By Troy Stangarone
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Managing the health and economic crises will be the administration's overriding priority, along with attempting to restore the faith in the U.S. government that has been lost under President Donald Trump.
While the domestic focus of the new administration is clear, its foreign policy focus will be more complicated due to the lack of cooperation by the Trump administration in the transition.
This failure to conduct a smooth transition will make foreign policy initially more complex, and could also make it more difficult for the Biden administration to engage in early talks with North Korea.
After four years of Trump's "America first" foreign policy, a course correction is necessary. While foreign policy will need to play a complementary role to domestic policy early in the Biden administration, initial steps will need to focus on restoring U.S. alliances and international credibility.
In addition to mending relations with allies, clear steps that the new administration is likely to take include returning to the Paris Climate Accords and the World Health Organization (WHO).
Returning to the WHO could be a key early step by the Biden administration that fits within its domestic agenda of dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic.
In contrast to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the pandemic has not seen the type of international cooperation needed to deal with the health and economic challenges countries are facing. Better international cooperation could save lives and improve global economic growth.
Beyond dealing with the pandemic and improving relations with allies, managing the increasingly competitive relationship with China and convincing Iran to return to the nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration will be priorities. The question for the administration will be where North Korea falls in this agenda.
While the default concern is that North Korea could fall down the U.S. foreign policy agenda; that may not be the case. Biden will be the first president to come into office facing a North Korea with the capability to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. It is also an issue that has strong bipartisan support.
In a survey conducted by my organization, the Korea Economic Institute, shortly prior to the election, Americans ranked North Korea as the third most critical foreign policy challenge for the United States, ahead of Iran. That same survey also found that 84 percent of Americans believed it was important for North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons.
It is likely that attempting to roll back North Korea's nuclear programs will be high on the foreign policy agenda after dealing with the immediate crisis.
Whether North Korea is prepared for discussions, however, is another question. Since the first signs of COVID-19 in China, North Korea has largely sealed its borders.
The increased restrictions have hit the North hard. Through the first three quarters, imports from China have dropped 73 percent. North Korean exports to China have fared no better with a 72 percent decline. A reported shoot to kill order along the border with China has meant that smuggling has been impacted as well.
In the absence of a vaccine ― something which might not be available until the middle of next year depending on North Korea's willingness to accept outside help which for the moment it seems unwilling to do ― Pyongyang is unlikely to loosen border restrictions and risk an outbreak of COVID-19 domestically.
This complicates the prospect for negotiations. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may be reluctant to negotiate from a perceived position of weakness. While North Korea has been reluctant to seek outside help, assistance with COVID-19 without strings attached could be a first step to building a new relationship with Pyongyang.
The current course of negotiations based on summits may have run its course due to COVID-19, but if North Korea were to indicate a serious willingness to restart talks, the Biden administration needs to be prepared.
The lack of intelligence briefings and transition meetings with Trump administration officials makes it harder for the incoming Biden administration to formulate North Korea policy and quickly conduct a review.
Once the Biden administration takes office, there will only be 15 months remaining for the Moon administration. That short period might be all that remains of the current window for talks with North Korea. It would be a shame to waste part of it over a failure to conduct an orderly presidential transition in the United States.
Troy Stangarone (ts@keia.org) is the senior director of congressional affairs and trade at the Korea Economic Institute.
