By Choi Sung-jin
Former President Roh Moo-hyun was ahead of his time in many ways.
In March 2005, for example, then-President Roh said South Korea would "play the role of a balancer" for the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia.
Officials at the presidential Blue House then explained that Roh's "theory of balancer" reflected his will toward more balanced and pragmatic diplomacy. "Seoul would play an active role in building a peace regime in this region by creating an order for multilateral security and cooperation," they said.
As it turned out later, the liberal president's bold initiative didn't go over well, to say the least, amid the barrage of attacks from conservatives. Roh's political opponents said it was not practicable by breaking up the bilateral alliance with the United States and leaning too much toward China. To no one's surprise, the U.S. government also showed an unfavorable response to the idea.
Even neutral commentators said the theory, albeit attemptable "someday," was a little premature at the time. That someday could be now.
In an interview with Singapore-based Channel News Asia on Friday, President Moon Jae-in, Roh's former chief of staff, emphasized the need for a balanced diplomacy between the U.S. and China.
President Moon's remark drew keen attention, here and abroad, as it came just days after his foreign minister, Kang Kyung-wha, while responding to lawmakers' questions last Monday, talked about Seoul's "three no policy." She cited no more deployment here of the U.S. antimissile system called THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), no participation in the U.S.-led missile defense network, and no collaboration for the trilateral military alliance with the U.S. and Japan.
A day later, South Korean and Chinese governments announced the two countries would put their bilateral relations back on the right track, ending more than a year of a diplomatic freeze caused by the U.S. missile shield which Beijing thinks mars its military maneuverability.
The conservatives rose up ― again ― against the accord, arguing that Seoul has given up its sovereignty and surrendered to Chinese pressure.
The critics jeered that President Moon and his administration were imitating "Gwanghaegun," a king of the Joseon Kingdom who walked a diplomatic tightrope between declining the Ming Dynasty and the emerging Qing Dynasty so adroitly that Joseon could avoid invasion by either during his reign (1608-1623).
Moon's opponents also compared the three-no policy to the "Humiliation of Samjeon Island" ― a historical event in which King Injo, unlike his immediate predecessor Gwanghaegun, took sides with the old Ming Dynasty while neglecting the new Qing Dynasty. Hong Taiji, the first emperor of the Qing Dynasty, was enraged and invaded Joseon in 1636. A year later, King Injo surrendered to the invaders and was forced to hit his head on the ground nine times before his Qing counterpart.
A film about that historical humiliation has now become a box office hit, with many commentators comparing today's South Korea to the Middle Age kingdom, and the G2 of America and China to the Ming and Qing dynasties.
In a thinly-veiled show of displeasure with the Seoul-Beijing agreement, H.R. McMaster, national security advisor to U.S. President Donald Trump, also said, he "doesn't think that South Korea would give up its sovereignty in those three areas."
Beijing was, of course, unbecoming as a global power to have inflicted billions of dollars in an economic loss on Seoul as retaliation against the installation of the antimissile battery. After months of under-the-surface negotiations, however, Seoul and Beijing somehow agreed to admit the status quo and cease mutually harmful acts, meaning the Moon administration has scored a strategic point.
Had Seoul been forced to accept Beijing's demands one-sidedly, there may be some truth in conservatives' comparison of the latest accord to the mortifying historical incident.
As most Korean voters remember, however, Moon had been reluctant about the THAAD deployment since his campaign days, but had few other choices but to keep the bilateral agreement made by his predecessor. The incumbent president has maintained South Korea needs its missile defense system rather than becoming a part of the U.S. system called MD. Moon also thinks the three-nation military alliance might unnecessarily isolate China, especially given the anxiety of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to rearm his country to return to a global military power.
By most accounts, the three no policy reflects President Moon's diplomatic philosophy. It is also what his political supporters have wanted in their president. Nobody, including the current U.S. leader, denies the importance of China in defusing the North Korean nuclear threats. Seoul and Beijing also share the view that attempts for dialogue should go hand in hand with the increase in economic sanctions on the North. On the other hand, Tokyo and Washington effectively rule out negotiation now ― and probably in the future, too.
Cheong Wa Dae officials, conscious of critical eyes at home and abroad on what is suspected of the revival of the late Roh's diplomatic initiative, say Moon's "balanced diplomacy" is different from the theory of balancer, saying the current policy is "a pinpoint tactic" to win China's cooperation in solving the North Korean nuclear issue.
A name would not matter. Nor would peace-loving Koreans care whether the two policies are the same or different as long as they lead to the peaceful, negotiated settlement of the nuclear crisis, eliminate war threats from this divided peninsula and stabilize political and military situations in Northeast Asia.
This is a diplomatically crucial week for South Korea and President Moon, meeting with his U.S. and Chinese counterparts.
President Moon should try to be like Gwanghaegun, not King Injo. Hampering him are the politicians to keep their petty, shortsighted political gains ― like the perennially quarreling courtiers in 17th-century Joseon.
