By Oh Young-jin
The unbelievable beating of Korean journalists accompanying President Moon Jae-in on his Chinese visit Thursday has failed to deter Moon.
Neither did Beijing's poor reception of the Korean president at the airport a day earlier.
What Moon seeks is clear: he wants to court China even at the cost of Korea's alliance with the United States.
Unlikely as it may sound, Moon's effort to get Korea what amounts to a divorce from its long security and economic partner has been under way with little popular opposition. To detect what's going on, three recent developments should be put together.
The first is about U.S. President Donald Trump's state visit to Korea in November, preceded by a visit from his Defense Secretary James Mattis.
During their previous summit in June in Washington, Moon and Trump set the year-end deadline to move on with a concrete plan to enable Korea to take wartime control of its troops now under American control. Mattis and Defense Minister Song Young-moo met for the annual Security Consultative Meeting but couldn't find any agreement, so the two presidents had nothing to tell the public after their Seoul summit.
The bone of contention is the structure of a new command that will replace the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). Currently, Gen. Vincent Brooks, the American four-star general in Korea, commands the CFC, with a Korean four-star general serving as his deputy commander. In the new command, the chain of command will be reversed, with a Korean general to serve as the commander.
Bruce Bennett, a Korea expert from RAND Corp., said it would be a deal breaker.
"The U.S. military would have a hard time in accepting it because there is no precedent," Bennett said. It also goes beyond the pride or tradition of the American military and comes down to the practicality of operations when the U.S. provides the nuclear umbrella to deter the North from attacking the South or sends reinforcements to push back the invading North Koreans, he said.
Then, he referred to U.S. congressional opposition to putting American military resources under foreign control. One alternative could be having a junior American general ― lieutenant general or major general ― serve a Korean four-star general. It would likely entail a reduced U.S. commitment that leads to a U.S. drawdown. Another is to go against the principle of unity of command and officially allow the junior American commander to disagree ― the drawback being a weakened command structure. Bennett suggested the postponement of the handover, which looks unlikely under Moon's presidency.
The second giveaway is a U.S. visit by Thae Young-ho, a senior diplomat who defected to the South in August last year. The Moon government had expected to reduce Thae's public appearances for fear of adversely affecting its bid to open dialogue with Pyongyang. As a matter of fact, Hwang Jang-yop, the architect of the North's founding "juche," or self-reliance philosophy, was virtually shut out of the public eye during the Kim Dae-jung government that prioritized inter-Korean reconciliation.
Bennett saw Moon allowing Thae to appear as showing how angry Moon is with the North for repeatedly rejecting his proposal for dialogue. But on the flipside, it may signify his confidence in dealing with the North and the resolution of its nuclear and missile threats. Moon's positive sentiment reflects that of the Korean public that knows through a mixture of wishful thinking and experience, peace has been maintained on the Korean Peninsula despite many close calls through nearly seven decades after the 1950-53 Korean War. That public sentiment is based on the reality of a lopsided growth difference between the two Koreas ― in a long game, the South is bound to win.
Finally, why China over the U.S.? It is related to Moon's lineage as declared successor of his mentor and friend, the late President Roh Moon-hyun's effort to gain a sense of independence from Washington's influence and play the role of regional "balancer of power" to mediate between the two superpowers. But when Roh talked about it, it was a vision. Now for Moon, it can become closer to a reality. China is an unstoppable juggernaut that is bound to clash and cooperate with the U.S. for now and may replace the U.S. as the sole regional hegemon.
That's why Moon has put up with China's poor treatment and its leader Xi Jinping's bellicose attitude over Korea's deployment of the U.S. missile defense system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery. Moon may have lost some face but it is obvious that his loss has been more than compensated for ― Chinese tourists are coming back to Seoul streets, K-pop stars are in Beijing again and Moon has exchanged a handshake with Xi in Beijing. Their latest summit shows their maturity by not letting the THAAD disagreement get in the way of their agreements in other areas such as the North.
In this context, how could one see Moon's expression of commitment to buy billions of dollars of American weaponry during his November summit with Trump? Isn't it alimony ahead of a divorce or spousal support to ease the pain of separation? The question is for Americans to ask.
