By Andrew Hammond
Last week's Democratic Party capture of the U.S. Senate has focused minds on the implications for President-elect Joe Biden's domestic policy. However, the results also mean that he may have significantly more time to focus on international affairs where, pandemic aside, his largest presidential challenges will lie from next week.
Biden is no stranger to massive foreign policy problems. In 2009, the 'in-tray' for him and then-President Barack Obama was widely acknowledged as perhaps the most daunting of any White House team in the post-war era, ranging from Iraq and Afghanistan to tackling climate change.
Another parallel with 12 years ago is that, today, the United States and wider world also simultaneously face separate, first order crises. In 2009, the Obama administration sought to tackle the worst international financial turmoil since the 1930s, whereas the incoming Biden team is facing into the coronavirus crisis, the first global pandemic in a century.
So the scale of combined dangers facing Biden is comparably large, and complex compared to a dozen years ago, but there is one big difference. Whereas Obama was elected in 2009 as a first term senator, Biden is perhaps the most experienced and knowledgeable president-elect on foreign affairs in modern U.S. history.
Of course, experience does not equal success, but it should allow Biden to hit the ground running which could be critical. For there are a number of burning issues that require immediate attention, beyond the pandemic which will already consume much of his time in 2021.
First, with U.S.-Russia relations remaining in the deep freeze, Biden must quickly choose how best to respond to the apparently massive recent cyber hack of U.S. federal agencies ― reportedly of Moscow's making. So far, there is only drift and denial from Donald Trump.
Other challenges confronting the U.S.-led international order include Iran which has reportedly restarted work on its nuclear site at Fordo. Meanwhile North Korea ― amidst Trump's flip-flopping between threats and courting of Kim Jong-un ― now has long-range missile capabilities on top of being a nuclear power, a combination which could easily become a major crisis.
Further geopolitical fault lines include the deep chill in U.S.-China relations, post-pandemic; continuing instability in Afghanistan and Libya; and the bleak prospects facing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Meanwhile, urgent action is needed to bolster international efforts on climate change too.
Collectively, this is a massive agenda. There are some 'quick wins' for Biden like rejoining the Paris climate change accord. But the thorniest issues have no easy, immediate answers.
Some critics of Trump see this international landscape of risks as entirely a result of the maverick leadership in Washington for the last four years. However, while the current president has made many missteps, this is too simplistic a conclusion in and of itself.
For the U.S. is not all-powerful, even if it remains the most powerful country in the world in a military sense with the ability to project and deploy overwhelming force. This has been demonstrated repeatedly throughout the post-Cold War period.
To be sure, the country will remain for the foreseeable future the primary actor in many theatres across the world. And while its relative power may erode, it will seek to continue to set the international agenda in the political, economic and security spheres and succeed in doing so more often than any other state.
Yet, going forward, U.S. success in helping manage the complexity of global affairs will increasingly depend upon the cooperation of others, both competitors and allies, which is why international alliances are so important, despite Trump's frequent disdain for them. This is why Biden will in 2021 swiftly seek to bring traditional allies back more firmly into the U.S. fold, including those in Europe.
Perhaps the key uncertainty is his presidency is China whose economic and military power is only likely to continue to grow. While increasing bilateral rivalry appears most likely, post-pandemic, there remains an outside possibility of a more fruitful partnership.
Such growing cooperation is possible if the two powers can increasingly find ways to resolve harder power disagreements, such as South China Sea territorial claims, while cooperating on soft issues like climate change. The prize here could be a deeper, collaborative strategic partnership, rather than escalating threats plus greater global instability, and a key question of Biden's presidency is whether the political window of opportunity to pursue this agenda has now been extinguished, or not.
Andrew Hammond (andrewkorea@outlook.com) is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.
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Biden is no stranger to massive foreign policy problems. In 2009, the 'in-tray' for him and then-President Barack Obama was widely acknowledged as perhaps the most daunting of any White House team in the post-war era, ranging from Iraq and Afghanistan to tackling climate change.
Another parallel with 12 years ago is that, today, the United States and wider world also simultaneously face separate, first order crises. In 2009, the Obama administration sought to tackle the worst international financial turmoil since the 1930s, whereas the incoming Biden team is facing into the coronavirus crisis, the first global pandemic in a century.
So the scale of combined dangers facing Biden is comparably large, and complex compared to a dozen years ago, but there is one big difference. Whereas Obama was elected in 2009 as a first term senator, Biden is perhaps the most experienced and knowledgeable president-elect on foreign affairs in modern U.S. history.
Of course, experience does not equal success, but it should allow Biden to hit the ground running which could be critical. For there are a number of burning issues that require immediate attention, beyond the pandemic which will already consume much of his time in 2021.
First, with U.S.-Russia relations remaining in the deep freeze, Biden must quickly choose how best to respond to the apparently massive recent cyber hack of U.S. federal agencies ― reportedly of Moscow's making. So far, there is only drift and denial from Donald Trump.
Other challenges confronting the U.S.-led international order include Iran which has reportedly restarted work on its nuclear site at Fordo. Meanwhile North Korea ― amidst Trump's flip-flopping between threats and courting of Kim Jong-un ― now has long-range missile capabilities on top of being a nuclear power, a combination which could easily become a major crisis.
Further geopolitical fault lines include the deep chill in U.S.-China relations, post-pandemic; continuing instability in Afghanistan and Libya; and the bleak prospects facing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Meanwhile, urgent action is needed to bolster international efforts on climate change too.
Collectively, this is a massive agenda. There are some 'quick wins' for Biden like rejoining the Paris climate change accord. But the thorniest issues have no easy, immediate answers.
Some critics of Trump see this international landscape of risks as entirely a result of the maverick leadership in Washington for the last four years. However, while the current president has made many missteps, this is too simplistic a conclusion in and of itself.
For the U.S. is not all-powerful, even if it remains the most powerful country in the world in a military sense with the ability to project and deploy overwhelming force. This has been demonstrated repeatedly throughout the post-Cold War period.
To be sure, the country will remain for the foreseeable future the primary actor in many theatres across the world. And while its relative power may erode, it will seek to continue to set the international agenda in the political, economic and security spheres and succeed in doing so more often than any other state.
Yet, going forward, U.S. success in helping manage the complexity of global affairs will increasingly depend upon the cooperation of others, both competitors and allies, which is why international alliances are so important, despite Trump's frequent disdain for them. This is why Biden will in 2021 swiftly seek to bring traditional allies back more firmly into the U.S. fold, including those in Europe.
Perhaps the key uncertainty is his presidency is China whose economic and military power is only likely to continue to grow. While increasing bilateral rivalry appears most likely, post-pandemic, there remains an outside possibility of a more fruitful partnership.
Such growing cooperation is possible if the two powers can increasingly find ways to resolve harder power disagreements, such as South China Sea territorial claims, while cooperating on soft issues like climate change. The prize here could be a deeper, collaborative strategic partnership, rather than escalating threats plus greater global instability, and a key question of Biden's presidency is whether the political window of opportunity to pursue this agenda has now been extinguished, or not.
Andrew Hammond (andrewkorea@outlook.com) is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.
