By Paul Tyson
Foreign ministries have geographic and regional divisions and within them individual country desks headed by a desk officer. The Japanese foreign ministry, the Gaimusho, has a Korea desk. It is led by career diplomats in the ministry, Ken Ono and Katsutoshi Takeda.
But neither should be considered the top Korea desk officer in Japan. That title goes to Japan's new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who served as foreign minister between 2012 and 2017 during the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
An analogous situation happened in the U.S. when George W. Bush was president. He had previously been U.S. ambassador to China and everyone in the U.S. State Department knew he should be considered the top China desk officer when he was in the Oval Office so they acted accordingly.
Policy makers in Korea should keep this in mind as they try to forge a new relationship with Japan under Kishida. Their first step should obviously be to study the records of negotiations and meetings with Kishida. But these will only tell part of the story.
President Moon Jae-in and his successor in Cheong Wa Dae would also do well to consult those foreign ministry officials and lawmakers who had dealt personally with Kishida. Think of meeting a friend who knows someone you are planning to meet. What is said over coffee or a drink often reveals much more beyond a CV. Is he personable or very formal? Is he direct? What does he drink if at all? What about his personal and family life? These questions are only answered in part by official records.
Next, what issues was he involved with? In the case of Kishida, we know that he was involved with North Korea and helped lead the negotiations with Seoul on the wartime sex slavery issue. What do his Korean interlocutors on these issues have to say about him? What are his views? How does he negotiate? Is he direct or more obtuse? Hardline or willing to compromise?
The best people to answer these questions will be the Korean officials who had face-to-face contacts with Kishida and his Gaimusho team. In turn, this will affect how the Blue House should staff future meetings with Kishida. Most countries would use the same people who have negotiated with him previously. They have met him, they know the history on the issues and they can move forward quickly.
The danger with this, however, and something that is rarely discussed openly in top levels of government, is that the Japanese might have an aversion to some Korean officials they have dealt with in the past. If that is the case, it is better to put a new face forward and create the conditions for a fresh start.
If the old negotiators who are disliked remain, it tends to lock in previous stances on the issues under negotiation. I have been in the room when a senior official has stated about another country's negotiating team, "I hope that SOB is not on their team. He is a pain in the ass." The best solution is to get them out of the way and bring in a new team.
This exercise can also be applied by officials in Seoul to the team that Kishida and the Gaimusho will field in bilateral negotiations. If they see the same faces, they will know that there could be tough sledding ahead, but if there are new faces it might be a cause for optimism.
Hopefully, the arrival of Kishida can go some way in thawing the chilly Korean-Japanese relations which are viewed as being at their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1965.
Much attention in Seoul has been paid to the fact that Kishida has retained the foreign and defense ministers as holdovers from the hawkish Abe administration. This is interpreted as showing that there will be little chance of progress in relations with Seoul.
But Kishida may have kept them on to retain the support of the Abe faction in the ruling party ahead of general elections to be held at the end of October. Once the elections are over, he might decide to appoint new ministers to these key posts rather than remaining in Abe's shadow.
Given his background as foreign minister, Kishida must surely be aware of the need to improve ties with Seoul. He did try to resolve the military sex slavery issue with the 2015 agreement made with former President Park Geun-hye, which was later scrapped by President Moon.
He is also likely to be more courteous than his predecessor, Yoshihide Suga, who refused to meet with the Korean ambassador to Tokyo while he was in office despite repeated requests.
Paul Tyson is a retired U.S. diplomat teaching diplomacy and government at New England College.
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But neither should be considered the top Korea desk officer in Japan. That title goes to Japan's new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who served as foreign minister between 2012 and 2017 during the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
An analogous situation happened in the U.S. when George W. Bush was president. He had previously been U.S. ambassador to China and everyone in the U.S. State Department knew he should be considered the top China desk officer when he was in the Oval Office so they acted accordingly.
Policy makers in Korea should keep this in mind as they try to forge a new relationship with Japan under Kishida. Their first step should obviously be to study the records of negotiations and meetings with Kishida. But these will only tell part of the story.
President Moon Jae-in and his successor in Cheong Wa Dae would also do well to consult those foreign ministry officials and lawmakers who had dealt personally with Kishida. Think of meeting a friend who knows someone you are planning to meet. What is said over coffee or a drink often reveals much more beyond a CV. Is he personable or very formal? Is he direct? What does he drink if at all? What about his personal and family life? These questions are only answered in part by official records.
Next, what issues was he involved with? In the case of Kishida, we know that he was involved with North Korea and helped lead the negotiations with Seoul on the wartime sex slavery issue. What do his Korean interlocutors on these issues have to say about him? What are his views? How does he negotiate? Is he direct or more obtuse? Hardline or willing to compromise?
The best people to answer these questions will be the Korean officials who had face-to-face contacts with Kishida and his Gaimusho team. In turn, this will affect how the Blue House should staff future meetings with Kishida. Most countries would use the same people who have negotiated with him previously. They have met him, they know the history on the issues and they can move forward quickly.
The danger with this, however, and something that is rarely discussed openly in top levels of government, is that the Japanese might have an aversion to some Korean officials they have dealt with in the past. If that is the case, it is better to put a new face forward and create the conditions for a fresh start.
If the old negotiators who are disliked remain, it tends to lock in previous stances on the issues under negotiation. I have been in the room when a senior official has stated about another country's negotiating team, "I hope that SOB is not on their team. He is a pain in the ass." The best solution is to get them out of the way and bring in a new team.
This exercise can also be applied by officials in Seoul to the team that Kishida and the Gaimusho will field in bilateral negotiations. If they see the same faces, they will know that there could be tough sledding ahead, but if there are new faces it might be a cause for optimism.
Hopefully, the arrival of Kishida can go some way in thawing the chilly Korean-Japanese relations which are viewed as being at their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1965.
Much attention in Seoul has been paid to the fact that Kishida has retained the foreign and defense ministers as holdovers from the hawkish Abe administration. This is interpreted as showing that there will be little chance of progress in relations with Seoul.
But Kishida may have kept them on to retain the support of the Abe faction in the ruling party ahead of general elections to be held at the end of October. Once the elections are over, he might decide to appoint new ministers to these key posts rather than remaining in Abe's shadow.
Given his background as foreign minister, Kishida must surely be aware of the need to improve ties with Seoul. He did try to resolve the military sex slavery issue with the 2015 agreement made with former President Park Geun-hye, which was later scrapped by President Moon.
He is also likely to be more courteous than his predecessor, Yoshihide Suga, who refused to meet with the Korean ambassador to Tokyo while he was in office despite repeated requests.
Paul Tyson is a retired U.S. diplomat teaching diplomacy and government at New England College.
