanded holding a ceremony to formally declare the end of the Korean War first. This was rejected by Pompeo.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is the director, the Center for Chinese Studies; and the director, Department of Unification Strategy at the Sejong Institute.
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He is already under a heavy domestic backlash for holding a summit with Kim in Singapore that was widely viewed as symbolically important yet lacking in substance on denuclearization.
Trump recently released a letter he received from the North Korean leader, touting the "great progress" in talks with Pyongyang. Some analysts argue that making the letter public itself shows how much Trump is cornered domestically, even to the degree that he felt compelled to publicize the letter, going against the usual diplomatic decorum.
Going forward, the dreadful thing is when Trump doesn't have anything to show and what he might do.
Already, there are two scenarios in the policy market. One is the so-called "October crisis." Trump's most immediate priority is to win the midterm elections in November. Midterms are usually seen as a referendum on the sitting president.
If Kim doesn't "help" Trump win the elections by making significant denuclearization step, it will certainly hurt their relationship. It's similar to the initial positive bonding between Trump and Xi Jinping of China that however has subsequently deteriorated.
In the worst case, a military option might be carried out against North Korea prior to the midterm elections, the view goes.
Second is the so-called "post-midterm crisis." That is, Trump is likely to wait, at least, until the November elections, in trying to "manage" the North Korean negotiations and keeping it on a positive spin. If Trump wins the elections, that's fine. However, if Trump loses, then there might be a Pandora's box waiting to be opened.
Domestically unpopular, entrenched by the Russian scandal, alienating his NATO friends, confronted by a defiant Xi Jinping in a trade war, the unpredictable Trump might do something. And "North Korea" may be an easy scapegoat where he can easily score big with overwhelming U.S. military power. After all, Trump threatened the North with "fire and fury" like the world has "never seen before."
The U.S. Congress is likely to oppose Trump's waging a war with North Korea, particularly if the Democrats win the midterm. But it appears there are other ways within the executive power of a U.S. president to deploy "kinetic" options against North Korea, without having to officially declare a war. One such case is the so-called "bloody nose" operation, which was a heavily discussed item last year.
Meanwhile, there are some observers who count the military option as an already defunct option, rationalizing that Trump "lost" the card the minute he signed a joint statement with Kim in Singapore in which he committed to "establish new U.S.-DPRK relations" that promote peace.
In addition, China clearly opposes a U.S. military attack on North Korea. Russia disproves of it too. And President Moon Jae-in of South Korea, a U.S. ally, declared last year "there will not be another war on the Korean Peninsula."
We don't know the tipping point for Trump's patience with Kim. In fact, Trump himself may not know what he will do with North Korea, if the current stalemate persists. He may decide something drastic in the fit of the moment.
But so far, he has been remarkably patient with Kim, restraining himself from personally criticizing the North Korean leader on Twitter ― his most favored communication channel to the world. That's a relief. For the moment.
Come to think of it, we also realize that the issue encompassing the whole debate is due to the fact that Washington and Pyongyang have not yet agreed upon a "denuclearization timetable." Doubts and bad faith arise accordingly.
The old pessimism in negotiating with North Korea has been rehabilitated back to the public sphere because we don't have the timetable. The idea for a military option has resurfaced because we don't have a timetable either.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reportedly demanded the timetable. This was rejected by the North. Instead, Pyongyang demanded holding a ceremony to formally declare the end of the Korean War first. This was rejected by Pompeo.
Now, at least, we know what the problem is. And we still have a few months' time to avoid thinking the unthinkable.
Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is the director, the Center for Chinese Studies; and the director, Department of Unification Strategy at the Sejong Institute.
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