Korea faces triple challenges in decisive yet dangerous decade

By Yun Byung-se

Whether by coincidence or not, three major powers ― the U.S., China, and Russia ― speak with one voice on one thing despite the ongoing tensions and competition. That is, the coming ten years will be a "decisive decade" for the international order. President Joe Biden used this term in his 2022 National Security Strategy Report.

The follow-up National Defense Strategy paraphrased it as one stamped by dramatic changes in geopolitics, technology, economics and environment. For China, this fits with the third, and the probable fourth term of President Xi Jinping. Likewise, President Vladimir Putin is expected to run for the fifth term in 2024, also the year of the U.S. presidential election.

Richard Haas, president of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, echoed this odd consensus, but went further by characterizing the decade as "the most dangerous moment since World War II" and called it "a perfect ― or, more accurately, an imperfect ― storm."

These somber projections are mainly due to multiple crises emanating from old geopolitical problems as well as new regional and global challenges, and the fast growing rivalries and lack of cooperation among key players.

Even though economic security has emerged as a key concern affecting our lives across the world, it cannot outrank the existential danger posed by nuclear weapons and high-tech weapons. In this vein, the Ukraine war, Taiwan Strait crisis and North Korea's unprecedented threat of nuclear weapons use against South Korea, Japan, and the U.S., among others, are making us "think the unthinkable."

Last month, President Biden declared that "we have not faced the prospect of Armageddon since Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis." It seems to reflect his genuine concern, as did President Kennedy 60 years ago, about Putin's open threat to break the nuclear taboo. In Biden's view, Putin "is not joking when he talks about the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons."

From my perspective, however, Putin's threat is a lesser concern than Kim Jong-un's departure from his previous policy of nuclear deterrence to actual preemptive use. The new posture was codified into law in September and has been actively pursued throughout the year with countless ballistic missile launches that can be mounted with tactical nuclear warheads. The country is now technically ready for its seventh nuclear test.

What emboldens North Korea is the favorable strategic environment that pits the U.S. against both China and Russia and the prospect of prolonged conflict between them. Both North Korea's northern neighbors now see increased strategic values of North Korea and willingly vetoed a sanctions resolution against the DPRK and even opposed a lesser form of joint statements at the U.N. Security Council.

In case President Putin actually uses tactical nukes or President Xi follows through with his public commitment to use force to unify China, Kim Jong-un will be tempted to follow suit.

Strangely enough, the Ukraine war, Taiwan Strait and North Korean nukes are becoming inter-twined factors in the emerging power equation. Putin's remarks at the Valdai international discussion club meeting in October offers a vivid example. Reiterating Russia's support for China's position on Taiwan, he added, "We have very good relations with the Republic of Korea, but now we know that it has decided to supply weapons and ammunition to Ukraine. This will destroy our relationship," only to be rebuffed by South Korean authorities as untrue. He further issued a veiled threat by saying "How would the Republic of Korea react if we resume cooperation with North Korea in this area?"

On this last point, the White House lost no time in confirming that North Korea is covertly supplying Russia with a significant number of artillery shells for its war in Ukraine. This complicated inter-connectedness is a reason why I regard the current situation as much more serious than that of 2017.

Nevertheless, what is reassuring is the much stronger posture of the U.S.-ROK alliance and international solidarity, in particular across the Indo-Pacific and Europe. The four latest U.S. strategy reports as well as a series of summits and high-level meetings among the U.S., ROK and Japan, including those of the past week, are good testimonies to our resolve to cope with the North Korean challenge.

From South Korea's perspective, the latest 2022 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and National Defense Strategy Report together are noteworthy in several aspects.

First, it did not adopt as a policy Biden's campaign pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons which had triggered serious concern from its allies around the world.

Second, as part of integrated deterrence, the U.S. emphasized stronger commitments to reinforce its extended "nuclear" deterrence which is foundational to its global network of allies and partners.

Third, these commitments specifically include the capability to forward deploy strategic bombers, dual-capable fighter aircraft and nuclear weapons to the region and globally.

Fourth, as a consequence, higher attention was given to the U.S. extended deterrence consultation dialogues with its allies in the Indo-Pacific, suggesting possible opportunities for trilateral ― the U.S., Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan ― or quadrilateral ― the trilateral plus Australia ― information sharing and dialogue.

Finally, both 2022 NPR and the ensuing ROK-U.S. annual defense ministers' meeting (SCM) issued an unusual public warning that "any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime."

As Richard Haas pointed out, Russia's aggression in Ukraine has upended many assumptions about post-Cold War international relations and ended "the holiday from history" in which wars between countries were rare. Now, we are witnessing "the return of history."

My concern is that there are other candidates in the Indo-Pacific who are tempted or committed to benchmark Putin's behavior. Whether we like it or not, the world in fragmentation is getting reconnected in an unfortunate way, us versus them. The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy notes that the fates of democratic allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe are intertwined in technology, trade and security. China and Russia are forming their own coalitions. In this regard, President Yoon sent an unambiguous and timely message to the world at the latest Korea-ASEAN Summit and East Asia Summit with Korea's new Indo-Pacific strategy.

All in all, this year's most impactful message award goes to President Biden, who reminded us, through the 2022 National Security Strategy report, of his favorite quote: "It's never a good bet to bet against the United States of America."

Yun Byung-se, former foreign minister of South Korea, is now a board member of Korea Peace Foundation and is a member of several ex-global leaders' forums and task forces, including the Astana Forum and its Consultative Council as well as the Task Force on U.S. Allies and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.