By Kim Sang-woo
The apparent attack and sinking of the Black Sea Fleet's flagship, the Moskva, represents a symbolic blow to the Kremlin. The Moskva was the pride of its fleet and the most prestigious vessel involved in the war against Ukraine.
"The sinking of the Moskva is not just a significant loss, it is emblematic of the shambolic Russian military campaign," said Michael Kofman, the research program director and a Russia expert at the Center for Naval Analysis.
Confirmation of the sinking came as CIA Director William Burns warned that Vladimir Putin may resort to using a tactical or low-yield nuclear weapon in light of his country's military setbacks.
During a speech in Atlanta, Burns said: "Given the potential desperation of President Putin and the Russian leadership … none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons."
The Kremlin placed Russian nuclear forces on high alert shortly after beginning the war on Feb. 24, and furthered its nuclear rhetoric on April 14 when it said it would be forced to strengthen its defenses in the Baltic if Finland and Sweden join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including by deploying nuclear weapons.
Burns, however, said the U.S. has not seen "a lot of practical evidence" of any actual deployments that could cause more worry.
Recently, Russia successfully tested the Sarmat ICBM and President Vladimir Putin boasted: "This truly unique weapon will … ensure the security of Russia from external threats, and make those who try to threaten our country think twice."
Asked about Putin's comments, a senior U.S. defense official called them irresponsible. "We find that rhetoric to be unhelpful … certainly it's not the kind of thing that we would expect from a responsible nuclear power, especially in the current environment."
Douglas Barrie, a senior fellow for military aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), said that the Sarmat's ability to carry ten or more warheads ― and decoys ― and Russia's option of firing it over either of the earth's poles, posed a challenge to ground and satellite-based radar and tracking systems: "This complicates where you've got to look."
Launching the Ukraine invasion, Putin made a pointed reference to Russia's nuclear forces and warned the West that any attempt to get in its way "will lead you to such consequences that you have never encountered in your history."
Failure in Ukraine could put Putin's own political survival at risk. His ultimate risks are his removal from office, imprisonment, and possibly even execution. Accordingly, Putin is far more likely to press harder in Ukraine than to acquiesce to a negotiated settlement that leaves him without tangible gains.
The use of tactical nuclear weapons inside Ukraine is also a possibility in a last bid to achieve a military success. As NATO's nuclear umbrella doesn't extend over Ukraine, Putin may discount the possibility of retaliation.
The shock of such an event would be profound and could even lead to Ukraine submission or acceptance of unfavorable terms.
To counter the threat of a Russian first-use nuclear strike and regain freedom of action, the United States and NATO must return to the core deterrence principles of capability and credibility.
NATO's nuclear forces, though much reduced, are absolutely capable of overwhelming Russia's. NATO's credibility, on the other hand, is constantly undermined when leaders publicly express fears that Putin will employ his nuclear arsenal, and they must at all costs avoid pushing him into a corner. A resolve not to be bullied is essential.
Deterrence works best when leaders are direct, unambiguous, resolute, and calm. As President Emmanuel Macron reminded Russia recently, the West has nuclear weapons too.
Over the last few weeks, such nuclear talk has arisen over a myriad of issues. If the war continues to go badly for Russia, at what point will a seemingly erratic Putin begin issuing nuclear redlines to Ukraine and its allies?
Would a crushing military defeat push Putin over the edge ― facing the possible end of his regime?
Ukraine nuke talk spins off into lots of other places. Nuclear North Korea is resuming its ballistic missile launches to intimidate non-nuclear South Korea and Japan. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear stockpiles as well.
On April 17, North Korea test-fired a new type of tactical guided weapon designed to boost its nuclear fighting capability. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said Kim Jong-un and other top officials observed the launch.
It said that the weapon tested has "great significance in drastically improving the firepower of the frontline long-range artillery units, enhancing the efficiency in the operation of (North Korea's) tactical nukes and diversification of their firepower missions."
The mention of the word "tactical nukes" suggests that the weapon is likely capable of carrying a battlefield nuclear warhead that could hit strategic targets in South Korea, including U.S. military installations.
Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha University in Seoul said, "Pyongyang's purposes likely exceed deterrence and regime survival. Like Russia employs the fear it could use tactical nukes, North Korea may want such weapons for political coercion, battlefield escalation and limiting the willingness of other countries to intervene in a conflict."
Lately, the media seems fixated on hyping the relative stockpiles and megatonnage of various nuclear states, as if they were GDP or energy output data.
The world seems nuclear-obsessed. Is there a danger in normalizing the abnormal and casually thinking the unthinkable?
"The prospect of nuclear conflict, once unthinkable, is now back within the realm of possibility," United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said last month.
This "strange voyage," in Winston Churchill's words, is a journey into the unknown, as all wars are. The best we can do is to prepare for the worst.
At stake now is an international order founded on something other than brute force and imperial ambition.
