Significant implications of Ukrainian war on Korean Peninsula

By Kim Sang-woo

On Nov. 15, after a massive rocket barrage, Kremlin spokesman, Dmitry Peskov declared that Russia's aim is to force Ukraine to the negotiating table. The bombing of civilians will stop if Ukraine succumbs to all of Russia's demands.

Ukrainians have responded with the remarkable resilience that has earned the respect of the world since Russia's invasion more than nine months ago. But anger and frustration are growing. Why is Vladimir Putin allowed to openly target Ukrainian civilians with such impunity?

Ukrainians ask for the capability to strike back, but Western leaders respond with vows to "stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes." Unfortunately, grand words are not the same as providing advanced weapon systems Ukraine so desperately needs.

Russia openly says to its people that the invasion of Ukraine is a "holy war" against the West and claims to be fighting NATO forces in Ukraine. As far as Russia is concerned, the West is already involved in the war, so maybe instead of trying not to provoke Putin, they should demonstrate the kind of resolve that will force the Russian dictator to listen.

The Russian army in Ukraine is large in number but greatly weakened. It is demoralized and vulnerable. If the West doubles down on its military support for Ukraine, Russia could be beaten.

Perhaps there is another reason for the hesitation. As written in the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy, "While Russia is recklessly flaunting the basic laws of the international order today … as in Ukraine … China is the only country with both the intent to reshape international order … and increasingly [the] power to achieve [it]."

The United States wants to make it clear that maintaining the territorial integrity and basic sovereignty of a greater Russia is in the international interest. Obviously, this is not appealing to those who prefer Moscow to face justice and accountability for its brazen aggression.

Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping proclaimed their geopolitical alignment with a "no limits" friendship in February 2022. So, if Putin becomes increasingly dependent on China to avoid economic collapse, diplomatic isolation, and military implosion, Beijing might exploit Russia's decline to turn much of Russia's Far East into a vassal region of China.

Should China capitalize on its interests in the Far East and the Artic with a weakened and isolated Moscow, Russia's loss of power from Ukraine could favor China in its long-term competition with the United States.

Therefore, U.S. interests calls for backchannel diplomacy with potential Putin successors, assuring them that a just peace deal with Ukraine can save Russia from complete chaos or the indignity of ceding its Far East to Beijing.

Nevertheless, at the moment, diplomacy cannot end the war in Ukraine, simply because Russian and Ukrainian interests do not yet coincide. The Ukrainians, understandably, want their country back. They want reparations for damage caused by Russia and accountability for their war crimes. Russia, in contrast, has made it clear that it still intends to bend Ukraine to its will.

Eventually, there will come a time for negotiations ― if Russia admits it has lost and wants to end the war, or if Ukraine says that the restoration of its territory isn't worth the continued suffering of the Russian bombardments. So far, neither has happened.

Indeed, the only softening of Russia's position was Putin's statement in October seemingly ruling out nuclear use ― at least for the time being. Apart from that, Moscow seems intent on doubling down, even as its military continues to be slowly pushed out of Ukraine.

What does this mean for the Korean Peninsula? A Ukrainian victory would signal that nuclear coercion has limits. Even though Russia's nuclear weapons have limited NATO participation in the Ukrainian war, they have not stopped it.

This is important to South Korea, where there is real anxiety that North Korea will learn from Russia that it can use nuclear threats to erode U.S. alliance commitments and disrupt outside assistance.

The appeal of nuclear weapons is not simply their value for defense and deterrence. They also offer the possibility of blackmail and coercion. Ukraine sought a no-fly zone from NATO in March, but NATO refused, primarily out of fear of escalation with a nuclear power.

However, now the military situation dictates that NATO should provide Ukraine with the necessary tools to ensure a resounding victory in the war. Otherwise, it could encourage nasty rogue states like North Korea to follow Russia's example.

This year, the threat from North Korea's nuclear arsenal entered a new phase. The most alarming development is that Kim Jong-un said its tactical nuclear weapons could be used at the outset of a conflict to fight and win a limited war on the Korean Peninsula.

In April, Kim said his nuclear forces will "never be confined to the single mission of war deterrent." In other words, Pyongyang now envisions its nuclear weapons as useful not only for retaliation against an attack but for winning a limited war.

This concept doesn't require North Korea to launch a deliberate all-out attack, but it could drive the regime's plan for any conflict, including wars that start by accident or that escalate from small crises.

The emphasis by South Korea and the U.S. on preemptive strikes or attacks on the regime's leadership could further pressure Kim to delegate authority to field commanders, which would raise the risk of a nuclear accident or miscalculation.

Seoul and Washington no longer can afford to just rely on their existing posture to deter North Korea's new nuclear doctrine, when now its task is to even the balance of power on the Korean peninsula.

Perhaps, therefore, among all the nuclear weapons in the world, North Korea's tactical nuclear weapons are the most likely to be actually used in a war.

Kim Sang-woo (swkim54@hotmail.com), former lawmaker, is chairman of the East Asia Cultural Project. He is also a member of the board of directors at the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation.