By Sandip Kumar Mishra
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On July 7, North Korea said that South Korea should not become a "mediator" between the U.S. and North Korea. The North's recent behavior is considered to be a slap in the face to President Moon Jae-in's attempts so far to engage North Korea.
It's being forgotten that South Korea's engagement policy from the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics led to four summit meetings, two joint declarations and one comprehensive military agreement between South and North Koreas.
Furthermore, Moon's conciliatory approach toward North Korea also contributed in the North joining denuclearization talks with the U.S. and having three summit meets with the U.S.
Notwithstanding some tangible outcomes of the inter-Korea relations, unfortunately North Korea and the U.S. were unable to have a quid pro quo deal on the denuclearization of the North and relaxing sanctions on the recalcitrant country. It happened because of mistrust between North Korea and the U.S. which led both sides to seek benefits but neither were ready to pay any costs for it.
The North's recent provocative behavior toward the South is, thus, being explained as either failure of South Korea's engagement policy, or North Korea's frustration with the lack of any deal with the U.S.
Actually, both explanations emanate from the two different positions. The first position assumes that inter-Korea relations are bilateral and if Moon's policy did not lead to a change in North Korean behavior, it is a failure of South Korean policy.
The second position recognizes that inter-Korean ties are essentially trilateral in which inter-Korea relations, South Korea-U.S. relations and North Korea-U.S. relations constitute three interconnected legs. If sufficient progress is not made at one of these legs, the probability of success at other legs is quite low.
Actually, the latter position is being preferred to comprehend the inter-Korea relations. The role and relationship of the U.S. with North Korea and South Korea have an important bearing on inter-Korea relations.
The Moon administration from the very beginning has been aware of this fact and so has tried to reach out to North Korea both for a better inter-Korea relationship and also to connect Pyongyang to the U.S. to negotiate the denuclearization issue.
Apart from establishing institutional and procedural connects with Pyongyang bilaterally, Seoul actively intervened whenever there were hiccups in the U.S.-North Korea talks such as a sudden meeting between Moon and Kim Jong-un when the Singapore summit was about to get derailed and arranging the third summit meet between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un at the truce village of Panmunjeom.
But it has proved to be a mirage for South Korea to have good connections with the two countries which are not ready to have a deal with each other. Actually, it has led to both North Korea and the U.S. getting dissatisfied with South Korea.
Now the choice for the South is either to take the lead in reaching out to the North and convince the U.S. to go along or seek autonomy of inter-Korea relations from the U.S. Actually, there have been times during the administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, when Seoul had a relatively autonomous North Korea policy.
This means the South may firmly convey to both the U.S. and the North that it wants to maintain good relations with both of them and try to keep U.S.-North Korea relations separate from inter-Korean relations.
Actually, a similar sentiment was expressed by South Korea's Unification Minister-nominee Lee In-young on July 6, when he said the South would push for inter-Korean cooperation regardless of the U.S. position. Actually, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun also said July 8 during his visit to Seoul that the U.S. "strongly" supports inter-Korean cooperation and also commits to its security alliance with the South.
Thus, it would be important for the South to minimize trilaterality in inter-Korea relations, and have a principled and consistent policy toward both the U.S. and North Korea. It appears necessary for improvement in inter-Korean relations, but of course insufficient because the North would also have to act accordingly.
A rethinking on how much inter-Korean relations are bilateral and/or trilateral would definitely bring clarity in South Korea's North Korea policy.
Furthermore, past experiences also teach that engagement with North Korea do not mean unprincipled compromises but a transparent, trustworthy and long-term approach which must be less affected by North Korea's oscillations.
The author (sandipmishra10@gmail.com) is associate professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.