By Son Hyo-jong
The momentum for dialogue on the Korean Peninsula created during the 2018 Winter Olympic Games has been frozen in just a little over two years. Since the end of the second U.S.―North Korea summit in 2019, North Korea has gradually increased its level of provocations.
On June 4, Kim Yo-jong, the first vice department director of the Workers' Party Central Committee, criticized the South Korean government for its failure to prevent North Korean defectors' groups from sending anti-Pyongyang propaganda leaflets over the border to the North. She also threated to demolish the Inter―Korean liaison office.
On June 16, the North turned the threat into action by blowing up the office in the border town of Gaeseong. The General Staff of the (North) Korean People's Army also threatened military action against the South.
In the meantime, Pyongyang has used both verbal threats and provocative actions. And it seems that the North is trying to send a message to Seoul and Washington by deliberately raising tensions.
A week after the demolition of the liaison office, however, Chairman Kim Jong-un suddenly decided to suspend any military action plan against the South while he was presiding over a preliminary meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party. Thus, it is hard to figure out the purpose of North Korea's harsh rhetoric and suspended action plan.
Based on the North's recent discourse and behavior, its intentions and calculations can be interpreted in several ways. First, North Korea seems to be trying to pressure the United States to pay attention to it.
In recent years, the U.S.―China trade competition has been the critical issue in Northeast Asia. And this year, the COVID-19 pandemic has emerged as a serious threat. For President Donald Trump, who is likely to be re-elected, his interest in North Korea is relatively low compared to the past two years, as he faces the big power rivalry with China and the spread of the coronavirus.
Although it has not been officially revealed, it is believed that North Korea has also suffered from difficulties due to the damage caused by COVID-19 and continued international sanctions.
It seems that North Korea has belatedly come to view the deteriorating situation as a strategic disadvantage. Hence, Kim Jong-un is apparently trying to put the brakes on the current situation and draw the attention of the U.S. to create an atmosphere conducive to making a deal again.
North Korea, therefore, is certainly applying pressure on the United States but in a manner that does not break their relationship. That is why Foreign Minister Ri Son-kwon has vowed to strengthen his country's nuclear deterrence to counter U.S. threats. But the North announced the suspension of its military action plan against the South seemingly so as not to escalate tensions further.
Second, it is speculated that there may be a problem with the power structure in the inner circle. In January, a personnel reshuffle at the 5th plenary session of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party raised the possibility that Kim Yo-jong, the sister of Kim Jong-un may have been transferred to the position of first deputy director of the committee with increased authority.
Also, in April, after Kim Jong-un was not seen in public for several weeks, rumors of poor health and even his death arose. They turned out to be false, but it may have led people to think about a power vacuum in North Korea.
Kim Jong-un's absence and Kim Yo-jong's heightened status raised questions about whether there might be power management issues such as the division of roles between Kim Jong-un and Kim Yo-jong or the drafting of a succession plan.
Although this cannot be confirmed, it is clear that the authority as well as the status of Kim Yo-jong is very solid with the Kim family's so-called Baekdo bloodline, so her expanding power could have significant meaning.
Thus, we need to check closely whether their somewhat conflicting behaviors are aimed at the division of roles to consolidate Kim Jong-un's leadership, or if they signal discord between brother and sister.
Third, the latest episode might have been for internal purposes of overcoming the economic and social problems that have become aggravated under international sanctions and amid the COVID-19 crisis. It might also have been designed to strengthen internal solidarity.
As sanctions continue, North Korea's trade with China decreased significantly last year. The situation may have worsened in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to KDI data, North Korea's total trade with China reached $2.8 billion in 2019, less than half the $5.8 billion in 2016, before the sanctions were tightened.
However, the North's trade with China has steadily increased recently. According to KOTRA data, the volume of trade with China has risen to account for 94.8 percent of the North's total foreign trade.
In the March―April period of 2020, after the outbreak of COVID-19, both exports and imports fell by 90 percent compared to the same period of 2019. This will make life more difficult for North Koreans than ever before, and for the North Korean authorities, the growing discontent of the people is a burden.
In addition, coping with the infectious disease with a weak healthcare system would have been a difficult challenge for the North Korean regime.
In order to overcome these socioeconomic difficulties and maintain internal order, the North Korean authorities have apparently tried to find a scapegoat ― to turn the blame to the outside world by creating enemies. Against this backdrop, the North Korean authorities have taken issue with the defectors' distribution of propaganda leaflets into the North in a bid to calm public sentiment.
Then where will the North's future course of action be headed? Previous analyses show that recent moves do not seem to be aimed at bringing about a catastrophe by increasing the level of provocation. Rather, it is believed that North Korea wants to overcome unfavorable situations and create a favorable atmosphere, instead of crossing the threshold.
As a countermeasure against North Korea, the United States announced the extension of six executive orders to maintain sanctions on the North and deployed three aircraft carriers to the Navy's 7th Fleet, whose operational zones include the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea will be reluctant to carry out provocations that could target the United States, such as an ICBM test or blatant criticism of President Trump, as Pyongyang is trying to manage the situation so that it does not increase friction with the U.S.
Meanwhile, North Korea may not try to break the fundamental relationship with South Korea. We must bear in mind that North Korea did not make any actual provocations because Kim Jong-un announced the suspension of military action.
Nevertheless, as there is still uncertainty and the possibility of low intensity provocations, it is necessary to maintain readiness while keeping a close eye on the North's movements, and managing the current situation from a long-term perspective. It is imperative to find ways to flexibly cope with the situation while maintaining security preparedness.
Son Hyo-jong, Ph.D., is an associate research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.
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On June 4, Kim Yo-jong, the first vice department director of the Workers' Party Central Committee, criticized the South Korean government for its failure to prevent North Korean defectors' groups from sending anti-Pyongyang propaganda leaflets over the border to the North. She also threated to demolish the Inter―Korean liaison office.
On June 16, the North turned the threat into action by blowing up the office in the border town of Gaeseong. The General Staff of the (North) Korean People's Army also threatened military action against the South.
In the meantime, Pyongyang has used both verbal threats and provocative actions. And it seems that the North is trying to send a message to Seoul and Washington by deliberately raising tensions.
A week after the demolition of the liaison office, however, Chairman Kim Jong-un suddenly decided to suspend any military action plan against the South while he was presiding over a preliminary meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party. Thus, it is hard to figure out the purpose of North Korea's harsh rhetoric and suspended action plan.
Based on the North's recent discourse and behavior, its intentions and calculations can be interpreted in several ways. First, North Korea seems to be trying to pressure the United States to pay attention to it.
In recent years, the U.S.―China trade competition has been the critical issue in Northeast Asia. And this year, the COVID-19 pandemic has emerged as a serious threat. For President Donald Trump, who is likely to be re-elected, his interest in North Korea is relatively low compared to the past two years, as he faces the big power rivalry with China and the spread of the coronavirus.
Although it has not been officially revealed, it is believed that North Korea has also suffered from difficulties due to the damage caused by COVID-19 and continued international sanctions.
It seems that North Korea has belatedly come to view the deteriorating situation as a strategic disadvantage. Hence, Kim Jong-un is apparently trying to put the brakes on the current situation and draw the attention of the U.S. to create an atmosphere conducive to making a deal again.
North Korea, therefore, is certainly applying pressure on the United States but in a manner that does not break their relationship. That is why Foreign Minister Ri Son-kwon has vowed to strengthen his country's nuclear deterrence to counter U.S. threats. But the North announced the suspension of its military action plan against the South seemingly so as not to escalate tensions further.
Second, it is speculated that there may be a problem with the power structure in the inner circle. In January, a personnel reshuffle at the 5th plenary session of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party raised the possibility that Kim Yo-jong, the sister of Kim Jong-un may have been transferred to the position of first deputy director of the committee with increased authority.
Also, in April, after Kim Jong-un was not seen in public for several weeks, rumors of poor health and even his death arose. They turned out to be false, but it may have led people to think about a power vacuum in North Korea.
Kim Jong-un's absence and Kim Yo-jong's heightened status raised questions about whether there might be power management issues such as the division of roles between Kim Jong-un and Kim Yo-jong or the drafting of a succession plan.
Although this cannot be confirmed, it is clear that the authority as well as the status of Kim Yo-jong is very solid with the Kim family's so-called Baekdo bloodline, so her expanding power could have significant meaning.
Thus, we need to check closely whether their somewhat conflicting behaviors are aimed at the division of roles to consolidate Kim Jong-un's leadership, or if they signal discord between brother and sister.
Third, the latest episode might have been for internal purposes of overcoming the economic and social problems that have become aggravated under international sanctions and amid the COVID-19 crisis. It might also have been designed to strengthen internal solidarity.
As sanctions continue, North Korea's trade with China decreased significantly last year. The situation may have worsened in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to KDI data, North Korea's total trade with China reached $2.8 billion in 2019, less than half the $5.8 billion in 2016, before the sanctions were tightened.
However, the North's trade with China has steadily increased recently. According to KOTRA data, the volume of trade with China has risen to account for 94.8 percent of the North's total foreign trade.
In the March―April period of 2020, after the outbreak of COVID-19, both exports and imports fell by 90 percent compared to the same period of 2019. This will make life more difficult for North Koreans than ever before, and for the North Korean authorities, the growing discontent of the people is a burden.
In addition, coping with the infectious disease with a weak healthcare system would have been a difficult challenge for the North Korean regime.
In order to overcome these socioeconomic difficulties and maintain internal order, the North Korean authorities have apparently tried to find a scapegoat ― to turn the blame to the outside world by creating enemies. Against this backdrop, the North Korean authorities have taken issue with the defectors' distribution of propaganda leaflets into the North in a bid to calm public sentiment.
Then where will the North's future course of action be headed? Previous analyses show that recent moves do not seem to be aimed at bringing about a catastrophe by increasing the level of provocation. Rather, it is believed that North Korea wants to overcome unfavorable situations and create a favorable atmosphere, instead of crossing the threshold.
As a countermeasure against North Korea, the United States announced the extension of six executive orders to maintain sanctions on the North and deployed three aircraft carriers to the Navy's 7th Fleet, whose operational zones include the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea will be reluctant to carry out provocations that could target the United States, such as an ICBM test or blatant criticism of President Trump, as Pyongyang is trying to manage the situation so that it does not increase friction with the U.S.
Meanwhile, North Korea may not try to break the fundamental relationship with South Korea. We must bear in mind that North Korea did not make any actual provocations because Kim Jong-un announced the suspension of military action.
Nevertheless, as there is still uncertainty and the possibility of low intensity provocations, it is necessary to maintain readiness while keeping a close eye on the North's movements, and managing the current situation from a long-term perspective. It is imperative to find ways to flexibly cope with the situation while maintaining security preparedness.
Son Hyo-jong, Ph.D., is an associate research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.