Kim Sang-woo (swkim54@hotmail.com) is a former lawmaker and is currently the chairman of the East Asia Cultural Project. He is also a member of the board of directors at the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation.
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"The sinking of the Moskva is not just a significant loss, it is emblematic of the shambolic Russian military campaign," said Michael Kofman, the research program director and a Russia expert at the Center for Naval Analysis.
Confirmation of the sinking came as CIA Director William Burns warned that Vladimir Putin may resort to using a tactical or low-yield nuclear weapon in light of his country's military setbacks.
During a speech in Atlanta, Burns said: "Given the potential desperation of President Putin and the Russian leadership … none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons."
The Kremlin placed Russian nuclear forces on high alert shortly after beginning the war on Feb. 24, and furthered its nuclear rhetoric on April 14 when it said it would be forced to strengthen its defenses in the Baltic if Finland and Sweden join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including by deploying nuclear weapons.
Burns, however, said the U.S. has not seen "a lot of practical evidence" of any actual deployments that could cause more worry.
Recently, Russia successfully tested the Sarmat ICBM and President Vladimir Putin boasted: "This truly unique weapon will … ensure the security of Russia from external threats, and make those who try to threaten our country think twice."
Asked about Putin's comments, a senior U.S. defense official called them irresponsible. "We find that rhetoric to be unhelpful … certainly it's not the kind of thing that we would expect from a responsible nuclear power, especially in the current environment."
Douglas Barrie, a senior fellow for military aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), said that the Sarmat's ability to carry ten or more warheads ― and decoys ― and Russia's option of firing it over either of the earth's poles, posed a challenge to ground and satellite-based radar and tracking systems: "This complicates where you've got to look."
Launching the Ukraine invasion, Putin made a pointed reference to Russia's nuclear forces and warned the West that any attempt to get in its way "will lead you to such consequences that you have never encountered in your history."
Failure in Ukraine could put Putin's own political survival at risk. His ultimate risks are his removal from office, imprisonment, and possibly even execution. Accordingly, Putin is far more likely to press harder in Ukraine than to acquiesce to a negotiated settlement that leaves him without tangible gains.
The use of tactical nuclear weapons inside Ukraine is also a possibility in a last bid to achieve a military success. As NATO's nuclear umbrella doesn't extend over Ukraine, Putin may discount the possibility of retaliation.
The shock of such an event would be profound and could even lead to Ukraine submission or acceptance of unfavorable terms.
To counter the threat of a Russian first-use nuclear strike and regain freedom of action, the United States and NATO must return to the core deterrence principles of capability and credibility.
NATO's nuclear forces, though much reduced, are absolutely capable of overwhelming Russia's. NATO's credibility, on the other hand, is constantly undermined when leaders publicly express fears that Putin will employ his nuclear arsenal, and they must at all costs avoid pushing him into a corner. A resolve not to be bullied is essential.
Deterrence works best when leaders are direct, unambiguous, resolute, and calm. As President Emmanuel Macron reminded Russia recently, the West has nuclear weapons too.
Over the last few weeks, such nuclear talk has arisen over a myriad of issues. If the war continues to go badly for Russia, at what point will a seemingly erratic Putin begin issuing nuclear redlines to Ukraine and its allies?
Would a crushing military defeat push Putin over the edge ― facing the possible end of his regime?
Ukraine nuke talk spins off into lots of other places. Nuclear North Korea is resuming its ballistic missile launches to intimidate non-nuclear South Korea and Japan. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear stockpiles as well.
On April 17, North Korea test-fired a new type of tactical guided weapon designed to boost its nuclear fighting capability. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said Kim Jong-un and other top officials observed the launch.
It said that the weapon tested has "great significance in drastically improving the firepower of the frontline long-range artillery units, enhancing the efficiency in the operation of (North Korea's) tactical nukes and diversification of their firepower missions."
The mention of the word "tactical nukes" suggests that the weapon is likely capable of carrying a battlefield nuclear warhead that could hit strategic targets in South Korea, including U.S. military installations.
Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha University in Seoul said, "Pyongyang's purposes likely exceed deterrence and regime survival. Like Russia employs the fear it could use tactical nukes, North Korea may want such weapons for political coercion, battlefield escalation and limiting the willingness of other countries to intervene in a conflict."
Lately, the media seems fixated on hyping the relative stockpiles and megatonnage of various nuclear states, as if they were GDP or energy output data.
The world seems nuclear-obsessed. Is there a danger in normalizing the abnormal and casually thinking the unthinkable?
"The prospect of nuclear conflict, once unthinkable, is now back within the realm of possibility," United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said last month.
This "strange voyage," in Winston Churchill's words, is a journey into the unknown, as all wars are. The best we can do is to prepare for the worst.
At stake now is an international order founded on something other than brute force and imperial ambition.
Kim Sang-woo (swkim54@hotmail.com) is a former lawmaker and is currently the chairman of the East Asia Cultural Project. He is also a member of the board of directors at the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation.