Choi Sung-jin (choisj1955@naver.com) is a Korea Times columnist.
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In March 2005, for example, then-President Roh said South Korea would "play the role of a balancer" for the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia.
Officials at the presidential Blue House then explained that Roh's "theory of balancer" reflected his will toward more balanced and pragmatic diplomacy. "Seoul would play an active role in building a peace regime in this region by creating an order for multilateral security and cooperation," they said.
As it turned out later, the liberal president's bold initiative didn't go over well, to say the least, amid the barrage of attacks from conservatives. Roh's political opponents said it was not practicable by breaking up the bilateral alliance with the United States and leaning too much toward China. To no one's surprise, the U.S. government also showed an unfavorable response to the idea.
Even neutral commentators said the theory, albeit attemptable "someday," was a little premature at the time. That someday could be now.
In an interview with Singapore-based Channel News Asia on Friday, President Moon Jae-in, Roh's former chief of staff, emphasized the need for a balanced diplomacy between the U.S. and China.
President Moon's remark drew keen attention, here and abroad, as it came just days after his foreign minister, Kang Kyung-wha, while responding to lawmakers' questions last Monday, talked about Seoul's "three no policy." She cited no more deployment here of the U.S. antimissile system called THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense), no participation in the U.S.-led missile defense network, and no collaboration for the trilateral military alliance with the U.S. and Japan.
A day later, South Korean and Chinese governments announced the two countries would put their bilateral relations back on the right track, ending more than a year of a diplomatic freeze caused by the U.S. missile shield which Beijing thinks mars its military maneuverability.
The conservatives rose up ― again ― against the accord, arguing that Seoul has given up its sovereignty and surrendered to Chinese pressure.
The critics jeered that President Moon and his administration were imitating "Gwanghaegun," a king of the Joseon Kingdom who walked a diplomatic tightrope between declining the Ming Dynasty and the emerging Qing Dynasty so adroitly that Joseon could avoid invasion by either during his reign (1608-1623).
Moon's opponents also compared the three-no policy to the "Humiliation of Samjeon Island" ― a historical event in which King Injo, unlike his immediate predecessor Gwanghaegun, took sides with the old Ming Dynasty while neglecting the new Qing Dynasty. Hong Taiji, the first emperor of the Qing Dynasty, was enraged and invaded Joseon in 1636. A year later, King Injo surrendered to the invaders and was forced to hit his head on the ground nine times before his Qing counterpart.
A film about that historical humiliation has now become a box office hit, with many commentators comparing today's South Korea to the Middle Age kingdom, and the G2 of America and China to the Ming and Qing dynasties.
In a thinly-veiled show of displeasure with the Seoul-Beijing agreement, H.R. McMaster, national security advisor to U.S. President Donald Trump, also said, he "doesn't think that South Korea would give up its sovereignty in those three areas."
Beijing was, of course, unbecoming as a global power to have inflicted billions of dollars in an economic loss on Seoul as retaliation against the installation of the antimissile battery. After months of under-the-surface negotiations, however, Seoul and Beijing somehow agreed to admit the status quo and cease mutually harmful acts, meaning the Moon administration has scored a strategic point.
Had Seoul been forced to accept Beijing's demands one-sidedly, there may be some truth in conservatives' comparison of the latest accord to the mortifying historical incident.
As most Korean voters remember, however, Moon had been reluctant about the THAAD deployment since his campaign days, but had few other choices but to keep the bilateral agreement made by his predecessor. The incumbent president has maintained South Korea needs its missile defense system rather than becoming a part of the U.S. system called MD. Moon also thinks the three-nation military alliance might unnecessarily isolate China, especially given the anxiety of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to rearm his country to return to a global military power.
By most accounts, the three no policy reflects President Moon's diplomatic philosophy. It is also what his political supporters have wanted in their president. Nobody, including the current U.S. leader, denies the importance of China in defusing the North Korean nuclear threats. Seoul and Beijing also share the view that attempts for dialogue should go hand in hand with the increase in economic sanctions on the North. On the other hand, Tokyo and Washington effectively rule out negotiation now ― and probably in the future, too.
Cheong Wa Dae officials, conscious of critical eyes at home and abroad on what is suspected of the revival of the late Roh's diplomatic initiative, say Moon's "balanced diplomacy" is different from the theory of balancer, saying the current policy is "a pinpoint tactic" to win China's cooperation in solving the North Korean nuclear issue.
A name would not matter. Nor would peace-loving Koreans care whether the two policies are the same or different as long as they lead to the peaceful, negotiated settlement of the nuclear crisis, eliminate war threats from this divided peninsula and stabilize political and military situations in Northeast Asia.
This is a diplomatically crucial week for South Korea and President Moon, meeting with his U.S. and Chinese counterparts.
President Moon should try to be like Gwanghaegun, not King Injo. Hampering him are the politicians to keep their petty, shortsighted political gains ― like the perennially quarreling courtiers in 17th-century Joseon.
Choi Sung-jin (choisj1955@naver.com) is a Korea Times columnist.
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