Possible nuclear armament for South Korea

By Park Jung-won

President Yoon Suk Yeol said recently that if North Korea's nuclear threats continued to worsen, South Korea would need to consider redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea and possibly establish its own nuclear armament. He pointed out that South Korea has the scientific and technological capability to develop such weapons within a short timeframe.

Opposition parties and experts criticized him for making reckless and dangerous remarks that could lead to a disastrous war. Some of these criticisms may be valid. For example, it is not wrong to say that pushing ahead with an independent nuclear weapons program would risk weakening the Korea-U.S. alliance due to U.S. opposition. The importance of this alliance to South Korea's peace and prosperity cannot be overemphasized.

Thus establishing a certain level of a "nuclear balance" whereby the U.S.'s nuclear capability serves as a reliable counter to the North Korean nuclear threat through extended deterrence seems to be the best measure for the time being. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, who visited South Korea on Jan 29-30, shared a similar view by noting the importance of the U.S.'s nuclear umbrella.

Nevertheless, Yoon's statement that South Korea might obtain its own nuclear arms cannot be dismissed as foolish. Anxiety exists over whether the U.S. would actually protect South Korea in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack. National security planning should not be based on hope. The worst case must be assumed as a possibility. South Korea and the U.S. may be blood allies, but in international politics, all countries worry about their own security before that of their treaty partners.

In a worst-case scenario, it is not impossible to imagine the U.S. striking a deal with North Korea that sees reduced capability ― through the dismantling of long-range missiles capable of reaching the U.S. ― or a partial reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, and the recognition of the North as a de facto nuclear power.

In return, the U.S. might withdraw some of its troops from South Korea. In the harsh world of international politics, such a scenario is not inconceivable. If South Korea is truly a sovereign independent state, it is quite natural for its president to speak about the possibility of nuclear armament at a time when the North Korean nuclear threat has become a reality. Why should the South Korean president not be able to say this? If the domestic political situation in the U.S. were to change, South Korea might have to watch helplessly as such a deal between the U.S. and North Korea took shape.

Is it crazy to believe that the U.S. would only actively intervene in the event of a real wartime situation in South Korea if it were cornered in an extreme situation such as Pearl Harbor and 9/11? South Koreans have already witnessed, under former President Donald Trump, that the U.S. can consider deals with North Korea without such a catastrophic situation. South Koreans have also seen many attempts by U.S. governments to pull troops out of South Korea.

The more serious problem is if Yoon makes such remarks about the possibility of his country's own nuclear development, without following them up with concrete measures. If so, Yoon would indeed be an incompetent leader who, as the opposition claims, is an amateur at diplomacy and is jeopardizing South Korea's security.

For example, he should be negotiating with the U.S. to revise the Korea-U.S. nuclear energy pact, to secure fuel-reprocessing authority related to peaceful use, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) system. And just as the U.S. has supported Australia's nuclear-powered submarine development, it should do the same for South Korea. More fundamentally, Yoon should instruct related agencies to report to him on South Korea's technological status and capabilities for developing nuclear weapons.

In other words, Yoon should order them to verify Korea's ability to quickly achieve its "nuclear potential," even if it decides not to produce or possess nuclear weapons for the time being. South Korea might need to leave the NPT in the worst-case scenario, but its capacity to quickly make nuclear weapons must be confirmed before such a withdrawal.

In this process, if the U.S. strongly opposes Yoon's administration, Yoon should consider conducting the type of brinkmanship diplomacy that South Korea's first president, Syngman Rhee, did in the past. Rhee's steadfastness gave birth to the Korea-U.S. alliance treaty. If South Korea does not take this course of action with strong resolve, it faces the grave possibility of one day being hit by a surprise nuclear attack from North Korea.

Another possible option for Yoon, amid domestic political disagreement over nuclear armament despite the North's increasingly extreme threats, would be to ask the South Korean people directly in the form of a national referendum, or by a pledge in a general election, whether they want their country to counter these threats by developing its own nuclear capability.

If the general public responds no, South Korea will be sadly reduced to an "impossible state," but the public will most likely respond to the idea positively. According to a recent poll, 77 percent of South Korean respondents said that their country needed to develop its own nuclear weapons program.

Can there be peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula? Why do those who call for peace and denuclearization stay quiet when it comes to North Korea's possession of nuclear arms? South Korean society has become insensitive to North Korea's nuclear blackmail and gaslighting after hearing its threats for so long. The path to South Korea's nuclear armament will be obviously very rough, but the expense and effort to protect the country and its people must be spent willingly, no matter the cost.

Park Jung-won (park_jungwon@hotmail.com), Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics (LSE), is a professor of international law at Dankook University.