By John Burton
It will be nearly a year from now when Korea holds its next presidential election on March 9, 2022. The last year in office usually proves to be a dismal one for Korean presidents due to their lame-duck status.
That appears to be the case for President Moon Jae-in, whose popularity among voters has fallen to below 40 percent from 60 percent last May. While Moon garnered strong support earlier in the year due to his government's effective response to the outbreak of COVID-19, his declining popularity is now blamed on an upsurge of COVID-19 cases since November and the slow rollout of a vaccine program.
Other problems have recently dogged Moon's presidency. One is a perceived conflict of interest when it comes to anti-corruption investigations of his administration as exemplified by the fight between the Justice Minister Choo Mi-ae and Prosecutor-General Yoon Seok-youl, which ended in Choo's resignation and undermined public trust in the government. The ruling party's progressive image was also damaged by sexual harassment allegations involving the mayors of Seoul and Busan. Meanwhile, the government has failed so far to deflate a housing price bubble in Seoul that has left many angry about the cost of living.
But it may be too soon to completely write off the final year of Moon's term as ineffective in terms of policy making. For one thing, Moon's Democratic Party holds a strong majority in the National Assembly, a result of public approval for his administration's COVID-19 response in last April's parliamentary elections. This has enabled Moon to pass a slew of legislation in recent months, including those pertaining to labor and corporate governance.
Public support for the Moon government could also grow if Korea makes a robust economic recovery from the impact of COVID-19. After China, Korea is seen as the country most likely to have a strong rebound in growth among the world's advanced economies in 2021, rising by an estimated 3 percent against a 1 percent contraction in 2020.
This reflects the fact that Korea has been relatively successful in stopping the spread of COVID-19 compared with other nations, although extensive government stimulus spending also helped keep the economy afloat last year. Korea is also benefiting from strong global demand for semiconductors, a key export product. With an expected gradual decline in the unemployment rate, now above 5 percent, household spending should increase this year as consumer confidence returns.
It is clear that Moon wants to use some of his remaining political capital to secure a lasting legacy by establishing a peace process and reconciliation with Pyongyang, which has always been a major goal of his presidency. The president recently suggested that inter-Korean cooperation on combating COVID-19 could restart dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang.
Moon also underscored that intention when he named Chung Eui-yong, his former special envoy to North Korea, as the new foreign minister in late January. Chung's appointment served as recognition that Moon must coordinate efforts with the new administration of President Joe Biden in Washington. Chung, a veteran diplomat, served as Moon's point man in helping arrange the two summits between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump.
But Chung's mission to facilitate closer coordination with the Biden administration could prove difficult since the new foreign policy team in Washington is expected to take a tougher line on North Korea.
One potential source of conflict between Seoul and Washington is already becoming clear. The Biden administration is emphasizing that human rights issues should be included in any talks with Pyongyang, which both Moon and Trump largely played down as they focused on curbing North Korea's nuclear program.
This view has been expressed by Jung Pak, the new U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia, who is expected to help lead North Korea policy making.
A former CIA analyst, she recently served as North Korea expert at the Brookings Institution, the top think tank in Washington. In her last report before leaving Brookings for the State Department, Pak criticized Moon for using "his power to dampen anti-North speech and activities to support his pro-engagement policy toward Pyongyang." She urged Moon to change his approach to human rights and North Korean defector groups.
There is a risk that strained ties with the U.S. on North Korea policy could distract Moon from achieving his other major goal of creating a more competitive and equitable economy. In his annual New Year address, Moon spoke of Korea becoming a global digital and green power leader, while saying these efforts would help create a more inclusive society.
But if Moon fails to address more immediate public concerns, such as runaway housing prices in Seoul, this could hurt the ruling party's political prospects over the next year and increase the chances of a conservative president taking power in 2022.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
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That appears to be the case for President Moon Jae-in, whose popularity among voters has fallen to below 40 percent from 60 percent last May. While Moon garnered strong support earlier in the year due to his government's effective response to the outbreak of COVID-19, his declining popularity is now blamed on an upsurge of COVID-19 cases since November and the slow rollout of a vaccine program.
Other problems have recently dogged Moon's presidency. One is a perceived conflict of interest when it comes to anti-corruption investigations of his administration as exemplified by the fight between the Justice Minister Choo Mi-ae and Prosecutor-General Yoon Seok-youl, which ended in Choo's resignation and undermined public trust in the government. The ruling party's progressive image was also damaged by sexual harassment allegations involving the mayors of Seoul and Busan. Meanwhile, the government has failed so far to deflate a housing price bubble in Seoul that has left many angry about the cost of living.
But it may be too soon to completely write off the final year of Moon's term as ineffective in terms of policy making. For one thing, Moon's Democratic Party holds a strong majority in the National Assembly, a result of public approval for his administration's COVID-19 response in last April's parliamentary elections. This has enabled Moon to pass a slew of legislation in recent months, including those pertaining to labor and corporate governance.
Public support for the Moon government could also grow if Korea makes a robust economic recovery from the impact of COVID-19. After China, Korea is seen as the country most likely to have a strong rebound in growth among the world's advanced economies in 2021, rising by an estimated 3 percent against a 1 percent contraction in 2020.
This reflects the fact that Korea has been relatively successful in stopping the spread of COVID-19 compared with other nations, although extensive government stimulus spending also helped keep the economy afloat last year. Korea is also benefiting from strong global demand for semiconductors, a key export product. With an expected gradual decline in the unemployment rate, now above 5 percent, household spending should increase this year as consumer confidence returns.
It is clear that Moon wants to use some of his remaining political capital to secure a lasting legacy by establishing a peace process and reconciliation with Pyongyang, which has always been a major goal of his presidency. The president recently suggested that inter-Korean cooperation on combating COVID-19 could restart dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang.
Moon also underscored that intention when he named Chung Eui-yong, his former special envoy to North Korea, as the new foreign minister in late January. Chung's appointment served as recognition that Moon must coordinate efforts with the new administration of President Joe Biden in Washington. Chung, a veteran diplomat, served as Moon's point man in helping arrange the two summits between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump.
But Chung's mission to facilitate closer coordination with the Biden administration could prove difficult since the new foreign policy team in Washington is expected to take a tougher line on North Korea.
One potential source of conflict between Seoul and Washington is already becoming clear. The Biden administration is emphasizing that human rights issues should be included in any talks with Pyongyang, which both Moon and Trump largely played down as they focused on curbing North Korea's nuclear program.
This view has been expressed by Jung Pak, the new U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia, who is expected to help lead North Korea policy making.
A former CIA analyst, she recently served as North Korea expert at the Brookings Institution, the top think tank in Washington. In her last report before leaving Brookings for the State Department, Pak criticized Moon for using "his power to dampen anti-North speech and activities to support his pro-engagement policy toward Pyongyang." She urged Moon to change his approach to human rights and North Korean defector groups.
There is a risk that strained ties with the U.S. on North Korea policy could distract Moon from achieving his other major goal of creating a more competitive and equitable economy. In his annual New Year address, Moon spoke of Korea becoming a global digital and green power leader, while saying these efforts would help create a more inclusive society.
But if Moon fails to address more immediate public concerns, such as runaway housing prices in Seoul, this could hurt the ruling party's political prospects over the next year and increase the chances of a conservative president taking power in 2022.
John Burton (johnburtonft@yahoo.com), a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is a Washington, D.C.-based journalist and consultant.
