On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the admission of the two Koreas to the United Nations, this is the second and last of two articles that will review the U.N.'s involvements on the Korean Peninsula since the two Koreas were established 73 years ago in the aftermath of World War II and deliberate on its future role.
By Park In-kook
The structural circumstances of the two Koreas reached a turning point when they simultaneously joined the U.N. in 1991. Given North Korea's persistent denial of South Korea's legitimacy, the two Koreas' simultaneous admission to the U.N. was a breakthrough. This development was made possible by the end of the Cold War and South Korea's zealous pursuit of a "northern policy" to improve relations with North Korea, and diplomatically engage with the Soviet Union and China.
This in part led to China's active engagement including Prime Minister Li Peng's visit to North Korea. The U.N.'s decision to admit the two Koreas to the U.N. highlighted a durable modus vivendi for their coexistence. Later that year, these events eventually paved the way for the conclusion of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement.
After becoming a member of the U.N., North Korea's lack of experience in multilateral fora combined with its nuclear obsession limited its role to a "single-issue delegation," focusing only on issues related to its nuclear programs and regime survival. It should also be noted that even though North Korea later unilaterally nullified the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, it did not retract its U.N. membership. This may be because the North Korean permanent mission to the U.N. in New York could continue to function as the de facto North Korean Embassy to the United States.
Another remarkable change was the inter-Korean summit talks in 2000 and 2007. This progress in the inter-Korean dialogue allowed the U.N. to support important principles for unification: an eventual ― not immediate ― unification through a phased approach, and unification by peaceful means.
These principles were reflected in UNGA Resolutions 55/11 and 62/5 on the occasion of the inter-Korean summit meetings in 2000 and 2007. Resolution 55/11 also encourages the full implementation of "other agreements" between the two Koreas, which include the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement.
North Korea's obsession with developing its nuclear program shifted the focus of U.N. deliberation on Korean issues to this matter starting in the late 1990s. The Security Council adopted 13 resolutions to impose sanctions on the North for conducting a series of nuclear and missile tests. Traditionally, U.N. sanctions vis-a-vis North Korea were perceived to be a "slap on the wrist."
In the wake of North Korea's successful launching of an ICBM in 2017, however, the Council toughened its sanctions (2270, 2321, 2356, 2371, 2375, 2397), which then played a pivotal role in identifying serious violations of the resolutions and implementing appropriate countermeasures.
It is also particularly noteworthy that China did not exercise its veto power when the Security Council adopted critical measures against North Korea, banning its exports of coal and setting a limit on its imports of a significant portion of crude oil.
In 2009, when North Korea conducted its second nuclear test, China showed a lukewarm attitude by refusing to include North Korea's uranium enrichment program in the sanction resolutions, and failing to strictly enforce the sanctions. However, China's attitude toward the North Korean nuclear crisis changed after the third nuclear test.
If North Korea becomes a responsible member of the international community by carrying out its previous commitments to achieve denuclearization, the U.N. should lead efforts to secure international assistance to help North Korea achieve economic growth. We have to remember that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), which was established in 1951, played an indispensable role in the reconstruction of South Korea until it was disbanded in 1973.
U.N. initiatives such as UNCURK are a good example of how the U.N. can engage with North Korea for its development in the future.
The interesting trend of South Koreans' attitudes toward unification also deserves attention. According to a survey conducted by the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU) last month, 56.5 percent of Koreans prefer peace amidst division, while only 25.4 percent support unification in the conventional sense. Unification should be the ultimate goal of the Korean people. But we have to understand that unification will be an arduous process that will entail close collaboration among all parties involved, internationally and domestically.
I believe the U.N. can ― and should ― continue to play an instrumental role in preventing another war, ensuring the denuclearization of North Korea and promoting the unification of the Korean Peninsula. To this end, with its time-honored trump cards, including agenda-setting, convening power, and ultimately the use of force, the U.N. can ultimately play a critical role.
The election of Ban Ki-moon as the eighth U.N. Secretary-General marked the moment of Korea's coming of age in the multilateral arena. Under his leadership, the international community adopted the historic Paris Agreement on climate change, while the U.N. successfully managed the transition from the Millennium Development Goals to the Sustainable Development Goals, under which the trinity of development, social justice and environment were consolidated to form a new overarching goal for the international community.
This will be remembered not only as Secretary-General Ban's legacy, but also go down in history books as landmark milestones of the U.N.
Park In-kook is former Korean Ambassador to the United Nations. He is now president of the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies.
By Park In-kook
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This in part led to China's active engagement including Prime Minister Li Peng's visit to North Korea. The U.N.'s decision to admit the two Koreas to the U.N. highlighted a durable modus vivendi for their coexistence. Later that year, these events eventually paved the way for the conclusion of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement.
After becoming a member of the U.N., North Korea's lack of experience in multilateral fora combined with its nuclear obsession limited its role to a "single-issue delegation," focusing only on issues related to its nuclear programs and regime survival. It should also be noted that even though North Korea later unilaterally nullified the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, it did not retract its U.N. membership. This may be because the North Korean permanent mission to the U.N. in New York could continue to function as the de facto North Korean Embassy to the United States.
Another remarkable change was the inter-Korean summit talks in 2000 and 2007. This progress in the inter-Korean dialogue allowed the U.N. to support important principles for unification: an eventual ― not immediate ― unification through a phased approach, and unification by peaceful means.
These principles were reflected in UNGA Resolutions 55/11 and 62/5 on the occasion of the inter-Korean summit meetings in 2000 and 2007. Resolution 55/11 also encourages the full implementation of "other agreements" between the two Koreas, which include the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement.
North Korea's obsession with developing its nuclear program shifted the focus of U.N. deliberation on Korean issues to this matter starting in the late 1990s. The Security Council adopted 13 resolutions to impose sanctions on the North for conducting a series of nuclear and missile tests. Traditionally, U.N. sanctions vis-a-vis North Korea were perceived to be a "slap on the wrist."
In the wake of North Korea's successful launching of an ICBM in 2017, however, the Council toughened its sanctions (2270, 2321, 2356, 2371, 2375, 2397), which then played a pivotal role in identifying serious violations of the resolutions and implementing appropriate countermeasures.
It is also particularly noteworthy that China did not exercise its veto power when the Security Council adopted critical measures against North Korea, banning its exports of coal and setting a limit on its imports of a significant portion of crude oil.
In 2009, when North Korea conducted its second nuclear test, China showed a lukewarm attitude by refusing to include North Korea's uranium enrichment program in the sanction resolutions, and failing to strictly enforce the sanctions. However, China's attitude toward the North Korean nuclear crisis changed after the third nuclear test.
If North Korea becomes a responsible member of the international community by carrying out its previous commitments to achieve denuclearization, the U.N. should lead efforts to secure international assistance to help North Korea achieve economic growth. We have to remember that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), which was established in 1951, played an indispensable role in the reconstruction of South Korea until it was disbanded in 1973.
U.N. initiatives such as UNCURK are a good example of how the U.N. can engage with North Korea for its development in the future.
The interesting trend of South Koreans' attitudes toward unification also deserves attention. According to a survey conducted by the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU) last month, 56.5 percent of Koreans prefer peace amidst division, while only 25.4 percent support unification in the conventional sense. Unification should be the ultimate goal of the Korean people. But we have to understand that unification will be an arduous process that will entail close collaboration among all parties involved, internationally and domestically.
I believe the U.N. can ― and should ― continue to play an instrumental role in preventing another war, ensuring the denuclearization of North Korea and promoting the unification of the Korean Peninsula. To this end, with its time-honored trump cards, including agenda-setting, convening power, and ultimately the use of force, the U.N. can ultimately play a critical role.
The election of Ban Ki-moon as the eighth U.N. Secretary-General marked the moment of Korea's coming of age in the multilateral arena. Under his leadership, the international community adopted the historic Paris Agreement on climate change, while the U.N. successfully managed the transition from the Millennium Development Goals to the Sustainable Development Goals, under which the trinity of development, social justice and environment were consolidated to form a new overarching goal for the international community.
This will be remembered not only as Secretary-General Ban's legacy, but also go down in history books as landmark milestones of the U.N.
Park In-kook is former Korean Ambassador to the United Nations. He is now president of the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies.