Oh Young-jin (foolsdie5@ktimes.com and foolsdie@gmail.com) is The Korea Times' digital news managing editor.
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Neither did Beijing's poor reception of the Korean president at the airport a day earlier.
What Moon seeks is clear: he wants to court China even at the cost of Korea's alliance with the United States.
Unlikely as it may sound, Moon's effort to get Korea what amounts to a divorce from its long security and economic partner has been under way with little popular opposition. To detect what's going on, three recent developments should be put together.
The first is about U.S. President Donald Trump's state visit to Korea in November, preceded by a visit from his Defense Secretary James Mattis.
During their previous summit in June in Washington, Moon and Trump set the year-end deadline to move on with a concrete plan to enable Korea to take wartime control of its troops now under American control. Mattis and Defense Minister Song Young-moo met for the annual Security Consultative Meeting but couldn't find any agreement, so the two presidents had nothing to tell the public after their Seoul summit.
The bone of contention is the structure of a new command that will replace the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). Currently, Gen. Vincent Brooks, the American four-star general in Korea, commands the CFC, with a Korean four-star general serving as his deputy commander. In the new command, the chain of command will be reversed, with a Korean general to serve as the commander.
Bruce Bennett, a Korea expert from RAND Corp., said it would be a deal breaker.
"The U.S. military would have a hard time in accepting it because there is no precedent," Bennett said. It also goes beyond the pride or tradition of the American military and comes down to the practicality of operations when the U.S. provides the nuclear umbrella to deter the North from attacking the South or sends reinforcements to push back the invading North Koreans, he said.
Then, he referred to U.S. congressional opposition to putting American military resources under foreign control. One alternative could be having a junior American general ― lieutenant general or major general ― serve a Korean four-star general. It would likely entail a reduced U.S. commitment that leads to a U.S. drawdown. Another is to go against the principle of unity of command and officially allow the junior American commander to disagree ― the drawback being a weakened command structure. Bennett suggested the postponement of the handover, which looks unlikely under Moon's presidency.
The second giveaway is a U.S. visit by Thae Young-ho, a senior diplomat who defected to the South in August last year. The Moon government had expected to reduce Thae's public appearances for fear of adversely affecting its bid to open dialogue with Pyongyang. As a matter of fact, Hwang Jang-yop, the architect of the North's founding "juche," or self-reliance philosophy, was virtually shut out of the public eye during the Kim Dae-jung government that prioritized inter-Korean reconciliation.
Bennett saw Moon allowing Thae to appear as showing how angry Moon is with the North for repeatedly rejecting his proposal for dialogue. But on the flipside, it may signify his confidence in dealing with the North and the resolution of its nuclear and missile threats. Moon's positive sentiment reflects that of the Korean public that knows through a mixture of wishful thinking and experience, peace has been maintained on the Korean Peninsula despite many close calls through nearly seven decades after the 1950-53 Korean War. That public sentiment is based on the reality of a lopsided growth difference between the two Koreas ― in a long game, the South is bound to win.
Finally, why China over the U.S.? It is related to Moon's lineage as declared successor of his mentor and friend, the late President Roh Moon-hyun's effort to gain a sense of independence from Washington's influence and play the role of regional "balancer of power" to mediate between the two superpowers. But when Roh talked about it, it was a vision. Now for Moon, it can become closer to a reality. China is an unstoppable juggernaut that is bound to clash and cooperate with the U.S. for now and may replace the U.S. as the sole regional hegemon.
That's why Moon has put up with China's poor treatment and its leader Xi Jinping's bellicose attitude over Korea's deployment of the U.S. missile defense system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery. Moon may have lost some face but it is obvious that his loss has been more than compensated for ― Chinese tourists are coming back to Seoul streets, K-pop stars are in Beijing again and Moon has exchanged a handshake with Xi in Beijing. Their latest summit shows their maturity by not letting the THAAD disagreement get in the way of their agreements in other areas such as the North.
In this context, how could one see Moon's expression of commitment to buy billions of dollars of American weaponry during his November summit with Trump? Isn't it alimony ahead of a divorce or spousal support to ease the pain of separation? The question is for Americans to ask.
Oh Young-jin (foolsdie5@ktimes.com and foolsdie@gmail.com) is The Korea Times' digital news managing editor.
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